Commentary

Will Past Success inform China’s Future Policies?

By Sourabh Gupta

January 18, 2019

In the News

Federal Prosecutors Pursuing Criminal Case Against Huawei for Alleged Theft of Trade Secrets
Dan Strumpf, Nicole Hong and Aruna Viswanatha
The Wall Street Journal, January 16

“Federal prosecutors are pursuing a criminal investigation of China’s Huawei Technologies Co. for allegedly stealing trade secrets from U.S. business partners, including the technology behind a robotic device that T-Mobile US Inc. used to test smartphones, according to people familiar with the matter.”

“The investigation grew in part out of civil lawsuits against Huawei, including one in which a Seattle jury found Huawei liable for misappropriating robotic technology from T-Mobile’s Bellevue, Wash., lab, the people familiar with the matter said. The probe is at an advanced stage and could lead to an indictment soon, they said.”

“The federal investigation puts added pressure on the Chinese technology giant, the world’s largest maker of telecommunications equipment and the No. 2 maker of smartphones world-wide. It comes amid a broader push by the Trump administration to aggressively pursue claims of intellectual property theft and technology transfer by Chinese companies.”

Trade War Tops Global Risks for Business Leaders
Joanna Sugden
The Wall Street Journal, January 16

“The threat of a full-blown global trade war and rising political tensions between world powers are the dominant global risks, according to a report by the World Economic Forum ahead of its annual gathering in Davos, Switzerland, next week.”

“Cyberattacks and climate change also feature high on the list of potential hazards drawn up from a survey of around 1,000 lawmakers, academics and business leaders for the group that organizes the Davos meeting.”

“The report, which analyzed global risks and trends over a 10-year horizon, said that the rate of global growth appeared to have peaked and the slowdown in China’s economy was of particular concern.”

U.S. official cautions Israel over Chinese investments
Reuters, January 16

“Interest by Huwaei and ZTE in Israel has worried its U.S. ally, as has the green light it granted China’s Shanghai International Port Group in 2013 to build a private port near Haifa, a berth for the U.S. Mediterranean fleet.”

“In December 2016 Huawei acquired Israel’s HexaTier, whose technology secures databases in the cloud, for $42 million. This followed a visit to Israel by the Chinese technology giant’s CEO. That same month, it also acquired IT research firm TogaNetworks for an undisclosed amount. According to Israeli media, ZTE has shown interest in Israel’s tech sector since sending a senior delegation to the country in 2013.”

“The Israeli daily Haaretz reported in 2016 that Israel has an undeclared policy of not using Huwaei or ZTE technologies, out of concern about possible security breaches. Israeli authorities have not commented on that report.”

Trump’s attorney general pick William Barr: China is biggest US rival, despite ‘fixation on Russia’
Kevin Breuninger
CNBC, January 15

“President Donald Trump’s nominee for attorney general, William Barr, on Tuesday singled out China as the United States’ “primary rival,” casting Russia as a much smaller threat by comparison, even while acknowledging the Kremlin’s attempts to sway the 2016 U.S. election.”

“Barr highlighted China as America’s biggest rival as trade talks between the two nations appeared to stall on key issues, Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, said in a conference call Tuesday.”

“U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer said “there hasn’t been any progress made on structural changes that need to be made,” according to Grassley.”

China’s Vice-Premier Liu He accepts invitation to visit Washington this month for trade war talks
Zhou Xin, Catherine Wong, and Sarah Zheng
South China Morning Post, January 15

“Chinese Vice-Premier Liu He has accepted an invitation to lead a Chinese delegation to Washington at the end of this month with the purpose of reaching a deal to end the trade war, according to a source who has been briefed on the arrangement.”

“Liu, who is overseeing China’s trade negotiations with the United States, is expected to meet US Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer and US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin during the two-day visit, the source added.”

“The trip will take place on January 30 and 31, dates previously reported by Bloomberg and The Wall Street Journal. Mnuchin himself subsequently confirmed that he expected Liu to visit Washington this month in an interview.”

