January 14, 2026

ICAS Bulletin (online ISSN 2836-3418, print ISSN 2836-340X) is published every other week throughout the year at 1919 M St NW, Suite 310, Washington, DC 20036.
The online version of ICAS Bulletin can be found at chinaus-icas.org/bulletins/.

- What's Going On? -

TikTok Stand-Off between China and U.S.

– On December 18, TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew announced that the company had signed an agreement to divest its U.S. entity into a joint venture, aligning with the deal as outlined in September 2025. 

– The US investor group Oracle and private equity firm Silver Lake, as well as Abu Dhabi-based investment firm MGX, will collectively own 45% of the U.S. TikTok operations with ByteDance keeping a 19.9% stake and affiliates of existing ByteDance investors holding 30.1%.

– According to Chew, the newly formed entity “TikTok USDS Joint Venture LLC” would be “responsible for U.S. data protection, algorithm security, content moderation and software assurance.”

– The Chinese Ministry of Commerce reacted to the deal on December 25, saying it hopes that “relevant parties can reach a solution regarding TikTok that complies with Chinese laws and regulations and achieves a balance of interests.” 

– Meta on December 29 announced its acquisition of the Chinese-founded AI startup Manus as part of Meta’s efforts to integrate advanced AI across its products. Manus launched the world’s first AI agent that requires less prompting in March 2025. The company was founded in China but later moved its headquarters to Singapore. 

– China’s Commerce Ministry on January 8 said it is investigating whether Meta’s acquisition of Manus violated Chinese technology-export and outbound-investment rules that require government approval for exporting certain interactive AI systems, since Manus was founded and owned by Chinese entities.

Venezuela First Step for U.S. Hegemony in South America

President Donald Trump attends a roundtable with energy officials and executives from the oil industry in the East Room of the White House, Friday, January 9, 2026. (“P20260109MR-0972” by The White House, United States Government Work)

– Early January 3, the United States conducted large-scale military actions in Venezuela and captured President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Celia Flores. President Maduro met with a Chinese envoy to reaffirm ties with Beijing just hours before his capture.

– After the attack, Trump downplayed concern arising from the meeting by saying his good relationship with Xi meant “there’s not going to be a problem” and that China would still “get oil.”

– On January 3, China strongly condemned the U.S. attack on Venezuela as a violation of international law and Venezuela’s sovereignty. 

– Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Russia also voiced strong condemnation, with Cuba and Nicaragua closely monitoring the crisis; the UK declined to comment. Germany and the EU were brief on their varied stances on U.S. military action in Venezuela. 

– The Trump administration on January 5 issued demands to Venezuela’s interim leadership that more oil exports be allowed only if Venezuela cuts economic ties with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba and agrees to work exclusively with the U.S. on oil sales. 

– The U.S. seized two Venezuela-linked tankers on January 7, including one sailing under Russia’s flag, prompting sharp condemnation from China and escalating tensions with Russia.

– On January 7, Trump said the U.S. expects to run Venezuela and control its oil “for years,” describing direct U.S. oversight of the country’s resources as long-term and “very profitable” while offering no timeline for relinquishing control.

– It was reported on the same day that Chinese independent refiners are expected to shift from Venezuelan supplies to heavy crude from Iran and Russia, buffered in the near term by roughly 75 days of Venezuelan oil already in floating storage.

– U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright on January 8 said Washington will permit limited Chinese commercial involvement in Venezuela but will not permit Beijing to gain major influence, emphasizing that the United States must remain the dominant partner while U.S. oil companies expand their roles there.

– Vitol on January 8 obtained a preliminary U.S. special license to negotiate 18-month imports and exports of Venezuelan oil and is now working to finalize the terms.

– Vitol and Trafigura on January 12 have begun talks with Indian and Chinese refiners to sell Venezuelan crude for a March delivery under U.S. marketing arrangements that aim to restart Venezuela’s halted exports, while also rushing to secure shipping and logistics for those sales.

