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By Sourabh Gupta
China developing naval rail gun technology, say experts
Charles Clover
Financial Times, February 7
Russia and China vie to beat the US in the trillion-dollar race to control the Arctic
Clay Dillow
CNBC, February 6
China Opens Inquiry Into U.S. Sorghum as Trade Tensions Worsen
Sui-Lee Wee
The New York Times, February 5
To Counter Russia, U.S. Signals Nuclear Arms Are Back in a Big Way
David E. Sanger, William J. Broad
The New York Times, February 4
Chinese military paper urges increase in nuclear deterrence capabilities
Reuters Staff
Reuters, January 30
Why Is China Buying Up Europe’s Ports?
Keith Johnson
Foreign Policy, February 2
At Davos, the Real Star May Have Been China, Not Trump
Keith Bradsher
The New York Times, January 28
Battle for data rages between China and US
Wataru Kodaka, Taisei Hoyama
Nikkei Asian Review, February 4
“In the future there will be no concept of “made in China” or “made in America,” because everything will be “made on the internet,” according to Jack Ma Yun. The founder of Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba Group Holding seemed irritated at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in late January, as he made the case against restricting trade.”
The autocrat’s Achilles’ heel
Alina Polyakova, Torrey Taussig
Foreign Affairs, February 2
“Great power competition is back, write Alina Polyakova and Torrey Taussig. Russia and China—two great powers with autocrats at their helms—are actively testing the durability of the international order as the West seemingly retreats. There seem to be no effective checks to Putin and Xi’s growing ambitions. Both leaders, however, could be making a strategic error.”
The education of Kim Jong-un
Jung H. Pak
Brookings Institution, February 1
“What sort of person was Kim Jong-un? Would he even want the burden of being North Korea’s leader? And if so, how would he govern and conduct foreign affairs? What would be his approach to the nuclear weapons program that he inherited? Would the elites accept Kim? Or would there be instability, mass defections, a flood of refugees, bloody purges, a military coup?”
Five sparks that could ignite a trade war between China and the US
Catherine Wong
South China Morning Post, January 31
“US President Donald Trump’s first state-of-the-union address is expected to highlight trade as a top priority in his broader mission to ‘build a safe, strong and proud America’.”
“Trump has said that the hour-long speech to the US Congress will cover the US trade imbalance with China. He has also indicated that his administration is ready to launch trade action against China.”
After the State of the Union, Trump’s foreign policy is still a mystery
Max Boot
The Washington Post, January 31
“National security and foreign policy were mainly an afterthought in President Trump’s State of the Union address. What he said was less notable than what he did not say.”
“The National Defense Strategy, recently released by Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, suggests that ‘interstate strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.’ It goes on to cite China and Russia as primary threats. Listed next are North Korea and Iran, only then followed by terrorism.”
Asia Forecast 2018
Event hosted by Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 24
CSIS hosted three panels on forecasts for Asia policies in 2018. Panel 1 focuses on security threats, citing the Sino-Indian border, North Korea, South China Sea, Taiwan, and East China Sea as areas of interest. Panel 2 was on growth, trade, and infrastructure, during which a discussion on how US-China trade relations–and potential trade war–will affect economics in the Asia-Pacific in 2018. Panel 3 was on alignment, leadership, and domestic politics in Asia-Pacific countries; panelists discussed which countries seemed likely or unlikely to “tilt” toward China, that many Asian countries will have elections this year, and what the prospects for democracy in Southeast Asia look to be like.
Watch the full stream here or listen to the audio recording here.
A World without NAFTA?
Event hosted by Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, January 25
The Trump administration’s efforts to renegotiate NAFTA continue amidst uncertainty and growing concern whether the parties will be able to conclude talks successfully. Several major issues are still pending resolution, so the NAFTA talks have been extended through the first quarter of 2018, including a negotiating round in Montreal in late January.
To analyze the potential impact of withdrawal on job growth, competitiveness, and geopolitics, the Wilson Center partnered with the Council of the Americas to co-host a discussion with city mayors, former ambassadors and business leaders from the three NAFTA countries.
