International Law Concerns Arising from the US Arrest of Nicolas Maduro: The End of “Rules-Based International Order” Rhetoric

When President Trump announced on January 3, 2026 that the US had used military force against Venezuela and captured its sitting president, Nicolas Maduro, followed by the initiation of criminal proceedings against him under US domestic law, the episode marked a dramatic escalation in the tension between power politics and international legal constraint: The arrest and prosecution of a sitting head of state by a foreign power represents one of the most legally and politically extreme scenarios contemplated by modern international law. It implicates not only questions of individual criminal responsibility, but also the foundational principles upon which the post-1945 international legal order rests: sovereign equality, the prohibition on the use of force, non-intervention, and the supremacy of international law over unilateral domestic action. 

Beyond the specific case of Venezuela, the episode has broader significance for contemporary debates about the so-called “rules-based international order”. For decades, the US has presented itself as a principal guardian of international rules and norms. Yet the Maduro operation shall be seen as exposing a deep structural contradiction: that the “rules” invoked by the US are often treated as binding on others, but optional or disposable when they conflict with US strategic interests. The incident, therefore, provides a revealing case study in the selective application of international law and the erosion of its normative authority.

This commentary examines the international law concerns arising from the US arrest of Nicolas Maduro. It argues that the US operation constitutes a blatant violation of both the UN Charter and customary international law, and that it exemplifies a broader pattern of unilateralism that threatens the integrity of the international legal system, forsaking its advocated “rules-based international order”.

I. A Blatant Violation of the UN Charter

The most immediate and serious international law concern raised by the US operation is the use of US military force against Venezuela, a sovereign and UN member state. Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations obliges all member states to refrain from “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” This prohibition is widely regarded as a cornerstone of the international legal order and a norm of jus cogens.

Admittedly, international law recognizes only two narrow exceptions to this prohibition: authorization by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the inherent right of self-defense in response to an armed attack, as recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter. On the available information and facts, neither exception applies. There was no Security Council authorization for the use of force against Venezuela, nor was there any evidence of an armed attack or imminent threat justifying self-defense. In essence, the action amounts to an unlawful infringement of Venezuela’s sovereignty. Accordingly, the US military operation constitutes a prima facie violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

On January 5, the US Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz defended the US operation as a “law enforcement operation” aimed at apprehending a “drug trafficker and international terrorist”. On January 6, the US Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche told US media that the US “has an absolute legal right” to arrest people like Nicolas Maduro. Whatever the rhetoric, framing the operation as “law enforcement” or “counter-narcotics” activity does not alter its international legal character. International law does not permit the unilateral use of military force to apprehend foreign leaders or enforce domestic criminal law. Indeed, international law draws a sharp distinction between consensual cooperation in criminal matters such as extradition and coercive enforcement measures. The latter, when conducted without consent, constitute prohibited intervention and, where military means are employed, unlawful uses of force. Accepting a law enforcement justification would create a dangerous loophole in the UN Charter framework, allowing states to circumvent Article 2(4) through self-interpretation.

Furthermore, according to the indictment against Maduro, the US has also asserted criminal jurisdiction over Maduro based primarily on the protective principle and effects doctrine, arguing that alleged narcotics trafficking targeted the US (the so-called “Narco-Terrorism Conspiracy”). While international law recognizes protective jurisdiction in limited circumstances, its scope has traditionally been confined to offenses directly threatening a state’s core security interests. Even if prescriptive jurisdiction were established, enforcement jurisdiction presents a distinct and more restrictive legal barrier. International law prohibits a state from exercising enforcement jurisdiction on the territory of another state without consent, as Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter enshrines the fundamental principle of sovereign equality of all states. 

Finally, it is worth pointing out that the arrest and prosecution of Maduro also violate the principle of non-intervention, as reflected in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. International law prohibits coercive actions that interfere with a state’s political independence. Forcibly subjecting an incumbent foreign president to domestic criminal jurisdiction constitutes an extreme form of intervention.

