ICAS Trade ‘n Tech Dispatch (online ISSN 2837-3863, print ISSN 2837-3855) is published about every two weeks throughout the year at 1919 M St NW, Suite 310, Washington, DC 20036.
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After slapping tariffs on its allies and friends, the United States now seeks their support to build a global coalition to break China’s dominance in the critical minerals supply chains. On Wednesday, the Trump administration hosted a Critical Minerals Ministerial, bringing together representatives from 54 countries and the EU, and floated a creation of a “preferential trade zone” for critical minerals by enforcing a price floor mechanism. China criticized the effort, saying that it opposes “any country setting up exclusive blocs to disrupt international economic and trade order.”
The expansive framework, however, poses multiple challenges, such as the risk of resource wastage, diminished market efficiency, and increased costs for downstream producers and consumers alike.
In One Sentence
Mark the Essentials
Keeping an Eye On…
President Trump’s disdain for international organizations is persistent. In early January, he withdrew the U.S. from 31 United Nations entities, including the UNCTAD (UN Trade and Development), as part of a larger recusal from 66 international organizations; the WTO was not one of them though. To the contrary, the Trump administration quietly restarted paying its backlog of dues to the organization last year. There is evidently value in the WTO to them, possibly in the negotiating and rulemaking functions. However, that value proposition does not extend to the organization’s dispute settlement methods. Since December 2019, successive Trump administrations, with an assist by the Biden administration, have sabotaged the functioning of the Appellate Body by blocking the formation of a quorum to hear appeals cases. Adverse panel rulings get kicked into the long grass and the dispute settlement arm can no longer act as a check on unilateral U.S. action.
This logic was on display last week with a WTO panel siding against the U.S. in a China-brought case against certain Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) tax credits on renewable energy and clean electricity instituted by the Biden administration, whereas the solar, wind, and EV tax credits have been excised by Trump. This time around, the U.S. didn’t try to justify the legal validity of its subsidies. The administration readily admitted that the subsidies—contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods—were non-compliant under the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) agreement. Rather, the administration invoked the General Exceptions article (Article XX of GATT 1994) to argue that the measures were “necessary to protect public morals.” The basis of the argument is as follows: China achieved its dominance in the renewable energy sector through pervasive non-market policies and practices that undermine fair competition, therefore the U.S. must countervail this behavior and the distortions that it created via the IRA subsidies.
This ‘public morals’ argument sounds familiar; it is the exact one that was trotted out by the Biden administration to defend the first Trump administration’s July 2018 and September 2018 Section 301 tariffs against China. In that case, the Biden administration had argued that China’s policies and practices of using “coercion and subterfuge to steal or otherwise improperly acquire intellectual property” implicated public morals because it violated “prevailing U.S. standards of right and wrong as reflected in the state and federal laws of the U.S.” and “the sense of right and wrong held by U.S. society [which would be] further offended if such fundamentally unfair policies and practices are left unchecked.” Unsurprisingly, the arbitral panel shot down that justification. In 250 pages of investigative groundwork by the administration prior to imposing the tariffs, there was nary a reference to the words ‘public morals’ in its findings. Besides, the administration had provided no evidence to identify and explain the relationship between the chosen measures, the additional tariffs, and the public morals objective being pursued.
The WTO panel’s ruling last week in the IRA case hews a similar line of argument. The panel noted the relevant inquiry is not whether Biden’s IRA was designed to increase domestic production or reduce reliance on China, but whether it was designed to protect the U.S.’ morals against supposedly unfair competition, forced labor, theft, and coercion. On this count, the U.S. had failed to satisfactorily explain the link between the chosen measure and the public morals objective being pursued. In fact, several aspects of the design and structure of the tax credits bore little relevance to the protection of public morals. Typically, the ‘public morals’ justification has been utilized in cases featuring: (a) money laundering, organized crime, and underage or pathological gambling, (b) the dissemination of audio-visual products and publications that contain morally objectionable content, and (c) harm to animal welfare. None are implicated in the current case against China’s industrial policies.
The WTO panel recommended that the U.S. withdraw the relevant IRA tax credits by October 2026. Yet that ruling has already been thrown out and recycled. So, what next? The U.S., unlike China, Japan, or the EU, is not a member of the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), an alternative appeals mechanism under Article 25 of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding to provide a review of WTO panel reports in the absence of the Appellate Body’s functioning. As such, the U.S.’ appealing of the ruling to the Appellate Body essentially amounts to appealing the ruling into the void. On trade and the WTO’s dispute settlement function, there is much more that binds Trump and Biden together than sets them apart.