What ARIA Will and Won’t Do for the US in Asia
Ankit Panda
The Diplomat, January 14

“On the very last day of 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), which according to the White House “establishes a multifaceted strategy to increase U.S. security, economic interests and values in the Indo-Pacific region.””

“The bill also calls on the U.S. president to “develop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with United States allies and partners to conduct joint maritime training and freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international system benefiting all countries.””

“In the broader picture of growing U.S.-China confrontation, the ARIA should primarily be seen as a bipartisan show of support for a more engaged U.S. in Asia – and a statement of concern about China’s rise.”

US trade deficit with China grows to a record and it’s likely even worse than the data show
Huileng Tan
CNBC, January 13

“China announced Monday that its 2018 trade surplus with the United States was its largest in more than a decade, despite the tariff war initiated by President Donald Trump against Beijing.”

“China’s surplus with the U.S. grew 17 percent from a year ago to hit $323.32 billion in 2018, according to government data. It was the highest on record dating to 2006, according to Reuters. Exports to the United States rose 11.3 percent year on year in 2018, while imports from the U.S. to China rose a meager 0.7 percent during that period.”

“China’s General Administration of Customs said Monday that the biggest worry in trade this year is external uncertainty and protectionism, forecasting the country’s trade growth may slow in 2019.”

US Admiral John Richardson to hold talks with China’s top military leaders
Laura Zhou
South China Morning Post, January 12

“Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson will meet his counterpart, Vice-Admiral Shen Jinlong, and other members of China’s Central Military Commission during a visit to Beijing and the eastern city of Nanjing, which runs through Wednesday, the US navy said in a statement on Friday.”

“The purpose of the trip – Richardson’s second to China as head of operations – is to “continue a results-oriented, risk reduction focused dialogue between the two militaries”, the statement said.”

“This visit comes as Washington and Beijing are engaged in a multipronged dispute on trade, technology and the South China Sea.”

China’s 2019 gross domestic product forecast cut to 6.2 per cent by World Bank under ‘Darkening Skies’
Frank Tang
South China Morning Post, January 9

“A report titled “Darkening Skies” has forecast China’s growth for 2019 will drop by a further 0.1 of a percentage point over concerns of “weaker exports”, with many other institutions joining the World Bank in predicting a deepening slowdown in the world’s second biggest economy.”

“The World Bank’s projection for Chinese growth this year is in line with estimates by both Chinese and foreign forecasters, which fall in a range of 6.0 per cent to 6.5 per cent, down from an estimated 6.6 per cent in 2018.”

“American President Donald Trump has claimed that the weakening of the Chinese economy has given the United States an advantage in the trade talks that extended into an unexpected third day on Wednesday, as it puts pressure on Beijing to make concessions to Washington.”

With Kim’s Visit, China Shows U.S. It Has Leverage on Trade
Keith Bradsher and Choe Sang-Hun
New York Times, January 8

“Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader, arrived by train in Beijing on Tuesday to meet with Mr. Xi during the second day of talks nearby between midlevel trade negotiators from China and the United States. Though the government said the events were unconnected, Mr. Kim’s surprise visit was an unmistakable reminder that China could complicate the Trump administration’s pursuit of other goals — including ridding the North of nuclear weapons — if the two powers fail to strike a deal on trade.”

““Kim is eager to remind the Trump administration that he does have diplomatic and economic options besides what Washington and Seoul can offer,” said Harry J. Kazianis, an expert on North Korea and the director of defense studies at the Washington-based Center for the National Interest, referring to the United States and South Korea.”

U.S. destroyer sails in disputed South China Sea amid trade talks
Reuters, January 7

“A U.S. guided-missile destroyer sailed near disputed islands in the South China Sea in what China called a “provocation” as U.S. officials joined talks in Beijing during a truce in a bitter trade war.”

“The USS McCampbell carried out a “freedom of navigation” operation, sailing within 12 nautical miles of the Paracel Island chain, “to challenge excessive maritime claims”, Pacific Fleet spokeswoman Rachel McMarr said in an emailed statement.”

“Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang said the conduct of the U.S. ship had violated China’s and international law, and China had lodged “stern representations”.”

