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By M. Taylor Fravel, J. Stapleton Roy, Michael D. Swaine, Susan A. Thornton and Ezra Vogel
Taiwan Set to Receive $2 Billion in U.S. Arms, Drawing Ire From China
Chris Horton
The New York Times, July 9
“The United States has tentatively approved the sale of $2 billion in military hardware to Taiwan, demonstrating support for its unofficial ally in a move likely to exacerbate deteriorating ties between Washington and Beijing.”
World Cannot Shut China Out, Vice President Says, in Jab at U.S.
Ben Blanchard
Reuters, July 7
“China and the rest of the world must co-exist, Vice President Wang Qishan said on Monday, in an indirect jab at the United States, with which Beijing is trying to resolve a bitter trade war.”
U.S. Says Trade Talk Resuming as China Demands End to Tariffs
Sarah McGregor and Ryan Haar
Bloomberg, July 5
“Kudlow says Lighthizer, Mnuchin, Liu have been in contact. Beijing says existing duties must be removed to reach a deal.”
Company that Donated Fireworks to Trump’s Event also Successfully Lobbied against Tariffs: Reports
Rebecca Klar
The Hill, July 4
“The CEO of a fireworks retailer donating $750,000 of products to President Trump’s Fourth of July celebration reportedly lobbied against expanding Chinese import tariffs in a private White House meeting. The same day the Phantom Fireworks donation was announced, Trump decided to postpone his threatened $300 billion in tariffs on Chinese goods, ABC News reports.”
“Phantom Fireworks CEO Bruce Zoldan told WTOP he met with Trump on the matter in a private May 22 meeting and “tariffs were discussed in general.” However, Zoldan denied that the donation was politically motivated. The Interior Department, overseeing the July 4 celebration, declined to comment on its policy for vetting or accepting donations. Almost all fireworks sold in the U.S. are imported from China, ABC News.”
China Military Starts Work With France and Germany, Tells U.S. to Mind Its Business on “Missile Test”
Tom O’Connor
Newsweek, July 3
“The Chinese armed forces have launched two separate operations alongside France and Germany while at the same time dismissing concerns by fellow NATO Western military alliance member, the U.S., regarding an alleged missile test in the disputed South China Sea. Citing the Central Military Commission’s Logistic Support Department Health Bureau, the Chinese military’s official site reported Wednesday that a team of 91 personnel has departed for Munich to participate alongside Germany’s own medical corps in the 14-day Combined Aid-2019 exercise set to begin that same day. The deployment was described as ‘the first time for China to dispatch a complete unit of medical service forces with real combat equipment to conduct joint exercise in Europe.’”
“Just two days earlier, Chinese service members arrived at another European destination. Staff from Beijing’s embassy in Paris, its consulate in Marseille and Chinese-funded business representatives greeted the Monday arrival of guided-missile destroyer Xi’an in France’s southern port of Toulon. Chinese 32nd escort taskforce commander Zhao Weidong was cited by the same military site saying the visit would include ‘official meetings, joint exercises and other events including basketball matches.”
China Tests Anti-Ship Missile in South China Sea, Pentagon Says
Brad Lendon
CNN, July 3
“China has test-fired at least one anti-ship missile in recent days in the area around the contested Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, the United States military confirmed Tuesday. “The Pentagon was aware of the Chinese missile launch from the man-made structures in the South China Sea near the Spratly Islands,” spokesman Lt. Col. Dave Eastburn said. In a notice to mariners released on Saturday, China said it would be conducting military exercises until Wednesday in a large area of the South China Sea, north of the Spratly Islands. The missile test was part of those exercises, according to NBC News, which first reported the Chinese action. More tests were expected, NBC said, citing unnamed US officials.”
HP, Dell and Microsoft Join Electronics Exodus From China
Cheng Tingfang, Lauly Li, Coco Liu, and Shunsuke Tabeta
Nikkei Asian Review, July 3
“Global consumer electronics makers HP, Dell, Microsoft and Amazon are all looking to shift substantial production capacity out of China, joining a growing exodus that threatens to undermine the country’s position as the world’s powerhouse for tech gadgets. HP and Dell, the world’s No.1 and No.3 personal computer makers who together command around 40% of the global market, are planning to relocate up to 30% of their notebook production out of China, several sources told the Nikkei Asian Review.”
U.S. Government Staff Told to Treat Huawei as Blacklisted
Alexandra Alper, Karen Freifeld, Stephen Nellis, and Sijia Jiang
Reuters, July 2
“A senior U.S. official told the Commerce Department’s enforcement staff this week that China’s Huawei should still be treated as blacklisted, days after U.S. President Donald Trump sowed confusion with a vow to ease ban on sales to the firm.”
