July 12, 2026 will mark the 10th “anniversary” of the South China Sea Arbitration Award. Over the past decade, the Award has been widely recognized by Western international law academia as a “significant development” of the law of the sea and its dispute settlement mechanism. A recent commentary written by two Vietnamese scholars, published on June 29, 2026 on the Diplomat also echoed this view. From the Chinese perspective, however, the Award has been heavily criticized as a “political farce” and “not acceptable”. Notwithstanding the sheer differences between Chinese and Western political stances, there are several misconceptions about the Award that need to be clarified. After all, an objective clarification of some of the major misconceptions may serve well for an unbiased evaluation of the Award, even from the Chinese perspective.

 “The South China Sea Arbitration Award is made by a UN body”.

International media outlets frequently inaccurately mentioned that the Award was made by an “international court” or an “UN Tribunal”. In fact, the Award was made by an “ad hoc” tribunal consisting of five arbitrators, under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The arbitration process was undertaken at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), though the “Court” merely provided secretariat service to facilitate the arbitration process. Indeed, the UNCLOS does not stipulate that an arbitration under Annex VII has to use the PCA. Moreover, the arbitration is also not relevant to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which is based in Hamburg, Germany, apart from the fact that in this case, four of the arbitrators were appointed by the then president of the ITLOS, according to the procedure expressly stipulated in Annex VII. Finally, the arbitration has nothing to do with the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal UN adjudication body, apart from the very fact that the ICJ and the PCA “share” the same building at the Peace Palace at The Hague. It is worth noting that on July 12, 2016, the ICJ issued an official statement to clarify that it had no relation to the SCS arbitration.

“China’s non-participation is against international rule of law”.

Both the United Nations Charter and customary international law require States to settle their disputes by peaceful means. In practice, however, they may choose either to pursue the settlement of a particular dispute or to defer it.  Accordingly, States can also choose not to participate in a specific settlement of dispute procedure, whether it be an arbitration or an adjudication procedure. Though the non-participation may put a State in a disadvantageous position, it is not unusual that States opted not to participate in an international arbitration or adjudication procedure. For example, the United States withdrew from the merits phase of the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case after contesting the ICJ’s jurisdiction; France declined to participate in the oral proceedings in the Nuclear Tests cases on similar jurisdictional grounds; and Russia chose not to participate in the UNCLOS Annex VII arbitration concerning the Arctic Sunrise, arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction. In each instance, the proceedings continued under the applicable procedural rules, confirming that non-participation is a recognized procedural possibility rather than, in itself, a violation of international law.

 “The Award deprived China of its claims over SCS Islands”.

The Philippines’ submissions to the SCS Arbitration Tribunal were designed in such a manner as to avoid being directly involved with issues of territorial sovereignty of disputed South China Sea islands so as to overcome the inherent obstacle to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. In 2006, China made a declaration under Article 298 of the UNCLOS to exclude disputes involving territorial sovereignty over land territory from the UNCLOS compulsory dispute settlement mechanism. So, at least superficially, the Award has not decided whether certain islands and other maritime features belong to China or the Philippines. The Award alone cannot deprive China of any SCS islands it claims. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that by “downgrading” several China-occupied maritime features from islands/rocks (which can generate at least a belt of territorial sea of 12 nautical miles) to low-tide elevations (which cannot generate any maritime zone of their own), the Tribunal practically put features such as the Second Thomas Shoal and Mischief Reef within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. This approach of “An Du Chen Cang” (pretending to take one path while sneaking down the other) has been heavily criticized by the Chinese government and Chinese international law scholars.

 “The Award invalidates China’s Nine-Dash Line”.

The Philippines, in its first two submissions to the SCS Arbitration Tribunal, targeted the Chinese “Nine-Dash Line” (“South China Sea Dotted Line”, or “Nanhai Duan Xu Xian”). The Award declared that China cannot enjoy more maritime rights than those provided under the UNCLOS. As such, the Award practically “invalidates” China’s historic maritime rights in the South China Sea. However, it must be pointed out and emphasized that China’s Dashed Line dated back to the 1940s and served as China’s claim over the territorial sovereignty of all South China Sea Islands ever since. It was not until 1998, with the adoption of the Chinese Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, that the Dashed Line assumed its official function of claiming “historic rights”. Accordingly, even if the Award invalidates the historic maritime rights claimed by the Dashed Line (the tribunal’s conclusion is extremely controversial and has been criticized by all Chinese and some Western scholars), it can never invalidate the Dashed Line’s original function of claiming territorial sovereignty of South China Sea Islands.

 “The Award should also be observed by other States and international courts and tribunals”.

Technically, whatever the Chinese official position or rhetoric is towards the arbitration award, it is “binding” on China since its issuance on July 12, 2016, provided that there will not be a “new” case to overrule the previous award. However, it is not correct to assert that States other than China and the Philippines should also follow the legal reasoning or conclusions made by the tribunal. Indeed, there is no rule of “stare decisis” in international law. In the era of international legal fragmentation with the proliferation of international courts and tribunals, it is not surprising that different institutions make contrary decisions. So, it is well possible that a future judgement or award does not agree with some conclusions made by the SCS arbitral tribunal. 

“Arbitration is the proper approach to solve South China Sea Disputes”.

The inherent function of any mechanism of dispute settlement is to “settle” a dispute, not to escalate it. To date, arbitration under Annex VII of the UNCLOS has successfully solved a couple of disputes between State parties to the UNCLOS. However, reviewing the progress in the South China Sea after the Award, it can be asserted that the Arbitration failed its function and purpose miserably. It seems that the Award has become an insurmountable obstacle in the China-Philippines bilateral relations, and it also has negative effects to the ongoing South China Sea Code of Conduct negotiations. The ultimate assessment of recourse to arbitration in the South China Sea scenario should be based on facts and reality in geopolitics, rather than resting purely on legal appreciation. Therefore, it is reasonable to predict that if the Philippines initiates another arbitration against China, it may once again receive a favorable result for itself, but will not do much to help stabilize the current situation in the South China Sea.

Dr. Yinan BAO is an associate research fellow at Huayang Center for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance, based in Haikou, China. He is also a non-resident fellow at the Institute for China American Studies, Washington DC, United States.