U.S. Renews China Travel Warning, Citing Risk of Arbitrary Detention
Liam Stack
New York Times, January 3

“The United States renewed a travel advisory for China on Thursday that warned American citizens could face arbitrary detention there, a move that came amid tense relations between the countries dominated by trade disputes and the recent American-requested arrest of a high-profile Chinese executive in Canada.”

“The travel advisory issued by the State Department on Thursday was a routine renewal of a similar warning issued in January 2018. It urged Americans to “exercise increased caution in China” because of so-called exit bans, a legal tool the authorities there use to bar a person from leaving the country.”

China’s Xi threatens Taiwan with force but also seeks peaceful ‘reunification’
Ben Blanchard and Yimou Lee
Reuters, January 1

“Xi spoke at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People on the 40th anniversary of a landmark Taiwan policy statement. He said that China reserves the right to use force to bring Taiwan under its control. However, he also said that China will strive to achieve peaceful “reunification” with the self-ruled island and that it has a bright future under any future Chinese rule.”

“According to Xi, “reunification” must come under a one-China principle that accepts Taiwan as part of China, anathema to supporters of Taiwan independence. He added that the “one country, two systems” model of autonomy, with which China governs Hong Kong, was the best path forward for Taiwan.”

Articles and Analysis

China’s Plan to Break off US Allies
Tao Peng
The Diplomat, January 16

“Meng’s arrest has angered China and Beijing is taking action to retaliate. However, China has adopted two different responses, approaching the issue gently with the United States – which requested Meng’s arrest – while launching strict action against Canada. In doing so, Beijing hopes to deter Canada from following the United States against China, in order to prevent Washington from forming a global and regional offensive against Beijing.”

“The Chinese official media Global Times published a particularly stern editorial entitled “Let the country that is invading China’s interests pay the price” on December 16, 2018. The article said that “for countries which do not care about China’s interests and have extraordinary behavior, China should resolutely fight back, let it pay the price, and even suffer huge losses.””

“China is deeply confident in attacking U.S. friendly forces while adopting a “soft” strategy toward the United States itself. First, China knows that almost all American allies maintain active economic and trade ties with China. China is also the largest trading partner for many of them. For example, Australia and New Zealand both count China as their largest trading partners, and Canada’s second largest trading partner is China. So China has ample measures to “deal with” these U.S. allies.”

Will China’s Economy Hit a Great Wall?
Paul Krugman
New York Times, January 15

“China’s economy appears to be stumbling again, however it is unclear whether a crisis will occur or the government will continue to prop up its economy. The core challenge to China’s economy is its unbalanced nature characterized by high levels of investment without enough domestic consumption to justify it.”

“High investment can sustain an economy for a long time due to the accelerator effect, however due to China’s technology matching or surpassing that of other countries it will be difficult to achieve rapid development through borrowing. Furthermore, the one child policy has led to slow growth in the working age population which is a detriment to future economic growth. Instead of focusing on increasing investment, China should shift its investment spending to consumption spending which is more sustainable.”

“China does not have a large trade surplus anymore, with its imports accounting for nearly three percent of world GDP. A stumble of the Chinese economy would greatly affect the world economy, especially large commodity exporters (such as the United States).”

Is China Really Cheating?
Stephen Roach
Bloomberg, January 15

“China’s theft of intellectual property is widely accepted as fact by people in both political parties – but where was this notion conceived? The IP Commission Report unveiled in 2017 that IPR theft cost the US between $225 and $600 billion with 90% of this amount due to stolen trade secrets. However, this report is flawed in its estimates as it relies upon “proxy models” which are pure estimates based on data such as US Customs and Border Protection seizures, corruption, and fraud.”

“This approach was also used in the drafting of the US Trade Representative’s Section 301 report which was used to justify President Trump’s trade war. The central argument of this report is that American companies are forced to transfer technology when they enter into joint ventures with mainland companies. In joint ventures, the agreement is voluntary and the report itself mentions that it lacks concrete evidence that this technology transfer is forced.”

“Also, Chinese economic policies (such as Made in China 2025) are viewed as ‘unfair’ yet similar criticism is given to similar policies enacted by American allies such as Japan and Germany. China should be held accountable for its unfair trade practices, however the US should not wage a trade war over ‘alternative facts.’”

