The U.S. DOD’s 2024 Arctic Strategy is a welcome respite from fatalistic views on China

On July 22, 2024, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) released the 2024 Arctic Strategy, marking the first update in five years on the DOD’s official approach to the Arctic region. Unlike most DOD policy and strategy releases of late, the 2024 Arctic Strategy takes a refreshing perspective on its priorities, thus providing a welcome respite from the now-expected fatalistic views on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in U.S. defense policy communications. 

Since its last Arctic strategy was released in June 2019, the Arctic has undergone unprecedented shifts in its geostrategic environment, which have only been exacerbated by the worsening effects of climate change. While much of this shift is rooted in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, China—a non-Arctic state—has long held a presence in Arctic affairs and has become more collaborative with Russia in the region, especially over the last two years.

While this Arctic Strategy does point out Russia’s and the PRC’s increased collaborative activity, it also painstakingly distinguishes their independent activities instead of simply grouping the two together in a list, as is often done elsewhere. More specifically, it briefly depicts how the Russian reliance on China for its energy export industry and their joint military activities have been “increasing,” but never refers to the two as ‘allies,’ ‘partners,’ or even suggests that they are parties with the same goals. At one point it even notes how “significant areas of disagreement” between the PRC and Russia remain, potentially to further highlight the United States’ own successful cooperation with its Allies and partners—a core message of this strategy.

Speaking at a Wilson Center event on the day of its release, Iris Ferguson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arctic and Global Resilience and a lead representative of the new 2024 Arctic Strategy, took a moment to drive home this point: “I want to be very clear. This document is not about a confrontation…despite this alignment, we still see it as a little bit superficial at the military level…[and] I don’t want to suggest in any way that they’re in that [high interoperability] level of cooperation.”

The PRC is also mentioned individually in the strategy, being called a “pacing challenge” that “seeks to increase its influence and activities.” But no language suggests outright preparation for a wartime scenario. Instead, the PRC is summarized as planning “to pursue greater influence and access, take advantage of Arctic resources, and play a larger role in regional governance.” At its most accusatory, it states that the PRC “seeks to promote the Arctic region as a ‘global commons’ in order to shift Arctic governance in its favor;” an unsurprising belief that has been expressed for several years. Most notably, the “PRC Activities in the Arctic” is the first in the list of five changes in the strategic environment of the Arctic, having been placed even ahead of “Russian Activities in the Arctic,” as a potential indication of the DOD’s prioritization of China.

As a whole, the 2024 Arctic Strategy is calm and calibrated in its terminology. The acknowledgement of a ‘competition’ or of ‘competitors’ or ‘adversaries’—terms now commonly used across formal U.S. government policy documents to refer to China or the PRC—is collectively mentioned fewer than 10 times throughout the entire document. The terms ‘war,’ ‘wartime,’ ‘conflict,’ ‘offense,’ or ‘enemy’ are mentioned in even fewer instances, if at all. 

Even with this minimal use of such terms, the unspoken ‘us vs. them’ mentality does remain present in the background due to the occasional reference of ‘competitors’ or the characterizations such as that of a “Western security architecture,” which naturally implies the existence of an alternative view.

The U.S. 2024 Arctic Strategy is not an open invitation for China to cooperate in the Arctic; nor should such an invitation be expected from the U.S. DOD, especially at such contentious times in bilateral relations as these. However, unlike most of its recent predecessor strategy documents, this new 2024 Arctic Strategy is not an outright fatalism into war and conflict. As Iris Ferguson explained at the Wilson Center, this document is intentionally an open, unclassified communication “to tell the story…about how we were thinking about the region” in a “very clear and simple” way.

Instead of periodically illustrating the threats of a ‘dangerous adversary’—the PRC—this clear-cut strategy firmly plants cooperation with Allies and partners as its centerpiece. It directly describes itself as taking a “pragmatic and transparent approach [that] is intended to reduce the possibility of escalation or misinterpretation.” Ferguson repeatedly mentioned how the authors strived to remain “clear-eyed” about the holistic situation in the Arctic, including when it comes to competitors, leading to the “monitor-and-respond” approach depicted throughout the finalized strategy. 

This tone is in sharp contrast to other recent DOD releases, such as the simultaneous ‘reoptimizations’ for Great Power Competition announced in February 2024 by the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Space Force. Both of these releases and their accompanying presentations consistently talk of ‘adversaries’ and of being prepared for potential, if not likely, warfare scenarios against the PRC.

Advertising differing approaches in different environments is not surprising, as each field of play demands specialized attention suited to its context, history, and capabilities. What is intriguing, however, is the fact that the DOD can produce two policy-related documents—both born from similar geostrategic shifts in regions of increasing militarization—within six months of one another that can so vary in tone on the PRC. Aided by both the Arctic region’s unique setting as well as its inhabitants’ clear goal of maintaining stability and security, the U.S. DOD’s new Arctic strategy elects to and effectively illustrates the PRC as a ‘notable presence’ instead of an ‘inevitable adversary.’ Even the popularized U.S. phrase “strategic competition” is only mentioned once, in the introductory memorandum to defense leadership signed by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.

Leaving out strikingly fatalistic terminology in the 2024 Arctic Strategy as it relates to China is beneficial two-fold for the U.S. Not only does it not eliminate potentially invaluable options for future engagement in the unique and inhospitable Arctic, it attracts U.S. Allies and partners and exemplifies how the U.S. DOD of today can still engage in a congenial, objective, and effective manner.

Furthermore, with how difficult terrain the Arctic always has been—and will continue to be as Cold War-era infrastructure ages, technology evolves, ice melts, funding wavers, and geopolitical arrangements shift—the U.S. can only benefit from more avenues of collaboration. If it truly wishes to maintain a stable Arctic region and safe homeland, one day China may need to be on that list of options. Collaborative efforts in the Arctic could also contribute to U.S.-China relations at large in support of maintaining lines of communication and reducing miscommunication.

Even before the release of its 2018 Arctic Policy, China has openly included the Arctic in its long-term planning. Coupled with its lasting infrastructure commitments and economic investments, it is only logical to conclude that China will remain not only present but active in the Arctic region, exerting its rights as an Arctic observer and a diplomatic nation operating under international law. Therefore, the U.S. DOD must adapt to a lasting Chinese presence in the Arctic for the sake of regional stability, even amidst the current lack of trust in U.S.-China relations. The non-fatalistic approach taken by the DOD’s 2024 Arctic Strategy is an unexpected but welcome stalwart step towards that end.