South Korea Tiptoes around China-Japan Tensions

Chinese President Xi Jinping holds a welcome ceremony for President of the Republic of Korea ROK Lee Jae Myung in the Northern Hall of the Great Hall of the People prior to their talks in Beijing, capital of China, Jan. 5, 2026. Xi held talks with Lee, who is on a state visit to China, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Monday. (Photo by Zhai Jianlan/Xinhua via Getty Images)

– North Korea fired two ballistic missiles during a military drill on January 4, just hours before South Korean President Lee Jae-Myung’s January 4-7 visit to China. North Korea said the drill was to test its hypersonic weapon system.

– Ahead of President Lee’s visit to China, he emphasized in a CCTV interview on January 2 that Seoul respects the One-China policy, values China as a reliable neighbor, and aims to clear past misunderstandings to elevate the relationship to a new stage.

– After meeting with President Xi, President Lee on January 5 called for a “new phase” of Korea-China relations focused on restoring ties, expanding economic cooperation, and coordinating on regional stability, while both leaders agreed to resume dialogue with North Korea and manage differences through consultation.

– South Korea and China signed 14 MOUs and a cultural artifact agreement covering industrial exchanges, technology, environmental, transportation, startup, and IP cooperation.

– President Lee on January 7 said that he asked President Xi to mediate with North Korea and support a phased approach to freeze North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. 

– On January 6, China banned exports of dual-use goods to Japan to prevent their potential military use, including heavy rare earths and magnets, prompting Japan to lodge a strong protest and demand withdrawal of the measure.

– Head of Asia Oceanian Affairs at Japan’s Foreign Ministry, Masaaki Kanai, urged China to withdraw the trade curbs, saying that a measure exclusively targeting Japan deviates from international practice.

– On the same day, Japanese lawmaker Hei Seki visited Taiwan and claimed it to be an independent country.

– China on January 7 opened an anti-dumping investigation into Japanese dichlorosilane imports after the price of the product fell sharply.

– During an interview on the same day, Trump said it is “up to” Xi what China does on Taiwan but warned he would be “very unhappy” with any change to the status quo, adding that he does not believe Xi will move against the island while he remains president through 2029.

– One day before meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, President Lee said in an interview with NHK aired on January 12 that a dispute between China and Japan was not desirable for regional peace, adding that Seoul would not meddle in the ongoing row. 

– President Lee and Prime Minister Takaichi agreed during their meeting on January 13 to strengthen bilateral cooperation across security, technology, and economic resilience while reaffirming their shuttle diplomacy framework to deepen trust and stabilize Korea-Japan relations.

Trump Tees Up Trade Barriers using National Security

– The FY2026 NDAA was signed into law on December 18, 2025 and includes the Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security Act of 2025 (the COINS Act) and the BIOSECURE Act. 

– The COINS Act creates a statutory outbound investment control requiring U.S. persons to notify or avoid certain financial transactions with “covered foreign persons” in countries and regions of concern involving advanced or sensitive technologies, coming into effect no later than March 2027. 

– The COINS Act is a significant expansion of the Treasury Department’s Outbound Investment Security Program in terms of technologies, geographic areas, and the definition of covered foreign persons. It adds high-performance computing, supercomputing, and hypersonic systems to the list of covered technologies, in addition to semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum information technologies, and artificial intelligence. It also extends the previous “countries of concern” from China to now include Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela under the Maduro regime. 

– The BIOSECURE Act imposes government-wide restrictions on “biotechnology companies of concern”, with the goal of barring U.S. federal agencies from procuring equipment and services from the designated entities. 

– In addition to listing entities that are subject to the control of China and other countries of concern, the law also targets firms on the existing Department of Defense list of “Chinese military companies” that have a sufficient biotechnology nexus.

– On December 31, the Trump administration postponed planned tariff hikes on upholstered furniture, kitchen cabinets and vanities to Jan 1, 2027, while keeping existing 25% duties in place.

– On January 5, The FCC banned new imports of foreign-made drones and components from the U.S. market by adding foreign drone companies to the FCC’s “Covered List” of entities deemed to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States”. 

– Multiple Chinese companies such as Huawei, ZTE, China Telecom (Americas) and China Mobile International USA are already within the Covered List.

– The ban came after the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act passed by Congress in 2024 mandated a security review of equipment produced by DJI, Autel, and other foreign drone makers by December 23, 2025.

