Maritime Affairs Program (MAP) Handbill Spotlight

By the 1990s, the commercial sector had all but collapsed. Today, the United States builds only a tiny fraction of the world’s commercial ships, most of which are destined for domestic use under the Jones Act. Even military shipbuilding has struggled with cost overruns, delays, and a shrinking industrial workforce. The U.S. Navy’s shipyard infrastructure is aging, while the number of private shipyards capable of delivering large, complex vessels has dwindled. According to recent reports, only seven private shipyards remain in the U.S. capable of handling major military contracts, which is down from dozens in the postwar era.

Meanwhile, other countries have aggressively scaled up. In the late 20th century, South Korea and Japan emerged as advanced and highly competitive commercial shipbuilding players. More recently, China leveraged its vast economic power and manufacturing base to become the world’s largest shipbuilder, not only dominating commercial ship production but also rapidly expanded its military shipbuilding as part of its broader naval modernization.

Recent Events

Since assuming office, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has vowed to revitalize America’s shipbuilding sector as a top strategic priority, framing it as essential to U.S. deterrence against China. In a press briefing in February, Hegseth warned that “we’re decades behind where we need to be—not just in ships, but in the yards, workers, and supply chains that make them.” He has pushed for an all-of-government effort to reindustrialize the maritime sector, including expanded contracts for civilian shipyard modernization and joint programs with community colleges and trade schools to address workforce shortages. President Trump echoed this message during his State of the Union in March 2025, stating, “We’re not going to let China outbuild us anymore. America will once again lead the seas—not just with courage, but with steel.” His administration has signaled a willingness to bypass traditional procurement timelines and regulatory bottlenecks to achieve measurable progress before the next election cycle.

Congress has also taken notice. Amid growing concern over the Navy’s lagging fleet size and deteriorating industrial base, bipartisan coalitions in both chambers have begun pushing legislation to jumpstart U.S. shipyard capacity. The proposed bipartisan Save Our Shipyards Act, introduced in March 2025, would establish a national commission to investigate the condition of the U.S. maritime industry and recommend steps to “revitalize our maritime industrial base.”​ In Senate hearings, lawmakers across party lines described China’s dominance in both commercial and military shipbuilding as a direct threat to U.S. global standing. Some lawmakers have also called for “Buy American” mandates in all Navy procurement contracts

The White House has also moved to confront China’s shipbuilding dominance through trade measures. In one of its first high-profile actions, the Trump administration vowed to expand and escalate the Section 301 investigation into China’s maritime, shipbuilding, and logistics sectors—originally launched by the Biden administration in late 2024. While the probe’s final determinations remain pending, President Trump has promised “strong, targeted measures” to defend U.S. industry—including potential tariffs on Chinese-built commercial vessels and government restrictions on maritime equipment sourced from China. According to administration officials, these actions are intended not only to level the playing field but also to “signal a new doctrine of maritime industrial sovereignty.”

Keep In Mind

While the renewed U.S. focus on shipbuilding reflects a genuine concern over China’s maritime dominance, the strategic and commercial motivations behind this push are far from straightforward. Beijing’s rapid naval expansion, underwritten by its massive commercial shipbuilding capacity, has undeniably shifted the global balance at sea. However, attempts to rebuild American shipbuilding must confront certain economic and geopolitical realities that neither rhetoric nor tariffs alone can overcome.

First, the commercial shipbuilding sector does provide essential industrial infrastructure—shared dry docks, skilled labor, and tooling capacity—that supports military production. However,  Washington’s apparent desire to decouple from global ship supply chains, impose tariffs on foreign-built vessels, and mandate U.S.-flagged transport marks a sharp departure from decades of maritime liberalization. Reversing globalization in a sector dominated by economies of scale and transnational logistics is not only commercially counterproductive—it may also price U.S. exports out of the global market and trigger retaliatory measures. America can’t outcompete China, Japan, and South Korea by raising walls around a shipbuilding industry that lags in capacity and competitiveness. Industrial revitalization requires structural investment, not protectionist escalation.

Second, the national security rationale—rooted in the logic of strategic competition—risks becoming directionless. The desire to match China’s naval output echoes Cold War-era instincts, yet the U.S. currently lacks a clear articulation of what ‘winning’ this new maritime race would entail. During the Reagan era, shipbuilding expansion was tied to a defined geopolitical objective: maritime superiority against the Soviet Union. Today, however, the goals are less coherent. If the U.S. is building ships for a confrontation it does not explicitly seek, or expanding capacity without a defined maritime strategy, the result may be an industrial mobilization without strategic clarity. The Trump administration’s emphasis on industrial resurgence may sound Reagan-esque—but without a Cold War-style organizing principle, the analogy breaks down quickly.