There are also several first or near-first cases being held that strongly suggest the formation or strengthening of a new or existing partnership. The European Union and the U.S. held their first-ever joint maritime security exercise in the Indo-Pacific from March 23-24, as agreed upon in the latest round of the EU-U.S. High-Level Consultations on the Indo-Pacific on December 2, 2022. Last November, the U.S., the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia held the weeklong Exercise Nautical Defender in the Arabian Gulf. Ahead of the 42nd case of the multinational, Indo-Pacific based Exercise Cobra Gold being held in February, the U.S. Navy SEALs and Royal Thai Special Warfare Command held the first iteration of a three-week collaboration now titled Exercise Flash Torch. Egypt and Sudan held the first iteration of Exercise SUD-EGY-T in Sudan in early April while India and Sri Lanka’s bilateral Exercise SLINEX took place April 6-8.

Somewhat similar to the United States’ own level of joint naval activities, China’s naval forces have been particularly active in an apparent pursuit of showcasing their partnerships, the extent of their reach, and their growing military capabilities. China, Russia and Iran held Exercise Security Bond, a newly-formalized joint exercise in the Gulf of Oman with other unnamed countries, in mid-March, further building on an apparent strengthening of naval ties that has been growing for more than a year. China, Russia and South Africa held the second iteration of joint naval exercises (the first being in 2019) from February 17-27, taking place in the Indian Ocean. Russia and China have been holding bilateral naval exercises in December 2022 off the southern coast of China and in the East China Sea, advertised as efforts to “further deepen” their partnership. Apart from Russia, China also held its first joint maritime exercise with Cambodia, code-named Golden Dragon, in March, and just announced joint naval drills with Singapore to be held from late April to early May.

The last few months have also seen joint naval exercises be specific responses to other diplomatic or military activities; an increasingly regular—and increasingly publicized—practice. In mid-April, the U.S., South Korea and Japan started holding joint naval missile defense exercises “to improve responses to North Korean threats” as part of new agreements from talks in Washington on April 14. Several of the above-mentioned cases, such as the U.S. and European Union’s new exercise promoting “high seas freedom of navigation,” could partially or fully be direct responses as well.

Keep In Mind

Again, joint naval exercises are not rare. What is notable is how the last few months have culminated in what appears to not be only increased activities but increased attention by the larger public and diplomatic representatives. Part of this increase could be credited to the reduction in Covid-19 related pauses, new launches of naval vessels, and expanding developments in naval technologies.

Virtually as important as their role in enhancing technical interoperability is the political and social power of joint naval exercises. They are regularly mentioned in high-level speeches as signs of mutual cooperation and in lists of how nations can hope to improve cooperative relations. Regardless of whether these exercises being held these last four months have been their first or their fifteenth, they—and the associated increase in public interest in them—are indicators of a heightened attention to maritime security and, in some cases, unavoidable indicators of where true loyalties lie. Nations understandably limit the amount of information granted to the public regarding a joint naval exercise, but the list of participating nations or parties as well as the length of the exercise is nearly always readily provided. This indicates the importance of the ‘invitation list’ and ‘participation list’ and is typically the largest takeaway from any announcement of a joint naval exercise: Who is involved, and has the participation list changed? The case of China being ‘disinvited’ from participating in the 2018 RIMPAC Exercise, a major, publicly-dealt blow to Beijing received with mixed global responses, is a key example showing the interplay between joint military exercises and global diplomacy.

Aside from participants, the size, frequency, length and focus of the exercises are important and telling features to note of any exercise. For example, this year’s Balikatan, a word in Tagalog which means ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’, is the “largest ever” with more than 17,600 sailors, Marines, soldiers and airmen participating and is taking place during a time of significant shift in Philippine policy.

What is dangerous is how these ironically public-yet-secretive events all but invite speculation by observers—and at all levels. For example, there has been a flurry of attention over the numerous trilateral naval exercises between Russia, China and South Africa and what it might mean in the context of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, for U.S.-China-South Africa relations, and for Indian Ocean and African geopolitics. In the case of U.S.-China relations, which has arguably reached its lowest and most tense point, joint military exercises have become a case study or statistic to point at and use in the ever-popular verbal arguments. Like cases of unilateral military exercises, they have the potential to be unabashedly used as silent diplomatic tools of disapproval and disagreement in reaction to another party’s actions. 

That is why, when hearing about a joint naval exercise being held, understanding the active context—both inside and outside of the military realm—is important to most accurately deciphering a nation’s mindset and intent. One of the first questions that should be asked, prior to any speculations being drawn, is regarding the establishment of context. Often shrouded in succinct press releases with minimized public details, joint naval exercises are powerful, public, silent tools that can be used to gauge the strength of two or more nations’ current state of alliance. More important than the number and types of troops and ships used, it is the location, timing, duration and participants that should be more thoroughly examined. Furthermore, it can be dangerous for non-military experts to be overinterpreting actions, just as it is dangerous for non-legal experts to be independently arguing on behalf of or against a concept with legal implications. When debating over joint naval drills, or any other military-intensive subject for that matter, observers should value the words of military professionals in the field over those of domestic, non-military political leaders.

This issue’s Spotlight was written by Jessica Martin, ICAS Research Associate & Chief Editor, ICAS Newsletters.