– On January 12, President Trump abruptly imposed a 25% tariff on goods from any country doing business with Iran, but did not detail how the new tariff will be imposed in regards to existing ones. The new tariff prompted strong condemnation from China, who vowed to safeguard its interests.

– G7 finance ministers and partner countries agreed on January 12 to accelerate efforts to reduce reliance on China for critical minerals by developing alternative supply chains. In response, China defended its position to maintain a stable global mineral market.

– On the same day, Japan launched a month-long deep-sea mission to lift rare-earth-rich mud near Minamitori Island.

U.S. Continues to Limit China Chips Sector

US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, left, and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, left, speak to the press after the second day of bilateral meetings between the United States and China. (KEYSTONE/EDA/Martial Trezzini, “SWITZERLAND MEETING USA CHINA BILATERAL” by FDFA Federal Dep. of Foreign Affairs, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

– On December 23, the Office of the US Trade Representative released the findings of a year-long Section 301 investigation of China’s semiconductor sector that began in December 2024. 

– The investigation accused Beijing of employing “unreasonable and discriminatory” practices, alleging that China relies on “sweeping non-market policies,” and its industrial plans target “every major segment of the semiconductor supply chain,” including fabrication, design, assembly, testing, and packaging. 

– Despite accusations, USTR delayed any additional tariffs for now. The new tariff is set at an initial rate of 0% which is set to rise in June 2027 to an undetermined amount, and would be stacked on top of the existing 50% tariffs.

– President Trump on January 2 ordered the U.S.-registered company HieFo to reverse its 2024 $2.9 million acquisition of Emcore’s chip assets due to national security concerns. President Trump’s national security accusations are due to one of HieFo’s two founders being a Chinese national.

– On January 7, China instructed some tech firms to pause Nvidia H200 orders while it weighs conditions for allowing the chip’s import and moves toward mandating domestic AI chip purchases.

– A Dutch court hearing on January 14 will decide whether to launch a formal investigation into Nexperia’s management or lift measures against its Chinese shareholder. The dispute, which has severely disrupted the auto industry, is causing both the Dutch and China-based arms of the company to prepare for a future apart by expanding non-Chinese production or securing alternative wafer supplies.

- What Are We Reading? -

- What's Happening Around Town? -

- What ICAS Is Up To -

ICAS Event

US-China Outlook 2026: Navigating Competition, Cooperation, and Global Implications

Hosted by ICAS x World Salon
January 15, 2026
12:00PM-1:20PM EST

ICAS will host a virtual event on the outlook of the U.S.-China relations after the first year of the Second Trump Administration. Moderating the panel is ICAS’ Sourabh Gupta, and panelists include Dr. Robert Sutter (Elliott School of George Washington University), Dr. Zhiqun Zhu (Bucknell University), and Dr. Yawei Liu (The Carter Center). Click on RSVP today to register see a complete list of questions and register on Zoom.

MAP Commentary

This commentary was originally released on China US Focus on January 12, 2026.

From Rules to Bargains
By Nong Hong
January 12, 2026

In the first week of 2026, three very different headlines landed virtually on top of each other: Washington publicly revived talk of acquiring Greenland, raising immediate questions inside the transatlantic alliance; the United States launched a major operation in Venezuela that sparked an unusually sharp debate about its legality under the UN Charter; and Kyiv’s partners in Paris discussed “security guarantees” and postwar recovery at the same time that reconstruction estimates—now widely cited at around $524 billion—hang over every negotiation…

MAP Commentary

From Text to Practice: The Rise of Implementation Politics in Ocean Governance
By Nong Hong
January 7, 2026

For years, ocean governance has been described in terms of gaps, fragmentation, and chronic under-enforcement. The more revealing story in 2025–2026 is a shift in what is being contested. Across several regimes, the core disputes are moving downstream from drafting norms to building compliance systems. Implementation is becoming observable and therefore political: who pays, who monitors, what counts as compliance, and how capacity and finance are mobilized across uneven capabilities…

MAP Commentary

Managing Maritime Disputes Today: A Three-Pillar Framework for a Crowded Maritime Century
By Nong Hong
December 29, 2025