In a word, the forcible capture of Maduro on Venezuelan territory therefore represents a direct violation of Venezuela’s sovereignty and the UN Charter.

II. A Serious Violation of Customary International Law 

Under customary international law, incumbent heads of state enjoy immunity ratione personae from foreign criminal jurisdiction. This immunity is absolute during the individual’s term of office and applies to both official and private acts. Its purpose is functional rather than personal: to protect sovereign equality and prevent indirect interference in another state’s internal affairs.

The International Court of Justice has affirmed this principle in cases such as Arrest Warrant (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), holding that even allegations of serious international crimes do not negate personal immunity before foreign domestic courts.

The US officials have asserted that Maduro is not entitled to immunity because the US does not recognize him as Venezuela’s legitimate president. Nevertheless, international law does not allow a state to evade its international obligation to respect the personal immunity of a foreign head of state through unilateral recognition policies. Objective criteria, particularly effective control over state institutions, are central to immunity determinations. Permitting states to deny immunity based on political disagreement would render the doctrine meaningless and dangerously politicized. 

In addition to personal immunity, international law also recognizes immunity ratione materiae for official acts performed on behalf of the state. This immunity continues after an official leaves office and reflects the principle that acts attributable to the state should not be indirectly adjudicated through prosecutions of individuals. Allegations that state institutions were used to facilitate criminal activity do not automatically negate functional immunity. Finally, it is worth noting that drug trafficking is not generally recognized as an international crime giving rise to universal jurisdiction. 

III. The End of the “Rules-Based International Order” Rhetoric

The US military operation against Maduro also reflects the sheer contrast between the UN Charter-based international order and the US-promoted notion of a “rules-based international order.” The Maduro operation starkly illustrates how the latter concept often functions as a flexible political instrument rather than a commitment to universally applicable legal norms. 

It is not exaggerating to assert the US emphasizes “international rules” when they constrain others, but discards them when they impede US action. In this sense, the operation against Maduro exposes the hollowness of the so-called “rules-based international order” rhetoric. What is presented as rule-governed conduct is, in substance, conduct based on US will and strategic preference, especially after the US newly published National Security Strategy of November 2025. 

Meanwhile, the operation against Maduro is reminiscent of a broader historical pattern of intervention in Latin America: a revival of Monroe Doctrine logic, treating the region as a sphere of influence subject to unilateral enforcement. This approach is fundamentally incompatible with modern “international law-based order”, which rejects regional hegemony in favor of sovereign equality as enshrined by the UN Charter.

The arrest of a foreign president sends a dangerous signal that sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force are no longer red lines, but technical obstacles to be navigated. Today, the pretext may be narcotics control; tomorrow it may be another label applied to politically inconvenient governments. If conduct such as the US operation against Maduro were to become normalized, the consequences for international law would be profound. The prohibition on the use of force and the principle of sovereign equality would be progressively hollowed out through claimed exceptions and unilateral reinterpretations.

Such erosion would disproportionately harm small and medium-sized states and intensify instability in international relations. The UN itself risks marginalization if the UN Charter rules are treated as optional. In the end, the post-war legal system could suffer the fate of the League of Nations, reduced to irrelevance by great-power unilateralism.

Conclusion

The US arrest of Nicolas Maduro represents a convergence of multiple violations of international law. It entails an unlawful use of force, a grave breach of sovereignty, a disregard for immunity of an incumbent foreign head of state, and an abuse of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Together, these actions constitute a blatant violation of both the UN Charter and customary international law.

More broadly, the episode exposes the fragility of the so-called “rules-based international order” when confronted with great-power interests. International law cannot survive as a system of restraint if its core rules are treated as optional by those who claim to uphold them. A genuine commitment to international order requires acceptance of legal limits, even when they constrain power. Without such commitment, the credibility of international law—and the stability it provides—will continue to erode.

Dr. Yinan Bao is an associate research fellow at Huayang Center for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance, and non-resident fellow at ICAS. The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Huayang Center for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance or ICAS.