U.S. Manufacturing Slips in June
Paul Kiernan
The Wall Street Journal, July 1
“The Institute for Supply Management’s manufacturing index edges near line separating expansion from contraction.”
U.S. and China Agree to Continue Tariff Talks
Jacob Pramuk and John W. Schoen
CNBC, June 29
“U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping emerged from a high-stakes meeting Saturday agreeing to proceed with trade talks after escalating tariffs between the two nations threatened to disrupt the world economy.”
“The summit, on the sidelines of the G-20 meeting in Japan, was a continuation of Trump’s years-long crusade to overhaul the U.S. trade relationship with China. He has long accused Beijing of unfair trade practices and sap American manufacturing jobs, and ran for president in 2016 on cracking down on China.”
Chinese Chip Designers Warn Beijing Risks Missing Tech Target
Coco Liu, Cheng Ting-Fang, and Lauly Li
Nikkei Asian Review, June 24
“Chinese chip designers, whose business has flourished under Beijing’s desire for a homegrown semiconductor industry, are warning it will be impossible to meet national targets for a viable, independent sector without access to U.S. technology.”
China Says FedEx Should Offer a Proper Explanation on Huawei
Huizhong Wu and Ben Blanchard
Reuters, June 24
“China’s foreign ministry said on Monday that FedEx Corp should offer a proper explanation after the firm apologized for refusing to ship a Huawei Technologies phone sent from Britain to the United States. Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang made the comment at a daily news briefing in Beijing.”
UBS: The Globe is Headed for a Recession and Bear Market if This Week’s US-China Trade Talks Fail
Thomas Franck
CNBC, June 24
“One Wall Street brokerage told clients Monday that the globe is “one step away” from a recession as the world’s two largest economies head to the G-20 summit meeting in Japan this week to try to hash out key issues and end a monthslong trade war.”
“While escalation isn’t what UBS expects, a failed meeting between President Donal Trump and China’s Xi Jinping that results in a new wave of tariffs would mean “major” changes to global GDP and market forecasts. The impact of a scuttled trade deal at the U.S.-China meeting in Osaka and agitated relations wouldn’t be felt immediately, however, but grow in severity over several quarters as higher prices stifle demand and growth, the UBS researcher wrote. In the United States, the cumulative reduction in GDP would be about 1% over six quarters, 1.2% in China and 0.74% in Europe.”
U.S. Considers Requiring 5G Equipment for Domestic Use Be Made Outside China
Stu Woo and Dustin Volz
The Wall Street Journal, June 23
“The Trump administration is examining whether to require that next-generation 5G cellular equipment used in the U.S. be designed and manufactured outside China, according to people familiar with the matter.”
From Best Buy to Kenneth Cole, U.S. Companies Tell Trump They Can’t Just Pick New Manufacturers After Tariffs
Daniel Moritz-Rabson
Newsweek, June 21
“American business leaders from an array of industries asked the U.S. government to not impose additional tariffs on $300 billion of goods imported from China, saying that new import duties would harm manufacturer relationships established over decades. Since Monday, the United States Trade Representative has held public hearings about the possible implementation of new tariffs. The hearing will continue on Monday and Tuesday, but remarks from some of the more than 300 business and trade group representatives scheduled to speak have emphasized the centrality of Chinese manufacturing to U.S. business.”
Trump Offers ‘Anything’ to Help Canada in Rift with China
BBC News, June 20
“Canadian PM Justin Trudeau has left Washington DC with assurances from President Donald Trump that he will assist Canada in its rift with China. President Trump said he would do “anything” to help Canada during his upcoming meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Mr. Trudeau said he expected the topic of two Canadians detained in China to be raised during that G20 meeting. The PM was in US capital city to discuss China and trade.”
U.S., China to Relaunch Talks with Little Changed Since Deal Fell Apart
David Lawder, Chris Prentice
Reuters, July 9
“Washington and Beijing appear to have different ideas of what the two leaders agreed in Osaka. One of the sources said Trump raised the issue of agricultural purchases twice during the meeting, but Xi only agreed to consider purchases in the context of a broader final agreement.”
Losing One Island Cost Japan a War. That’s a Warning for the South China Sea
Brad Lendon
CNN, July 5
“While small islands can help a country project power with aircraft and missiles, they also offer a more mundane but vital advantage for any military — something Saipan gave the Americans in World War II: a place to shorten the supply chain and stage ground forces. Saipan, for example, became a vital way to support US operations on Islands closer to the Japanese mainland such as Okinawa, making those campaigns easier to sustain. In the South China Sea, islands facilities could give PLA ships safe harbors where they can rest and replenish without going back to bases on the Chinese mainland. While no one is contending that any conflict — let alone one of the scales of World War II– is an imminent risk in the South China Sea, China’s islands would give it a distinct advantage in the event of war. And, as Japan failed to recover from the losses sustained on Saipan in 1944, some wonder if it’s too late for the US and its allies and partners in Asia to reverse the gains China has made by constructing the islands.”