China Is Losing The Trade War In Nearly Every Way
Kenneth Rapoza
Forbes, January 14

“China is still the world’s No. 2 economy and is still the monster of emerging markets, but regardless of those bonafides, Xi Jinping’s country is losing the trade war in nearly every way imaginable. Thanks in part to Huawei, China is getting beat on the public relations front in the trade war. Additionally, China has failed to woo the EU, whom China thought were its allies early in the trade war.”

““The Chinese trade numbers released today got all the alarm bells ringing,” says Naeem Aslam, chief market strategist for Think Markets in London and a Forbes contributor. “If you need any evidence how the trade spat is impacting a country’s economic health then look no further than China trade. The lower export number means lower jobs, which means another direct impact on the (Chinese) economy. Donald Trump can be pleased. His policies have brought China to its knees.” However, China’s President Xi Jinping may play the long game by waiting out Trump’s presidency.”

“Perhaps China’s biggest “win” on the trade front is Vietnam’s membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership. Vietnam has become an outpost of Chinese businesses, especially manufacturing and exporters looking for cheaper labor and less regulations.”

“Should the U.S. economy buckle further, and the stock market is taken down with it, Trump might be more inclined to end the trade war despite his team’s long-term goals to lessen China’s role in the U.S. corporate supply chain. Should this occur, Xi will have more time to adjust and ultimately keep things as they were pre-Trump.”

China’s economy is fine, Trump and Xi won’t fight a trade war and the Fed is a friend
Dr. Michael Ivanovitch
CNBC, January 14

“China’s economy is fine, U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping won’t fight a trade war and the Federal Reserve is a friend. The triad of China’s economy, trade war and the Fed’s policy is a false alarm. China’s economy has plenty of active demand management instruments to prevent a major growth slowdown.”

“For two years now, Trump got nowhere with China on trade. In fact, Trump put trade negotiations on a wrong path. The main problems are America’s dangerous security challenges around the world involving military confrontations with China and Russia. American forays into what China considers its territorial waters are sovereignty challenges Beijing is unlikely to tolerate. At the moment, the chances of a nuclear Armageddon hinge on the U.S., China and Russia military hotlines to prevent “accidents and miscalculations.””

“Barring an unlikely inflation flare-up, or price tensions in energy markets, the Fed can leave the economy in an adjustment process under conditions of full employment and easy credit terms.”

“The White House should not be pushed by its domestic adversaries to raise those tensions. A constructive relationship with China and Russia is in the interest of America and the rest of the world.”

Is The China-US South China Sea Struggle Becoming Unmanageable? – Analysis
Mark J. Valencia
Eurasia Review, January 14

“The China-US military face off in the South China Sea is dangerous. With escalating incidents and burgeoning bellicose rhetoric on both sides, it may be on the verge of getting out of control.”

“The US-China disputes in the South China Sea are driven by the much deeper contest to dominate the future Asian regional order. At base the dialectic is simple and stark. America wants to remain the leading strategic power in Asia and China wants to replace it. With their respective influential domestic nationalists prodding them towards confrontation, neither leadership is likely to back down.”

“The strategic context is that both see each other as a potential threat and an enemy. Contributing to the increasing tension, the U.S. has stepped up the frequency of its provocative Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) challenging China’s claims.”

China’s Grand Strategy
Daniel Araya
Forbes,January 14

“Through its infrastructure and expansion of its supply chain, China’s grand strategy is centered around developing new markets for advanced Chinese technology. China is reimagining the current world order as a series of trade routes and supply chains which is best illustrated through its Belt and Road Initiative.”

“The Belt and Road Initiative serves as a platform for China to dominate advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, clean energy technology, and others. Aside from the vast investments in infrastructure, China is also investing billions of dollars into science and technology focusing on quantum computing, robotics, and materials sciences. Huawei and ZTE, Chinese technology firms, are becoming global market leaders employing hundreds of thousands and leading the way in industry research and development.”

