Maritime Affairs Program (MAP) Handbill Spotlight

With the end of open hostilities and the transition into the Cold War period, the battle capabilities of multi-carrier formations became less important to the U.S. in comparison to global deterrence and the need to protect Transatlantic supply routes from Soviet submarines lest open conflict break out between the superpowers. In this context, the contemporary CSG was born. These formations typically consist of one nuclear-powered ‘supercarrier’ (over 1,000 feet long with 70-80 aircraft on deck), two guided-missile cruisers, two anti-aircraft destroyers, one frigate, two submarines, and a supply ship. The Navy currently maintains eleven CSGs: two are tasked with training and certifying the Atlantic and Pacific fleets (CSG-4 and CSG-15, respectively), five are based in Virginia, three are based in California, and one—Carrier Strike Group 11—is forward-deployed in Japan.

Recent Events

With such substantial operational diversity and depth, CSGs have been involved in several practical engagements since the end of the Cold War. One such application is their use as mobile bases for air strikes on land targets as in: the 1995 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the 2017 missile strikes in Syria. However, due to their unmatched power, CSGs have also been deployed more symbolically to signal American commitment to a given cause, or resolve to deter a rival. Take, for example, the involvement of CSGs in the humanitarian response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2006–2016 NATO anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, and various annual joint exercises (such as RIMPAC) in the Western Pacific and South China Sea.

Recently, CSG-10, with the USS George H.W. Bush as its flagship, has been operating in the eastern Mediterranean. A destroyer attached to the formation, the USS Nitze, made news on February 3 when it made a port call in the Bosphorus Strait; the closest that a U.S. vessel has come to entering the Black Sea since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year. Additionally, the formation sailed towards Antakya and was placed on standby to assist with humanitarian efforts following the devastating earthquake that hit the Turkish-Syrian border region earlier this month. The Sixth Fleet described the activities as signals of U.S. commitment to Türkiye, the main NATO ally in the region.

And halfway across the world in Asia, CSG-11, headed by the USS Nimitz, made headlines for its operations in the South China Sea. In a joint exercise with an amphibious ready group (ARG) of the Marine Corps, the Nimitz CSG conducted “integrated expeditionary strike force operations” near the Spratly Islands on February 11. China, which claims sovereign rights and jurisdiction in large swathes of the South China Sea, released footage on February 16 from the deck of an aircraft carrier of its own, the Shandong, issuing warnings in Chinese and English. It is yet unclear whether these announcements were in response to the ongoing U.S. exercises or simply part of the Chinese Navy’s own drills preparing for a potential future encounter with the U.S. Nevertheless, this ‘like-for-like’ response to a CSG is certainly a novel signal of China’s disquiet with U.S. operations in the region. Coming amid a period of heightened tensions, this may have implications on how Washington utilizes the formation going forward.

Keep In Mind

Since 2020, U.S. maritime strategy has revolved around countering threats posed by “determined rivals” Russia and China with a particular emphasis on the latter as “the most pressing, long-term strategic threat.” In this strategy, and subsequent documents released by the Navy, the Pentagon emphasizes the continued relevance of carrier strike groups in its “sea control and power projection” aims. Joined by this, however, is a sensitivity to China’s growing ability to counter American naval operations in its near-abroad through asymmetric military modernization. 

Military commentators are divided over the extent to which Chinese defensive capabilities could neutralize the offensive advantage of a U.S. carrier strike group in open conflict. These arguments revolve around whether Chinese hypersonic anti-ship missiles, fifth generation fighters and stealth bombers, cyber weapons, and forward submarine bases give it an asymmetric advantage against American carriers which denies their ability to operate in the South and East China seas. (This strategy is called “Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines” (ASCEL) by the PLA, and “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD) by the U.S.) Aware of this potential vulnerability, U.S. officials are prioritizing research and development and are experimenting with new tactics aimed at denying China’s defensive advantage. For example, last August, the Navy deployed an amphibious assault ship—a smaller class of carrier that usually holds helicopters due to the limited room for takeoff—to the South China Sea with a deck full of F-35B stealth fighters, widely regarded as far more useful and resilient against Chinese defenses than helicopters. The USS Makin Island amphibious assault ship also hosted several F-35s in its joint exercises with the Nimitz CSG earlier this month. This suggests that Washington may intend to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities in part through further enhancing U.S. carrier dominance; introducing smaller carriers into CSGs that allow them to ‘flood the zone’ with short-takeoff fifth-generation aircraft like the F-35. 

Nevertheless, the concerns of wargamers over how a potential conflict with Beijing could play out miss the fact that U.S.-China military competition hitherto (and hopefully forever) has been limited to the ‘gray zone’—conflict short of open war. Carrier strike groups continue to operate with great frequency on China’s doorstep which has a deterrent value in times of peace and crisis response that should not be understated. The near-continuous U.S. presence in the South China Sea over the past year shows that the Pentagon is not practically averse to operating in range of China’s defenses and can sustain this pressure through nuclear-powered CSGs unfettered by refueling range. This conspicuous American naval power must factor into Chinese calculations regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea. 

It remains to be seen whether the pace of Chinese military development could eventually give the U.S. pause in how it uses carrier strike groups. Currently, China’s ability to directly counter CSG-type operations is limited by the reliance of its surface vessels on diesel fuel (though China’s indigenous carrier development efforts are likely focusing on nuclear propulsion). Nevertheless, the counter-exercises of the Chinese carrier Shandong and its escorts this month show that Beijing likely intends to step up its responses to U.S. operations in its near-abroad if bilateral relations continue to sour. In the words of the Chinese Navy, the show of force after a perceived incursion “gives people an overwhelming sense of security.” These drills and resolute language show that the deterrent effect of CSGs on China is steadily deteriorating, though their timing during the ‘balloon saga’ could point to factors beyond regional balance of power.

Does this mean that American CSGs can no longer operate with impunity in China’s backyard? One needn’t be so hasty, as there is still no demonstrable threat to U.S. forces in the gray zone beyond increased Chinese resolve. Additionally, pulling back the Nimitz CSG at this stage would only further weaken its deterrent effect. China’s heightened response, however, does entail a change in Washington’s optics calculations. The U.S. has not positioned an aircraft carrier in the Taiwan Strait since the crisis of 1995. This is not because Washington now believes that a carrier in these waters would be immediately destroyed by Chinese defenses: it believes that the diplomatic fallout and indirect danger of such a move would outweigh its deterrent effect on a cross-strait invasion. Without any diplomatic and military-to-military efforts to restore U.S.-China relations in general, American carrier strike group operations in the South China Sea could also drift into this area of undue risk and limited effect—forcing the Pentagon to reconsider their efficacy.