A China-U.S. Trade Truce Could Enshrine a Global Economic Shift”
Keith Bradsher
The New York Times, June 29
“Even a fragile truce could have lingering implications. The United States would keep in place broad tariffs on Chinese goods for months or perhaps years to come.”
Trump’s Reelection is in Serious Jeopardy Without China Deal”
Liz Peek
The Hill, June 24
“If President Trump wants another four years in the Oval Office, he needs to strike a deal with China. Soon. For Chinese President Xi Jinping, the stakes are just as high. What began as a trickle of firms moving production out of China could become a torrent; the threat to his authority from faltering growth and the recent challenge from Hong Kong dissidents is real… President Trump is similarly at a crossroads. Most Americans support his confrontation with China. But, few have felt any repercussions from the imposition of tariffs that have been the president’s chief strategic weapon.”
“President Trump is right to confront China. But the possible cost of the trade war – choking off growth and ceding his reelection – is too high. It is now essential that he find other ways to pressure the Xi regime.”
Ending America’s Endless War
Bernie Sanders
Foreign Affairs, June 24
“We Must Stop Giving Terrorists Exactly What They Want.”
China’s Communist Party is Making Its Own (Virtual) Reality
Eduardo Bapista
Foreign Policy, June 21
“Propaganda is getting an upgrade with technological tricks.”
Debate: “Should the United States Severely Restrict Huawei’s Business?”
Event hosted by CSIS, June 28, 2019
Maritime Irregular Warfare: Preparing to Meet Hybrid Maritime Threats
Event hosted by Hudson Institute, June 26, 2019
China’s New Media Dilemma: The Profit in Online Dissent
Event hosted by National Endowment for Democracy, June 27, 2019
Kennedy Conversation with Eric Hyer on U.S./China Relations
Event hosted by BYU | David M. Kennedy Center For International Studies, July 25, 2019
Dialogues on American Foreign Policy and World Affairs: A Conversation with U.S. Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse
Event hosted by Hudson Institute, July 24, 2019
The Role of Technology in the US-China Trade War
Event hosted by Brookings, July 18, 2019
Network Futures: 5G, SDN, and the Internet
Event hosted by CSIS, July 10, 2019
(On July 3, experts on U.S.-China relations delivered an open letter concerning President Trump’s policy on China, stating that viewing China as a U.S. enemy is counterproductive. The open letter appeared on Washington Post with 95 joint signatories who work in academic, diplomatic, military and business domains in regard to U.S.-China relations.)
By M. Taylor Fravel, J. Stapleton Roy, Michael D. Swaine, Susan A. Thornton and Ezra Vogel
We are members of the scholarly, foreign policy, military and business communities, overwhelmingly from the United States, including many who have focused on Asia throughout our professional careers. We are deeply concerned about the growing deterioration in U.S. relations with China, which we believe does not serve American or global interests. Although we are very troubled by Beijing’s recent behavior, which requires a strong response, we also believe that many U.S. actions are contributing directly to the downward spiral in relations.
The following seven propositions represent our collective views on China, the problems in the U.S. approach to China and the basic elements of a more effective U.S. policy. Our institutional affiliations are provided for identification purposes only.
1. China’s troubling behavior in recent years — including its turn toward greater domestic repression, increased state control over private firms, failure to live up to several of its trade commitments, greater efforts to control foreign opinion and more aggressive foreign policy — raises serious challenges for the rest of the world. These challenges require a firm and effective U.S. response, but the current approach to China is fundamentally counterproductive.
2. We do not believe Beijing is an economic enemy or an existential national security threat that must be confronted in every sphere; nor is China a monolith, or the views of its leaders set in stone. Although its rapid economic and military growth has led Beijing toward a more assertive international role, many Chinese officials and other elites know that a moderate, pragmatic and genuinely cooperative approach with the West serves China’s interests. Washington’s adversarial stance toward Beijing weakens the influence of those voices in favor of assertive nationalists. With the right balance of competition and cooperation, U.S. actions can strengthen those Chinese leaders who want China to play a constructive role in world affairs.
3. U.S. efforts to treat China as an enemy and decouple it from the global economy will damage the United States’ international role and reputation and undermine the economic interests of all nations. U.S. opposition will not prevent the continued expansion of the Chinese economy, a greater global market share for Chinese companies and an increase in China’s role in world affairs. Moreover, the United States cannot significantly slow China’s rise without damaging itself. If the United States presses its allies to treat China as an economic and political enemy, it will weaken its relations with those allies and could end up isolating itself rather than Beijing.
