Caught in the Net: The D1 MPA and Krill Fisheries

The proposal for the D1 MPA, covering parts of the Antarctic Peninsula, was advanced by the European Union and later supported by the United States and other like-minded members. The initiative aimed to balance ecological conservation with sustainable use of marine living resources. By setting aside critical feeding and breeding grounds for penguins, seals, and whales, while still allowing regulated fishing in certain zones, the D1 MPA was designed to embody CCAMLR’s ecosystem-based management principle and to contribute to the global 30×30 conservation goal.

Krill fisheries are central to this debate. Antarctic krill (Euphausia superba) form the foundation of the Southern Ocean food web and are simultaneously the focus of growing commercial demand, particularly from China, Russia, and other major fishing nations. Both states have questioned the scientific sufficiency of evidence presented for new MPAs, warning against what they view as overly precautionary restrictions on fishing rights.

In detailed submissions, China (SC-CAMLR-43/05) suggested alternative revisions to krill management, including reallocation of catch limits and seasonal closures, while Russia (CCAMLR-43/24) argued that changes to CM 51-07 were inconsistent with its legal framework and stressed that existing measures already embodied precaution.

The requirement for unanimity prevented adoption of both the D1 MPA and the renewal of CM 51-07, creating what observers described as a “governance vacuum” and prompting questions about CCAMLR’s ability to manage krill fisheries in an increasingly competitive geopolitical context. The D1 MPA debate illustrates this structural vulnerability: although a strong majority—including the EU, U.S., Australia, and New Zealand—supported the proposal, China and Russia withheld agreement. In such cases, the consensus principle, originally designed to safeguard equality among parties, allows a small minority to block measures when strategic or economic interests diverge.

The lapse of CM 51-07, which had regulated the spatial distribution of krill catches in Area 48 to prevent localized depletion, further underscored the limitations of the consensus model by removing key safeguards on fishing practices. These outcomes highlight both the inclusivity and the constraints of consensus decision-making, while raising broader concerns about CCAMLR’s credibility as a conservation body and the resilience of the ATS in a more competitive geopolitical environment. As CCAMLR struggled with stalemates over binding conservation measures, the ATCM was simultaneously addressing a different set of governance challenges, particularly those associated with the rapid growth of tourism.

Soft Consensus in Practice: Tourism Rules vs. Penguin Protection

Tourism has become one of the fastest-growing human activities in Antarctica, raising concerns about cumulative environmental impacts and governance gaps. Because the issue was widely recognized and carried broad consensus, progress at ATCM-46 was relatively swift. The resulting framework, however, remains largely “soft law” in nature—relying on voluntary implementation by states and self-regulation by tour operators rather than binding obligations.

In contrast, the same meeting failed to agree on listing the Emperor Penguin as a specially protected species under Annex II of the Madrid Protocol. Experts presented compelling scientific evidence of the species’ vulnerability to climate change and declining breeding habitats, yet consensus could not be reached, exposing a persistent gap between science and political decision-making.

The juxtaposition of these two outcomes illustrates the dual nature of consensus within the ATS. Tourism regulation advanced as a form of soft consensus, producing a general framework but without binding enforcement, while the attempt to protect the Emperor Penguin showed how consensus falters when hard legal obligations are required. This contrast highlights how the ATS can deliver broadly acceptable, non-binding measures but struggles to adopt initiatives that demand robust, enforceable commitments.

Institutional Dynamics in Practice: Inclusivity vs. Effectiveness

The consensus principle has long been celebrated as a defining feature of the ATS. It guarantees equality among parties by ensuring that no decision can be taken without the agreement of all consultative members. Yet this inclusivity comes at a price. As the case studies on MPAs, krill management, and species protection demonstrate, the consensus rule often translates into a veto power exercised by a minority of states, creating persistent deadlock and limiting the system’s ability to respond to emerging challenges.

The trajectory of decision-making further reveals an imbalance. Non-binding policy declarations and voluntary frameworks—such as agreements on climate declarations or tourism management—tend to pass with relative ease. By contrast, initiatives requiring stricter, legally binding obligations—such as the establishment of new MPAs or the protection of the Emperor Penguin—regularly encounter resistance. This pattern demonstrates the ATS’s tendency to produce “soft consensus” while struggling to achieve “hard execution,” a dynamic that raises questions about the system’s effectiveness as a conservation regime.

These dynamics are increasingly shaped by broader geopolitical rivalries. Whereas the ATS was historically envisioned as a sanctuary for scientific collaboration, it now also functions as an arena for strategic competition. China and Russia have opposed certain conservation measures they regard as constraining fishing opportunities or strategic flexibility, though their motivations are not always identical. By contrast, the United States and the European Union have generally supported expansive protection initiatives as part of their environmental leadership. The result is a polarization that mirrors global power politics, leaving the ATS more exposed to external rivalries than in the past.

Conclusion

The consensus mechanism remains the cornerstone of the ATS, safeguarding equality among states and ensuring that all parties have a voice in decision-making. Yet as the preceding analysis shows, its application has revealed growing strains when environmental imperatives collide with divergent resource interests and geopolitical competition. The central challenge is to preserve the legitimacy of consensus while ensuring that the system can act effectively when urgent conservation measures are required.

Meeting this challenge will require innovation. Possible steps include strengthening the role of scientific advisory processes to provide more authoritative evidence, enhancing transparency in negotiations to build trust, and experimenting with incremental or hybrid mechanisms that retain inclusivity but reduce the scope for persistent vetoes. Such measures could help reconcile inclusivity with effectiveness, enabling the ATS to adapt to rising environmental and political pressures.

The upcoming CCAMLR-44 in October 2025, expected to revisit proposals on the D1 MPA and krill fishery management, will provide an early test of whether Parties can move beyond recent stalemates. Looking further ahead, the 2048 review of the Madrid Protocol’s mineral provisions looms as a critical inflection point, when debates over resource exploitation may intensify. How the ATS navigates these challenges will determine whether it can continue to uphold its mandate as the foundation of Antarctic governance in the decades to come.

This issue’s Spotlight was written by Nong Hong, Executive Director at ICAS.