As a new administration reevaluates its military priorities and defense holdings abroad, the U.S. military base in Djibouti is one that deserves extra attention.

Djibouti is a small, East African country strategically located on the Horn of Africa. Geographically, it borders the Gulf of Aden and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait that links the Suez Canal and Red Sea of the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. Despite its small size and third world nation status, Djibouti’s valuable location has attracted the attention of multiple military powers who have since established semi-permanent or permanent presence along the country’s coast. These powers include the United States, Japan, Italy, France and, most recently, China. Russia has also looked into the country but Djibouti’s government blocked Moscow’s attempts to build a base in 2014, causing Russia to instead announce in November 2020 that it would build a base in neighboring Sudan.

Foreign militaries have valued Djibouti as a strategic stronghold in Africa largely for its location. Having operations in Djibouti not only assists with secure transport through the vital Suez Canal, but also serves as a waypoint that connects U.S. operations in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific. In particular, the United States needs to maintain a strong presence in Djibouti to continue operating globally and to be a deterrent to adversaries—such as terrorists and pirates—who seek to harm the interests of the United States and its allies. China, with its prioritization of trade and increasing desire for global interoperability, holds similar incentives as the United States to establish itself in Djibouti.

The U.S. and China in Djibouti

Djibouti is the U.S. Department of Defense home base in Africa, with the U.S. neglecting the remainder of the continent in favor of endeavors elsewhere. Camp Lemonnier, the only permanent U.S. military base in Africa, has been leased by the U.S. from the Djibouti government since 2002 and most notably houses U.S. Africa Command’s (USAFRICOM) Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Most of Camp Lemonnier’s operations are related to anti-piracy missions and peacekeeping on the high seas.

With Christopher Miller as Acting Secretary of Defense, will Camp Lemonnier and USAFRICOM begin to receive higher prioritization in military discussions? Will the rapidly, quietly expanding Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) support base play a factor in the Department of Defense’s interest in Djibouti and the Horn of Africa? If there is no change or effort to cohabitate, will future Pentagon leaders regret the lack of attention to the area as other nations potentially grasp hold of the African continent?

A short 10 kilometers away from Camp Lemonnier lies the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Support Base, which officially opened on August 1, 2017 as China’s first and only official overseas military base. Operated by the PLAN, the base takes up a ground area of 0.5 square kilometers and includes a short 400 meter runway, a heliport, and a hospital, among other support features. Like other Chinese defense projects, this Support Base has been undergoing rapid construction efforts that, evidenced from satellite imagery, have continued progressing despite the coronavirus pandemic and are still in development. Most notable of these is the 1,120-foot pier and its 320 meter extension that will reportedly allow dual-sided berthing of large PLAN warships, carriers or submarines. A potential second pier is also suspected, which would vastly expand the capacities of this small support base.

Given its strategic location not only in Africa but in relation to other foreign bases in Djibouti, this PLAN support base and its potential for tipping the balance in foreign presence in Africa deserves heightened attention.

China’s overall interest in the African continent has only grown in the last two decades. This became increasingly apparent as Beijing linked itself to Africa with its Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2014, and pushed the associated multitude of telecommunications, transportation, and sociocultural infrastructure programs. While Beijing’s specific goals in the Indian Ocean region remain ambiguous, “it is clear that the Chinese leadership is actively pursuing capabilities that would allow it to undertake a range of military missions” far from and close to its shore. This opinion is congruent with China’s long-term push towards building a blue-water Navy and the government-denied rumors in October 2020 the PLAN making camp in the formerly USN-occupied Ream Naval Base in Cambodia. 

Djibouti as a Rare Point of Commonality

Djibouti has the potential to become a unique point of cooperation on holistic issues that plague the stability and peace of the international community. At the top of this list of issues is piracy on the high seas and humanitarian operations. Both the U.S. and China—as well as other foreign presences in the Horn of Africa—have vested interests in countering these issues, as Djibouti’s neighbor “Somalia continues to have a reputation as the launching point for terrorism, piracy, people trafficking and smuggling operations.” Piracy has increased exponentially in East Africa in recent decades and inevitably has a negative impact on the international economy. In fact, a majority of the activities currently conducted by foreign militaries in Djibouti revolve around piracy and peacekeeping on the high seas. It could prove mutually beneficial to coalesce on solving these issues, especially seeing how the population of each foreign military is relatively small.

If parties are willing, there is strong potential for a healthy and stable U.S.-China engagement over Africa; especially in the Horn of Africa over security issues related to piracy and global shipping. The minimal number of U.S. inroads into the African continent, the suspicions over Beijing’s intentions for the region, and the high complexity of the African sociopolitical environment are undeniable roadblocks to debate and cooperation that cannot be ignored, but they are not insurmountable.

Djibouti would be a rational proving ground for cooperation between Washington and Beijing for five main reasons: 1) its international representation can invite a sense of accountability, 2) the small size of the parties represented naturally makes a project more manageable, 3) its isolated locale can act as a deterrent against outside influence, 4) its regional issues threaten both the U.S. and China and can provide an outlet for joint programs, and 5) regional stability is crucial to Africa’s future development, which invariably impacts American and Chinese global reputation and credibility. While acknowledging the current bilateral tensions and the low likelihood of a joint partnership at present, the idea of joint operations in Djibouti still deserves merit.

Anti-piracy efforts would be the most rational and natural first choice of joint activity, given its precedence. The PLAN first participated in United Nations-backed anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden in 2008 and has sent more than 30 naval task forces as escorts in the region since. In fact, in December 2014, the U.S. Navy and PLA Navy conducted a joint anti-piracy exercise. While circumstances were widely different in U.S.-China relations six years ago, the blueprints for joint exercises are well-worn in both nations’ militaries and precedence exists for joint U.S.-China military engagement.

Unfortunately, the likelihood of joint exercises with China remain slim at present and will not be likely to increase at a rapid rate, even under a new administration. But if such joint activities are not considered and worked towards, they—and the benefits that come from them—will never arrive. Once the Biden administration lays out its National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, a case for binational connections in Djibouti over international issues such as piracy should be worthy of consideration and pursuit.

Jessica L. Martin is a Research Assistant at ICAS. This commentary was originally released on November 25, 2020.