4. The fear that Beijing will replace the United States as the global leader is exaggerated. Most other countries have no interest in such an outcome, and it is not clear that Beijing itself sees this goal as necessary or feasible. Moreover, a government intent on limiting the information and opportunities available to its own citizens and harshly repressing its ethnic minorities will not garner meaningful international support nor succeed in attracting global talent. The best American response to these practices is to work with our allies and partners to create a more open and prosperous world in which China is offered the opportunity to participate. Efforts to isolate China will simply weaken those Chinese intent on developing a more humane and tolerant society.
5. Although China has set a goal of becoming a world-class military by midcentury, it faces immense hurdles to operating as a globally dominant military power. However, Beijing’s growing military capabilities have already eroded the United States’ long-standing military preeminence in the Western Pacific. The best way to respond to this is not to engage in an open-ended arms race centered on offensive, deep-strike weapons and the virtually impossible goal of reasserting full-spectrum U.S. dominance up to China’s borders. A wiser policy is to work with allies to maintain deterrence, emphasizing defensive-oriented, area denial capabilities, resiliency and the ability to frustrate attacks on U.S. or allied territory, while strengthening crisis-management efforts with Beijing.
6. Beijing is seeking to weaken the role of Western democratic norms within the global order. But it is not seeking to overturn vital economic and other components of that order from which China itself has benefited for decades. Indeed, China’s engagement in the international system is essential to the system’s survival and to effective action on common problems such as climate change. The United States should encourage Chinese participation in new or modified global regimes in which rising powers have a greater voice. A zero-sum approach to China’s role would only encourage Beijing to either disengage from the system or sponsor a divided global order that would be damaging to Western interests.
7. In conclusion, a successful U.S. approach to China must focus on creating enduring coalitions with other countries in support of economic and security objectives. It must be based on a realistic appraisal of Chinese perceptions, interests, goals and behavior; an accurate match of U.S. and allied resources with policy goals and interests; and a rededication of U.S. efforts to strengthen its own capacity to serve as a model for others. Ultimately, the United States’ interests are best served by restoring its ability to compete effectively in a changing world and by working alongside other nations and international organizations rather than by promoting a counterproductive effort to undermine and contain China’s engagement with the world.
We believe that the large number of signers of this open letter clearly indicates that there is no single Washington consensus endorsing an overall adversarial stance toward China, as some believe exists.
M. Taylor Fravel is a professor of political science at MIT. J. Stapleton Roy is a distinguished scholar at the Wilson Center and a former U.S. ambassador to China. Michael D. Swaine is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Susan A. Thornton is a senior fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center and a former acting assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Ezra Vogel is a professor emeritus at Harvard University.
The above individuals circulated the letter, which was signed by the following:
James Acton, Craig Allen, Andrew Bacevich, Jeffery A. Bader, C.Fred Bergsten, Jan Berris, Dennis J. Blasko, Pieter Bottleier, Ian Bremmer, Richard Bush, Jerome A. Cohen, Warren I. Cohen, Bernard Cole, James F. Collins, Gerald L Curtis, Toby Dalton, Robert Daly, Michael C. Desch, Mac Destler, Bruce Dickson, David Dollar, Peter Dutton, Robert Einhorn, Amitai Etzioni, Thomas Fingar, Mary Gallagher, John Gannon, Avery Goldstein, Steven M. Goldstein, David F. Gordon, Philip H. Gordon, Morton H. Halperin, Lee Hamilton, Clifford A. Hart Jr., Paul Heer, Eric Heginbotham, Ambassador Carla A. Hills, Jamie P. Horsley, Yukon Huang, Frank Jannuzi, Robert Jervis, Marvin Kalb, Mickey Kantor, Robert Kapp, Albert Keidel, Robert O. Keohane, William Kirby, Helena Kolenda, Charles Kupchan, David M. Lampton, Nicholas Lardy, Chung Min Lee, Herbert Levin, Cheng Li, Kenneth Liberthal, Yawei Liu, Jessica Mathews, James McGregor, John Mclaughlin, Andrew Mertha, Alice Lyman Miller, Mike Mochizuki, Michael Nacht, Moises Naim, Joseph Nye, Keven O’Brien, Jean Oi, Stepehn A. Orlins, William Overholt, Douglas Paal, Margaret M. Pearson, Peter C. Perdue, Elizabeth J. Perry, Daniel W Piccuta, Thamans Pickering, Paul R. Pillar, Jonathan D. Pollack, Barry Posen, Shelly Rigger, Charles S. Robb, Robert S. Ross, Scott D. Sagan, Gary Samore, Richard J. Samuels, David Shear, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Richard Sokolsky, James Steinberg, Michael Szonyi, Strobe Talbott, Anne F. Thruston, Andrew G. Walder, Graham Webster, David A. Welch, Daniel B. Wright
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