“Policymakers around the world are concerned that China’s pivot to advanced technologies threatens to dismantle existing global supply chains and that their technology companies could act as an extension of their government. Despite strong US opposition led by President Trump, China continues to expand its BRI initiative throughout the Eurasian supercontinent. In addition, China’s ‘neo-colonialism’ in Africa and Latin America leads to market expansion and increased global influence.”

China is a Dangerous Rival, and America Should Treat It Like One
Derek Scissors and Daniel Blumenthal
New York Times,January 14

“The Trump administration is understanding of the threat China poses through their military buildup, attempts to undermine American influence abroad, and its economic actions. Previously the US would respond through rounds of talks and deals which ultimately had no effect, however now the United States should seek to begin cutting its economic ties with China.”

“Although not an easy task, if the US cut exports to China by half it would only account for <0.5% of GDP and curb the continued infringement of intellectual property rights. Reducing Chinese imports would be more difficult, however there are other countries that do not use predatory trade practices which we could shift our manufacturing to.”

“Intellectual property theft not only hurts American businesses but also helps the Chinese military-industrial complex. Tariffs wrongly hurt American workers and consumers and are not the appropriate reaction to China’s unfair trade practices. Beneficiaries of stolen American intellectual property should be sanctioned and firms receiving/facilitating the theft of intellectual property should not be allowed to do business with American firms. America needs to appropriately react to China’s economic aggression instead of treating it like other friendly trading partners.”

Is North Korea a player in the U.S.-China trade war?
Adam Taylor
The Washington Post,January 10

“Kim Jong Un’s visit to Beijing this week was brief. After a 20-hour journey to the Chinese capital aboard his armored green train, the young North Korean leader spent barely a day at his destination. But it was still an important visit — and the target audience appears to be President Trump, who’s pursuing ambitious foreign-policy goals with both North Korea and China.”

“Xi could potentially use China’s leverage over North Korea as a valuable concession in trade talks with the United States, trading flexibility from Washington for more support in pressuring Pyongyang. As for North Korea, Kim could play China against the United States, turning to one for relief whenever the pressure from the other got to be too much. Trump continues to talk about his summit with Kim as a key foreign-policy victory, and the promise of further wins will be a potent bargaining chip for Pyongyang.”

“Despite their proximity and potentially shared interests, though, Xi and Kim can still seem like distant neighbors. But for now, the two leaders may hope that their democratically elected peer, facing domestic political scandals, economic uncertainty and the start of the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign, may be eager to reach a deal that pleases all parties.”

China’s slowdown is the biggest threat to the world economy
Matt O’Brien
The Washington Post,January 9

“Despite not receiving much media coverage, China’s benchmark stock index dropped twenty-five percent making it the world’s worst-performing in 2018. While the US-China trade war did play a role in this drop, it was not the primary cause.”

“During the 2008 Great Recession, the Chinese government unleashed stimulus amounting to over nineteen percent of its GDP. Besides being over three times the amount of President Barack Obama’s stimulus package (estimated to be five or six percent of US GDP), this stimulus was also unique in the way it was distributed. The central government pushed local governments and state-owned enterprises to borrow money instead of taking on debt itself. The result is a wide net of debt which is difficult for the government to manage due to the use of ‘shadow banks’ by the local governments and SOEs.”

“China has relied on this strategy in the past and it has allowed the country to avoid a recession for nearly 25 years. However, the difference is that new debt today is primarily being used to pay back old debt or being spent on questionable development projects. Beijing is now reverting back to tested stimulus strategies such as tax cuts and infrastructure spending. If China’s industrial profits continue to fall, it could put the rest of the world’s economies at risk of decline also.”

Why the World Needs America and China to Get Along
Robert E. Rubin
New York Times,January 2

“American business, military, and political leaders are adopting a confrontational stance towards China due to legitimate concerns such as military aggression and unfair trade practices. However, now is the time that both the US and China should be increasing their cooperation to tackle pertinent global issues such as climate change and nuclear weapons.”

