NAFTA, China, and the WTO: End of the Beginning, or Beginning of the End?
Edward Alden
Council for Foreign Relations, January 22

“The next few weeks could be the most consequential for global trade since the final negotiations in December of 1993 that led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO)…Two events are central—the critical sixth round of the renegotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico, which begins in Montreal on January 23; and the expected announcement of a series of U.S. trade actions targeted at China, which could be unveiled during or prior to President Trump’s first State of the Union address on January 30.”

“The two issues, NAFTA and China, have a common hook for the Trump administration—both are seen as ‘unbalanced’ trade relationships that have harmed the economic interests of the United States (a third, the renegotiation of the U.S.-South Korea trade agreement, or KORUS, starts from the same premise). U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer has been explicit that the goal of the NAFTA talks is to negotiate a ‘rebalanced’ agreement that will do more to favor the United States. President Trump last week told Chinese President Xi Jinping that the large U.S. trade deficit with China is ‘not sustainable.’”

Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America
Jim Mattis
Department of Defense, January 19

“Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department, and require both increased and sustained investment, because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase in the future.”

“China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage. As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future. The most far-reaching objective of this defense strategy is to set the military relationship between our two countries on a path of transparency and non-aggression.”

Partnership, Not Dominance, Is the Goal
Hong Xiao
China Daily, January 18

Cui Tiankai, China’s ambassador to the US, stated that China seeks global partnerships rather than global dominance at the China General Chamber of Commerce – USA (CGCC) Chinese New Year of the Dog Gala. “Our aim is to build a new type of international relationships and a community of mankind for a shared future. Therefore, China is continuing to seek cooperation with other countries to improve global governance, maintain international order, build peace and stability and promote common development,” he said. He emphasizes the mutual benefit in cooperation, and that the China-US relationship is China’s most significant and consequential global partnership.

America’s Economic Future Hinges on Its Partnership with Asia
Richard Fontaine, Daniel Kliman
National Interest, January 13

“Nearly a year into Donald Trump’s presidency, his administration has started to craft a strategic narrative for its approach to Asia. This is atypical: it took Barack Obama nearly three years to unveil his “rebalance” to the region. George W. Bush succeeded in advancing U.S. relations in Asia arguably despite never articulating an explicit narrative.”

China’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy: Will China Drop “No First Use?”
Nan Li
China Brief, January 12

“China’s nuclear forces are undergoing an important transformation into an effective, survivable force. As these new capabilities come online, China’s leaders will have to reassess the full scope of their nuclear strategies. While No First Use is likely to remain China’s official nuclear policy in the near future, in the meantime, the dynamic evolution of China’s nuclear policy, strategy, and capabilities requires careful analysis. Such analysis is particularly necessary if the anti-NFU view begins to have great popular support within the PLA, if China develops a more grim view of its regional security environment, or if China believes that its economy is sufficient to support a more robust nuclear capability along the lines of Russia or the United States.”

America Still Needs an Asia Policy
Sandy Pho, Michael Kugelman
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, January 3

“The absence of a U.S. strategy on Asia doesn’t just make Washington look clueless about North Korea. It also undermines America’s ever-tenuous leadership in the broader region.”

“This blow to U.S. leadership does not, however, equate to a net win for Beijing—yet. Our conversations with diplomats and analysts in the region make quite clear that America’s Asian partners still prefer a strong U.S. presence in order to balance China’s growing influence. They remain willing to wait for Washington to show up and lead. Make no mistake: Washington’s treaty allies in Asia have zero interest in jeopardizing the American defense umbrella at such a tumultuous moment in the region, with the North Korea threat and deepening volatility in the South China Sea making for a giant powder keg in the world’s most populous region.”

“Asian countries also still seek U.S. leadership in the economic sphere—even as China deepens its economic footprint in the region.”