China-US Relations and the May 2016 Philippine Elections

Presidential campaigns for the May 2016 elections just kicked off in the Philippines. Though all candidates pay greater attention to perennial domestic issues of poverty, employment, crimes and corruption, one major foreign policy concern that should inevitably top the agenda of all presidential aspirants in the Philippines is the country’s strategic relation with two competing world powers: China and the US.

Whoever becomes the next Philippine president, there is one stark reality in Philippine foreign and security policy that it is utterly mission impossible to alter: the “rock solid” security alliance of the Philippines with the preeminent superpower, the US. The Philippine Supreme Court’s most recent decision declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) as constitutional provides a strong legal backing for the enhancement of this enduring alliance. The decision also binds the next Philippine president to vigorously embrace this alliance by seriously implementing the EDCA, especially in the context of China’s growing political and military presence in the South China Sea.

With EDCA, Presidential aspirants will no longer debate about the need to increase the rotational presence of American troops in the Philippines. The major debate will focus instead on reducing EDCA’s nagging social costs, like the unintended violence against women resulting from the rampant prostitution associated with American presence. Environmental concerns may also be raised as more US military activities in the Philippines may also create long-term pressures and damages to the country’s ecosystem, particularly in eight initial locations already offered by the Philippine government for use of American troops.

In these eight vital locations, the US can build its facilities inside Philippine bases to support American military activities not only in the country but also in the wider Asia Pacific region. Military activities include joint and combined military exercises, capacity building training, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and maritime domain awareness, among others.

Most presidential candidates welcome American presence in the country because of the anticipation that it can provide the needed deterrence against China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea. But China is very wary of EDCA and the subsequent increase in US military presence in the Philippines because of Beijing’s long-standing fear of American containment.

China is still undoubtedly suffering from an acute paranoia of American military presence because of the strong apprehension that the US is unnecessarily targeting China as a result of their growing major power rivalry in the 21st century. Presidential candidates in the May 2016 Philippine elections are aware that the Philippines is bitterly caught in the middle of this seemingly inevitable major power struggle.

Thus, one of the hard choices that the incoming Philippine president will take is how to effectively deal with China, particularly in the context of the worsening territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Given the reality of Philippine alliance with the US, will the next Philippine president repair its damaged relations with China? There are some opportunities for the next Philippine administration to improve its ties with China.

First, Manila’s accession to the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) provides opportunities for the Philippines and China to cooperate in economic fields. Strong cooperation in economic areas has a tendency to spill over to other functional areas of cooperation. Cooperation in one functional area can spread to others until the habit of cooperation is strongly established. If the Philippines and China form this habit of cooperation, both countries can build the necessary confidence to work through their differences in the South China Sea disputes. Overcoming their differences is essential in the creation of the strategic trust required for more amicable and fruitful bilateral ties.

Second, the result of Philippine international arbitration case against China can encourage the next Philippine administration to resume its bilateral talks with China because Manila will have the needed legal leverage to deal with Beijing. It will become more practical for the Philippine government to resume its bilateral talks with China in the post-arbitration period. Otherwise, China will harden its position further making it more difficult for the Philippines to conduct its own activities in the contested areas.

However, if the next Philippine president decides to continue the overly pro-Americanism of the current administration, repairing the damaged relations with China will be very onerous. Excessive pro-Americanism will even exacerbate the already ailing political ties between Manila and Beijing.

The May 2016 Philippine elections need to ensure that the next Philippine president has the necessary statecraft to balance its relations with China and the US. Just like other Southeast Asian leaders, the next Philippine president must learn how hedge with these two competing world powers in pursuit of Philippine national interests.

Dr. Rommel Banlaoi teaches at the Department of International Studies at Miriam College, the Philippines. He is the Director of the Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies (CINSS), Chairman of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR, and Vice President of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies (PACS).