“Neither country can solve these issues alone, which is why they should come together to lead the world in developing a solution. As the two largest economies, they could cooperate to invest in clean energy and enforce strict environmental regulations while encouraging their trading partners to do the same. Both the United States and China also have a vested interest in ensuring security on the Korean peninsula which means they could also work together to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”

“Most of America’s frustration with China is concerned with aspects of China’s economic model such as the subsidization of exports and requiring foreign companies to share intellectual property. These aspects are unlikely to change as they are at the center of their economic model and Washington needs to accept this just as Beijing needs to understand the consequences it leads to in the trade arena. The US and China need to cooperate just as they have in the past for the future of humanity, not just immediate economic gain.”

Serbia: China’s Open Door to the Balkans
Philippe Le Corre and Vuk Vuksanovic
The Diplomat,January 2

“The Serbian government, which has been knocking on the EU’s door for some years without much success, is now turning to China as an economic partner. “It would not be immodest or wrong to call Serbia China’s main partner in Europe,” stated Minister for Construction Zorana Mihajlovic. Trade between China and Serbia tripled between 2005 and 2016, to $1.6 billion, but it is a very unbalanced relationship: China exports $1 billion in goods, whereas Serbia exports $1 million of goods to China. Investments are rising because the Belgrade government is able to move quickly as a non-EU member.”

“In addition to trade, the political relationship between China and Serbia is growing as well. In 2019, Xi is expected to pay his second visit to Serbia as China’s top leader. It will be a statement of China’s strategic interest for southeast Europe, where it has been building a strong presence. Serbia, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Albania (all former socialist countries) are all members of the 16+1 forum, China’s main platform in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).”

“With an important presence in Greece, China now aims to open a transport route through Central and Southeastern Europe, and south all the way to the Mediterranean Sea. To the north, in Central, Eastern, and Southeast Europe. The Balkans have become a top priority of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, on which 16+1 meetings now center, even though most projects over the past few years have been the result of strong bilateral links — for example, between China and Serbia.”

“There is obviously an EU concern — including in Berlin — that China will use the Balkans as a new entry point into the European market and try to promote its own political model in countries with weaker governance as opposed to the EU model of liberal democracy. But as the EU is facing increased divisions over a large number of issues, it looks unrealistic to envisage the Balkans joining the Union anytime soon – leaving China and others to occupy a somewhat empty space.”

Past Events

The Launch of the Stephenson Ocean Security Project
Event hosted by Center for Strategic and International Studies,January 9, 2019


The Stephenson Ocean Security Project (SOS) is focused on the links between ocean health and global security. The Project will highlight how marine resource disputes drive instability in key regions of the globe and the ways that climate change is exacerbating this challenge through degraded ecosystems and the opening of new areas to potential exploitation.

Upcoming Events

U.S.-China Relations after the U.S. Midterm Election and Maritime Security
Event hosted by the Institute for China-America Studies, January 19, 2019

Happiness in China: Family, Fate, and the Good Death
Event hosted by the Initiative for US-China Dialogue and the Walsh School of Foreign Service Asian Studies Program, January 23, 2019

Environmental Policy and Enforcement Trends in China and the Impact of Business
Event hosted by the US-China Business Council, January 24, 2019

A conversation with the Chief of Naval Operations
Event hosted by Brookings, January 28, 2019

Geopolitical Implications of a New Era on the Korean Peninsula
Event hosted by the Wilson Center, January 30, 2019

China’s Rise and the International Order
Event hosted by the National Bureau of Asian Research, February 7, 2019

Power Struggle in Central Asia: China, Russia, and the United States (Teleconference)
Event hosted by the Pacific Council, February 7, 2019

Edgerton Series: A Conversation with Ambassador John Negroponte
Event hosted by the Pacific Council,February 13, 2019

Commentary

Will Past Success inform China’s Future Policies?

By Sourabh Gupta

Forty years ago, the Communist Party of China held its third plenum of the 11th Central Committee. The plenum was a defining event of the second half of the 20th century, inspiring reforms that spurred decades of economic growth in China. On the brink of another period of economic transition, the pragmatic approach to development that has been the hallmark of Chinese policymaking over the past four decades remains as valuable as ever.

