Exploring China’s Unmanned Ocean Network
By J. Michael Dahm
Center for International & Strategic Studies, June 16

“China has deployed a network of sensors and communications capabilities between Hainan Island and the Paracel Islands in the northern South China Sea. These capabilities are part of a “Blue Ocean Information Network” (蓝海信息网络) developed by China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), a state-owned company, to aid in the exploration and control of the maritime environment using information technology. The network constructed in the northern South China Sea between early 2016 and 2019 is referred to as a demonstration system. However, future plans for the Blue Ocean Information Network involve expanding the sensor and communications network to the rest of the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and other ocean areas far from Chinese territory. While the Blue Ocean Information Network is largely cast as an environmental monitoring and communications system, the military utility of its sensing and communications functions makes its development important to monitor….”

“It remains to be seen how much of CETC’s ambitions can be realized. As of June, satellite imagery reveals no additional floating or fixed platforms being constructed at its fabrication site on Hainan. But the development of this network, and potentially others like it, bears watching. The Blue Ocean Information Network demonstration system in the South China Sea is the most visible and ambitious project of its kind, using information technology to advance China’s goal of becoming a great maritime power.”

2019 Young China Watchers Pulse Report
Young China Watchers, June 8

“2019 was a significant year for China with numerous anniversaries celebrated in China and around the world, most notably the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Today, China’s role in the world is increasingly scrutinized on issues such as trade and investment, technology, and health.”

“Here are a few key takeaways:

• Views are increasingly polarized and negative about China’s influence, especially toward its domestic and external policies. The survey records a 26% swing in net sentiment toward China’s impact on global affairs, from 9% net positive in 2018 to 15% net negative in 2019.
• Respondents are most positive about China’s global economic impact but are less positive about other countries adopting aspects of China’s model.
• Concerns about the impacts of China’s economic influence on national security and the environment are top of mind for respondents.
• Domestically, respondents exhibit declining confidence in China’s ability to meet economic and policy goals over the next 5 years.
• Overall, respondents demonstrate a trend toward less neutrality and more negative sentiment.
• The report highlights differing sentiments across its chapters with Asia-Pacific overall being more positive than North America.”

“More detailed insights can be found in the report, including analyses that further illuminate how different regions are interpreting China’s global role. This year we have also been able to include a time series for the first time, comparing the results with those from 2018.”

The Death of Engagement
By Orville Schell
The Wire-China, June 7

“The policy of ‘engagement’ has defined U.S.-China relations for almost a half century. It didn’t have to end this way.”

“But for those tempted to wait for a new administration, it is worth pointing out that neither Trump nor Xi have yet attacked the other in an ad hominem way, thus leaving the door still ajar for a one-on-one interaction. But because antagonisms are escalating rapidly, time is very short. For such a plan to be successful, Washington would have to be ready to acknowledge it will not be able to resolve the most fundamental systemic issues dividing Beijing from Washington and forgo regime change as an end game. Beijing would have to be willing to set its paranoia and victimization narrative aside and then temper its global belligerence to focus on areas where common interest still prevails. Right now, the kind of grand hopes of convergence that once animated earlier iterations of engagement are unrealistic. We must settle instead for a far more minimalist agenda, one that would allow us to pragmatically work together on those issues — public health, trade, climate change, and nuclear proliferation — where the mutual interest is obvious and urgent.”

“Finally, both sides would have to recognize that even in times of deep division there are still issues of critical common interest that can be jointly addressed. It is helpful to remind ourselves that the U.S. and China have squared this circle before, and it is here that the Nixon-Kissinger breakthrough in 1972 is worth re-studying. As Nixon then observed to Premier Zhou, ‘we have common interests that transcend those differences” and “while we cannot close the gulf between us, we can try and bridge it so that we may be able to talk across it.’”

The Endangered Asian Century: America, China, and the Perils of Confrontation
By Lee Hsien Loong
Foreign Affairs, June 4

“Asia has prospered because Pax Americana, which has held since the end of World War II, provided a favorable strategic context. But now, the troubled U.S.-Chinese relationship raises profound questions about Asia’s future and the shape of the emerging international order. Southeast Asian countries, including Singapore, are especially concerned, as they live at the intersection of the interests of various major powers and must avoid being caught in the middle or forced into invidious choices.”

COVID-19 endangers China’s Silk Road strategy
By James C. Grant
Washington Times, June 3

“The COVID-19 pandemic is hitting China’s global Belt and Road Initiative hard, jeopardizing President Xi Jinping’s multi-trillion dollar foreign policy agenda. Developing nations across the Belt are struggling as Chinese resources dry up and critical infrastructure projects are put on hold. However, Beijing is wasting no time during this crisis to recalibrate its soft power in pursuit of long-term strategic objectives.”

Chinese Perspectives on International Relations in the Xi Jinping Era
By Ren Xiao and Liu Ming
National Bureau of Asian Research, June 2

“This NBR Special Report offers perspectives from two Chinese scholars on the intellectual framework that structures current discussions within China about the international order. The first essay by Ren Xiao (Fudan University) surveys the growing importance of area studies within China and argues that this trend reflects the country’s increasing interests in the wider world. The second essay by Liu Ming (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences) examines the implications of Xi Jinping’s concept of a “community with a shared future for humankind” for China’s role as a rising power willing to take on more international responsibility.”

Let U.S. Diplomats Handle China, Not Judges
By Jarrett Blanc
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 29

“Calls to expose China to coronavirus liability lawsuits overlook lasting harms to U.S. diplomacy and national security”

“…a parade of prominent legislators are promising to lift China’s sovereign immunity, alongside other proposals to appear tough on Beijing. It’s the appearances that matter most, since the proposals are primarily distractions from the absence of serious ideas about the U.S.-China relationship. For example, President Donald Trump continues to threaten to issue new tariffs, still laboring under the false impression that they are paid by Chinese exporters and not by American consumers already hard-pressed by the recession. Senator Lindsey Graham and White House officials have called for the United States to stop payments on debt owed to China, despite the global economic tumult that forcing the U.S. government to default on its debts would trigger.”

“China is too powerful a country to be judged and punished in U.S. courts. When the world begins to emerge from the current crisis, the United States needs to have a serious discussion about its future political and economic relations with China. But this is not the way to proceed. Grandstanding about reparations is a distraction from the urgent debate a healthy democracy should have, especially in a presidential election year. Whoever is president in January 2021 will need to use diplomacy to pursue U.S. national interests. Tying their hands would make that critical job even harder.”