Maritime disputes today sit at the intersection of law, geopolitics, economics, and security. From the South China Sea to the Arctic, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Red Sea, states face overlapping jurisdictional claims, intensifying competition over energy and seabed resources, and a growing mix of non-traditional security risks in increasingly crowded waters. Yet persistence does not inevitably mean escalation. Practice suggests that the most effective approaches combine three interlocking pillars: a credible legal baseline grounded in international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), genuine political will to manage risk and absorb compromise, and adaptive regional and bilateral mechanisms that operationalize the UN Charter’s commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes…

Commentary

Will Viet Nam’s Balancing Act Persist in 2026?
By Rían Knighton
December 22, 2025

Despite tight rope walking between the two largest economies in the world, Viet Nam has become one of the clear winners of the U.S.-China trade war. With Q3 GDP rounding out at 8%, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) cites an expected 6.7 percent GDP projection, while the United Overseas Bank (UOB) claims 7.7 percent for the year. As tariffs and geopolitical mistrust fractured global supply chains, manufacturers seeking alternatives to China poured investment into the underdog nation…

ICAS In the News

On Saturday, January 3, 2026, Senior Fellow Sourabh Gupta was quoted by South China Morning Post on China-Japan row.

  • “This time, Beijing’s tough response is to warn off not just Japan but others too who will be called upon by the United States to militarily support its operations during an armed Taiwan contingency.”
  • “But by keeping the response below the rabble-rousing threshold, China also gets to maintain the patina of a law-abiding, responsible nation.”
  • “China prides itself as a safe country from a law-and-order standpoint and would like to maintain that reputation.”

On Wednesday, December 31, 2025, Senior Fellow Sourabh Gupta was interviewed by CGTN America on CGTN’s 2025 Year in Review.

  • “Obviously, the tariffs were most unwelcome both in China and in other countries and of course, also the tariffs have ended up hurting Americans themselves, American small businesses and American consumers but there’s a small irony out here. The irony is that the tariffs were meant for Mr. Trump to obtain leverage. Whether he obtained that leverage or not, it’s not exactly clear, but it at least facilitated a conversation between the two sides. And the end result of that conversation has been a very productive one…”

On Monday, December 29, 2025, Senior Fellow Sourabh Gupta was quoted by China Daily on the state of the U.S. in 2025.

  • “There has been such a breakdown in trust and polarization over the last 20 to 25 years that has made governance harder.”

On Sunday, December 28, 2025, Senior Fellow Nong Hong was featured by CGTN’s The Point on managing maritime disputes.

  • “First of all, you have to respect the sovereignty claims and also jurisdiction claim in this region and you have to respect political willingness of the region. You have to respect that region to solve their problem.”

On Saturday, December 27, 2025, Senior Fellow Sourabh Gupta was quoted by South China Morning Post on Taiwan arms deal.

  • “The Taiwan matter sits on an entirely different shelf, even though it sets the tone of ties in a major way.”

On Thursday, December 18, 2025, Senior Fellow Sourabh Gupta was quoted by South China Morning Post on Trump’s new National Security Strategy.

  • “He has pushed folks to the limit on the economic and trade and security side.”
  • “He’s been an equal opportunity punisher.”

On Wednesday, December 17, 2025, Research Associate Yilun Zhang was quoted by South on “capital decoupling” from China in new NSS.

  • “It is very difficult to understand this new national security strategy through the lens that the Trump administration is truly seeking a strategic retraction.”
  • The U.S. “cannot allocate all resources equally to address every single issue around the world.”
  • “We have seen that the U.S. is prioritizing resources in Latin America. We see aircraft carriers in the Caribbean threatening Venezuela’s independence.”

On Wednesday, December 17, 2025, Senior Fellow Sourabh Gupta was interviewed by CGTN on China’s Hainan Free Trade Port.

  • “I think we’re going to see an even greater integration of China, the two-tier customs system and the recent liberalization with regard to the Hainan free trade port is to interlock and interlink the entire Asia-Pacific region in the area of both goods trade as well as in the area of services trade…”
Senior Fellow Sourabh Gupta on CGTN on December 17, 2025.
Senior Fellow Sourabh Gupta on CGTN America's 2025 Year in Review on December 31, 2025.