Expanded Reading
Trump Announces Initial Trade Deal With India, The New York Times, February 2, 2026
WTO sides with China in clean energy dispute against US, PoiliticoPro, January 30, 2026
What to Know About Kevin Warsh, Trump’s Pick to Lead the Fed, The New York Times, January 30, 2026
Mexico’s Sheinbaum, Trump talk trade as USMCA review approaches, Reuters, January 29, 2026
Trump Threatens Canada With More Tariffs Over Jet Snag, Bloomberg, January 29, 2026
US Treasury strengthens currency monitoring criteria, but finds no manipulation, Reuters, January 29, 2026
Trump declares national emergency over Cuba, threatens tariffs on nations that supply oil to communist regime, Fox News, January 29, 2026
Ambassador Greer Signs the U.S.-El Salvador Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, January 29, 2026
Trump threatens to increase tariffs on South Korea, Politico, January 26, 2026
Trump warns Canada of 100% tariffs if it becomes China’s ‘drop off port’ with new potential trade deal, Fox News, January 24, 2026
DG Okonjo-Iweala urges “steady nerves” amid trade tensions; ministers discuss WTO reform, World Trade Organization, January 23, 2026
Lutnick Rejects Canada’s China Tilt, Sees Summer USMCA Talks, Bloomberg, January 22, 2026
Coupang investors seek US probe over South Korea’s handling of data leak, Reuters, January 22, 2026
Legislative Developments
Hearings and Statements
Expanded Reading
In an ambitious attempt to build a global coalition to ease China’s chokehold on critical minerals supply chains, the Trump administration hosted a Critical Minerals Ministerial on Wednesday, February 4th in Washington, bringing together representatives from 54 countries, including Japan, South Korea, India, the EU, Australia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Before the meeting, Vice President JD Vance called on participating countries to confront vulnerabilities in mineral supply chains together, saying “Our goal here…is to align trade policy, development finance, and diplomatic engagement towards a shared strategic objective. And that objective is…diversifying, global supply in the critical minerals market, while strengthening the partner countries who help all of us in this shared effort.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the initiative an “international multilateral effort” and promised attendees that the U.S. “stands ready alongside each of you as we enter this new age of shared prosperity and security.” Despite an impressive show of unity for the ministerial, not all participants decided to join the bandwagon. However, the administration did announce a trilateral agreement with Japan and the European Commission as well as bilateral MoUs with 11 countries, including Argentina, Peru, UAE, and the Philippines.
The centerpiece of the U.S.-led initiative is the creation of a “preferential trade zone” for critical minerals by enforcing price floor mechanisms. The price flooring concept to create non-China mineral supply chains has gained traction in recent months; the G7 and other countries such as Australia have been exploring the mechanism. The U.S. plan is to establish floor prices for critical minerals at each stage of production for partner countries maintained through tariffs and other measures to uphold what the Trump administration calls “pricing integrity” and avoid flooding markets with cheap critical minerals.
Last year, the Trump administration signed a sweeping agreement with MP Materials—the only major rare earths producer in the U.S.— to buy equity stake and guarantee a minimum support price. U.S. officials have indicated that it could also use powers under Section 232 to slap tariffs on certain critical minerals to ensure price stabilization. Other measures such as stockpiling could also be used to sustain mineral prices.
At home, the U.S. plan includes buying equity stakes in private firms, offering loans and offtake guarantees, fast-tracking permits, and announcing a strategic minerals reserve. The efforts to adopt such an aggressive state-led playbook have gained momentum since April last year when Beijing slapped export restrictions on key rare earths and magnets in retaliation for U.S. tariffs on Chinese products. As supplies from China dried up, it resulted in a scramble for rare earth magnets among companies and countries and even led to temporary shuttering of auto factories from Europe to the United States. However, after multiple rounds of negotiations between the U.S. and China, a deal was announced after a meeting between President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in October in South Korea.
Despite targeting allies and partners with steep tariffs and lopsided trade agreements, the Trump administration is now seeking to rally their support to counter China’s dominance in critical mineral supply chains, especially rare earth elements. In early January, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent hosted a finance ministers’ meeting of alliance partners and friends to “discuss solutions to secure and diversify supply chains for critical minerals.” In December, the State Department announced the creation of Pax Silica, a U.S.-led initiative to secure AI-related supply chains, including critical minerals. Nine countries including Australia, Japan, and South Korea joined the informal bloc while India is expected to join later this month. The Trump administration has also signed bilateral deals with the DRC, Australia, Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, Saudi Arabia and Ukraine.
The latest push to garner international support comes on a day when Trump held a phone call with President Xi ahead of the U.S. president’s planned visit to China in April. By presenting a united front on critical minerals, the U.S. may be signaling to China that its leverage is rapidly eroding.
Implementing any international agreement on critical minerals could be difficult amid the growing trust deficit between the U.S. and its allies. Participating countries may also fear Chinese retaliation and doubt whether the U.S. would come to their rescue. Second, price floors would force the U.S. and its partners to allocate significant resources and pay above-market prices, raising questions about the burden on taxpayers and long-term viability. In addition, a guaranteed price could reduce incentives for mining companies to pursue efficiency, invest in R&D, or respond to market signals. This could create a negative feedback loop—fewer competitive firms, less efficiency, and weaker incentives for diversification. The goal of building resilient, China-free supply chains could become even more difficult to achieve.
While price floors may prove beneficial to producers, a “protected” supply chain may end up raising costs for downstream customers, and ultimately consumers. A temporary, targeted price support mechanism for select minerals could foster sustainable supply chains, but a sweeping policy without clear guardrails risks being counterproductive. The Trump administration, which favors a muscular and bilateral approach through tariffs and threats, is trying its hand at multilateral cooperation.
Its friends can’t be blamed for remaining skeptical.
This issue’s Spotlight was written by Nayan Seth, Research Assistant at ICAS.
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