The 1978 plenum launched the country on an unprecedented journey of ‘reform and opening-up’ and ‘socialist modernisation’. The prevailing ‘two whatevers’ orthodoxy — whatever Mao Zedong decided would remain valid, whatever directives Mao gave should be followed — was skilfully circumvented by Deng Xiaoping. Deng argued that while one should always ‘seek truth from facts’, as per Mao Zedong Thought, ‘practice is the sole criterion for testing truth’. Pragmatism, not ideological blinkers, became the order of the day and reality, not received dogma, the ideological basis to test policy correctness.

Having turned Mao’s ‘truth from facts’ dictum on its head, Deng reformulated the Party’s ‘general task’ away from ‘waging class struggle’ and set about unleashing the Four Modernisations — that of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defence.

The success of China’s third plenum-inspired reforms has been ascribed to a variety of factors. Under Deng’s directive, China institutionalised power competition and orderly succession within a broader framework of oligarchic collective leadership. The process allowed the Party to move beyond the acute personality and ideology-based clashes that had convulsed the body politic during the later Mao years.

Reforms in agriculture aligned individual incentives with the production structure and unleashed a burst of creativity in the countryside that later spilt into towns and cities. The third plenum communique ruled that ‘small plots of land for private use by commune members, their domestic side-occupations … are necessary adjuncts of the socialist economy, and must not be interfered with’. The ‘big bang’ approach to reform was eschewed and pro-reform constituencies were fostered that could overcome inefficiencies associated with imperfect markets and price distortions.

The opening of China’s eastern seaboard to foreign trade and investment enabled China to profit from its comparative advantage in labour-intensive industries. As the supply chains of foreign-invested and export-oriented enterprises took root on Chinese soil, an ever-increasing share of parts and components began to be sourced domestically. China now retains a hold over the development of these supply chains in medium-technology intensive industries within global manufacturing. An enabling external environment featuring a symbiotic relationship with the United States should not be discounted either.

But above all, two factors were key. First, because the reform process was part of a political calculus to strengthen the Party’s legitimacy, the consensus for reform was broad, deep and durable. Second, the reforms that emphasised political and fiscal decentralisation struck the right balance between top-down control and local initiative and were embedded in historical patterns of growth and development. Imperial China was also a regionally segmented economy held together by the centre’s iron control over personnel transfers and promotions. This prevented patron-client politics from capturing the system and motivated ambitious local officials to innovate both for themselves and for the country.

Looking ahead, the nation and the Party stand on the cusp of a transition just as consequential and challenging as that of four decades ago.

Economically, the East Asian growth model has not been conducive to countries aspiring to shift from manufacturing and investment-led growth to services and consumption-led growth. Each high-growth, manufacturing-intensive economy that has attempted it, notably Japan and South Korea, suffered a sharp slowdown.

Politically, middle income status and the growing sophistication of a propertied middle class have not been conducive to domestic stability in authoritarian, late-developing societies. No East Asian society (barring the small city-states) that has traversed the perilous thoroughfare from US$10,000 to US$20,000 per capita income has come away with its political system unscathed. South Korea and Taiwan witnessed dramatic pro-democracy movements.

Externally, meanwhile, the US–China relationship stands at a profound inflection point.

That said, there is nothing foreordained about China’s — and the Party’s — future. China is liberalising its inward investment and services regimes at a far earlier level of development than Japan or South Korea ever attempted. The collective decision-making structure of the upper echelons of the Party also differs from the charismatic, one-person military dictatorships that ruled in Seoul and Taipei during their transitions.

The Trump administration’s unprecedented geo-economic actions against Beijing could well produce a reform of China’s foreign investment and joint venture regime that is as thoroughgoing as the late-1990s reform of its trading regime. This would bind the two countries in a symbiotic trade and investment relationship for the next three decades.

Whatever China’s fortunes might turn out to be, one thing is certain: so long as it continues to make ‘practice the sole criterion for testing truth’, its astonishing economic re-opening will propel the nation forward in the 21st century. As President Xi Jinping seemed to suggest in his speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of reform and opening-up, reality as the test of policy correctness will likely continue to govern the day.

 

(Sourabh Gupta is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for China–America Studies in Washington DC. This article was first published on East Asia Forum.)