Watch the full webcast and read selected quotes from the panel here.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later
Event hosted by US-China Commission, January 25
The hearing consisted of three panel talks that analyzed China’s implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) respectively from perspectives of the economic rationale, geostrategic and military implications, and regional reactions. China-centric effort that serves China’s interests in economic and strategic domains, whereas the benefits came along with difficulties and challenges. Panelists made recommendations that the United States should be more proactive and cooperate closely with its regional allies so as to sustain power and leadership in Indo-Pacific.
Watch the webcast here.
What’s next for Trump’s regulatory agenda: A conversation with OIRA Administrator Neomi Rao
Event hosted by Brookings Institution, January 26
On January 26, Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Neomi Rao visited Brookings to deliver remarks on her role at OIRA, the office’s achievements in 2017, and the Trump administration’s vision, goals, and priorities for regulatory policy moving into 2018. Following her remarks, Rao joined a discussion with Ted Gayer, vice president and director of the Economic Studies program at Brookings. After their discussion, Rao and Gayer took questions from the audience.
Watch the introduction, presentation, and Q&A here.
Chinese Civil Society in 2018 – What’s Ahead?
Event hosted by ChinaFile and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, January 29
More than a year since two major civil society laws were enacted in China, the environment for domestic and foreign civil society actors is undergoing a major shift. ChinaFile, in collaboration with the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, is convening a panel to address a number of outstanding questions about what is happening on the ground in China now. Discussion topics will include: What are the key trends and challenges in Chinese civil society? How are domestic and international non-profits faring in the new environment? What are the implications for China-U.S. cooperation? For Chinese foreign and domestic policy? For foreign NGOs hoping to work in China?
Watch the full webcast here.
What to expect from Donald Trump’s first State of the Union address
Event hosted by Brookings Institution, January 29
President Trump is scheduled to deliver his first formal State of the Union address to Congress and the nation on Jan. 30. On Jan. 29, Governance Studies at Brookings convened a panel of domestic policy experts to discuss what they hope to hear and what they expect to hear in this pivotal speech. After a year of challenging norms in Washington, will the president deliver a traditional State of the Union or a previously unimaginable tirade?
Panelists explored which post-tax-bill priorities the president is likely to highlight—with an emphasis on how well they align with the priorities of his political base and with those of Congress. Will the president propose policies that advance the well-being of struggling Americans, and if so, do they have any chance of succeeding? Will he rely on divisive campaign trail rhetoric, or demonstrate a willingness to work across the aisle? And most importantly, will his speech have an effect on policy making—and on Americans’ lives—in the coming year?
Watch the full panel here.
The Trump Doctrine at One Year
Event hosted by Cato Institute, January 30
A year into President Trump’s term, what can we say about the Trump Doctrine? As a candidate, Trump promised dramatic changes for American foreign policy. As president, many would agree he has delivered on that promise. In just one year, Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal and the Paris climate treaty, launched cruise missiles at Syria for using chemical weapons, increased American arms sales abroad, refused to certify Iran’s compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, increased the number of American forces operating in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and rattled sabers on the Korean peninsula. How do these changes square with Trump’s call for an “America First” foreign policy? How does Trump’s operating style differ from that of previous presidents? Is America safer today than it was a year ago?
Watch the full panel here.
The Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review: Continuity and change
Event hosted by Brookings Institution, February 12
World Economic Update
Event hosted by Council on Foreign Relations, February 21
Nuclear Risks in Northeast Asia
Event hosted by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 27
By Sourabh Gupta
On January 30th, Donald Trump delivered his first State of the Union address. Following are some of the key takeaways from that address insofar as they concern U.S.-China relations in 2018.
First, Trump appeared more calm and composed during the speech compared to his usual self. This same scripted persona had been on display at Davos a week earlier. If it is in fact the case that Donald Trump is dialing down his more mercurial side and settling down to a more measured style and tone, this is a good thing. It will lend predictability to his decision-making, which should be good for bilateral ties require stable and predictable patterns of interaction and engagement.
Second, Trump referred to China just once directly in his speech. Excessive references to China, as was the case in the recent National Security Strategy, typically tend to signal trouble for the bilateral relationship. It tends to indicate that China is about to be used as a political “whipping boy.” That China was mentioned only once in Trump’s address suggests that it will not assume this front-and-center role within American domestic politics. This, in turn, opens the way for quiet and more responsible management of the bilateral relationship.
Third, in that one direct reference, Trump labelled China as a ‘rival power.’ At first blush, it appears hardline, but there is a silver lining. Trump’s more belligerent White House staff have preferred to paint China as a ‘revisionist power’ that is out to undo the liberal international order. For his part, Donald Trump has stuck to the less combative rhetoric of ‘rival power’ – both in the U.S. National Security Strategy release speech and now in the State of the Union. Indeed, during the release of the National Security Strategy, Trump even went so far as to describe China as a rival power with whom he would “attempt to build a great partnership.” Trump’s continuing preference for ‘rival’ over ‘revisionist’ is perhaps worth embracing. It could have been worse.
Fourth, the most welcome aspect of Trump’s State of the Union address pertained to what he did not say as opposed to what he did say – particularly in the area of trade. Most trade policy specialists in Washington were anticipating far worse, expecting Trump to lay out specific trade enforcement measures against China – and in the process trigger a full-blown trade war. None were laid out, and he stuck to his simple and oft-repeated ‘fair and reciprocal’ trade mantra – much like the case in Davos. One should not assume on this basis that enforcement measures will not eventually be imposed on China. They will down the line. But Trump left enough space with his sparse trade policy comments, to enable him to maintain the bilateral relationship with President Xi Jinping on an even keel, even if some significant trade policy actions against China are implemented in the coming weeks and months.
Fifth, the overall foreign policy impression that Trump left viewers with is that America is focused on its domestic policy challenges. This may or may not be the case, but it does leave the impression that Trump’s America does not reflexively seek ‘to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy’ or transform the world to its image. America’s efforts at world transformation over the past two decades has left much misery in its wake and a more homeward-focused America – even one which aims to ‘Make America Great Again’ – might signify less interventionism and violence abroad.
Finally, there are two major foreign policy areas of concern in his State of the Union address that deserve flagging. His goal of modernizing America’s nuclear deterrent and lower the threshold for their use is, both, unnecessary and dangerous. This will upset strategic stability, risks triggering an arms race and will do significant damage the global non-proliferation regime. Worse, his planned approach to the DPRK crisis during 2018, as foreshadowed in the State of the Union, is deeply disappointing and alarming. Trump entered office promising a policy of ‘maximum pressure and engagement’. The engagement element appears to be non-existent. At a time when the shoots of détente are visible in Inter-Korean relations, this is a particularly unsatisfactory approach. The United States should be encouraging diplomacy and toning down its belligerent rhetoric, not dialing it up. America should explore avenues to support its South Korean partner – – ideally by initiating bilateral, private, special interlocutor-level conversations with senior regime types in Pyongyang. At this time, it appears that Trump is determined to press forward in the opposite direction, which will further damage the already-fraught U.S.-DPRK relationship, heap pressure on U.S.-China relations and undercut President Moon Jae-in’s outreach to Pyongyang. Military tensions and brinkmanship on the Korean Peninsula will regrettably return once the Olympics and Paralympics conclude by mid-March.
Overall, Donald Trump’s State of the Union speech leaves the impression – perhaps optimistically – that a floor has been lain beneath which the U.S.-China bilateral relationship in 2018 will not sink. Just three weeks prior most analysts in Washington anticipated the opposite, that 2018 would be a year of reckoning in U.S.-China relations. With luck, this harsh outcome might be averted or, at minimum, toned down to manageable proportions.
Sourabh Gupta is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS) in Washington, D.C.
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