May 16, 2025

Volume 5

Issue 10

ICAS Trade ‘n Tech Dispatch (online ISSN 2837-3863, print ISSN 2837-3855) is published about every two weeks throughout the year at 1919 M St NW, Suite 310, Washington, DC 20036.
The online version of ICAS Trade ‘n Tech Dispatch can be found at chinaus-icas.org/icas-trade-technology-program/tnt-dispatch/.

What's Been Happening

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U.S. and China Reach Tariff Truce following Geneva Meeting

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In One Sentence

  • U.S. and Chinese delegations, led by Vice Premier He Lifeng and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent alongside US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, concluded two days of trade talks in Switzerland earlier this month.
  • In their joint statement, both sides agreed to roll back tariffs on each other’s goods for a 90-day period.
  • Specifically, the U.S. will suspend 24 percentage points of the tariff on Chinese goods for 90 days, retain a 10% rate, and remove the significant additional tariffs that were imposed on April 8, 2025, (Executive Orders 14259) and April 9 (EO 14266).
  • The U.S. also slashed the de minimis tariffs on low-value Chinese shipments down to 30%. 
  • Meanwhile, China will suspend 24 percentage points of its tariff for 90 days, keep a 10% rate, lift tariffs from Announcements No. 5 and No. 6 of 2025, and suspend a number of non-tariff countermeasures imposed since April 2.
  • At a press briefing, He Lifeng described the meetings as in-depth, candid, and constructive, while President Trump in a social media post called the negotiations constructive and beneficial for both countries.

Mark the Essentials

  • Notably, ahead of the Geneva talks, Beijing stated that it joined the negotiations at the request of the U.S., citing global expectations and China’s national interest, while warning Washington not to use the talks as a means of exerting pressure or coercion.
  • For his part, President Trump stated ahead of the talks that he would consider lowering tariffs if the discussions were successful, adding that trade could form the basis for “greater friendship with China,” but only if China opens its market.
  • Despite the breakthrough in Geneva, numerous issues remain to be sorted out between the U.S. and China. At the WTO session on April 30, the U.S. and its allies again criticized China for overcapacity and industrial subsidies, while China countered that the U.S. is the main force disrupting global trade. 
  • At a recent U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission meeting, industry experts and representatives warned that China’s dominance in electrical grid components and critical minerals for renewable energy is unlikely to decline soon, even if the U.S. develops a strategy to counter Beijing’s industrial policies.
  • Last month, President Trump signed an Executive Order aimed at countering China’s minerals sector dominance and reducing U.S. reliance on foreign suppliers by launching a broad initiative to accelerate deep-sea critical mineral extraction—particularly in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf—through streamlined permitting, interagency coordination, and expanded export support. 
  • U.S. industry groups have welcomed the end of de minimis treatment for Chinese goods and called for stronger enforcement, including expanding the ban to other countries, upgrading customs systems, and reinstating formal entry rules, warning that Chinese platforms may shift to alternative logistics models that still disadvantage U.S. businesses.

Keeping an Eye On…

  • Evidently, the United States and China are back to their 90-Day trade theatrics. On May 12th, the two sides agreed to pause most of their stratospheric duties on one another (as well as some of China’s export controls) in order to negotiate the outlines, if not terms, of a new economic and trade relationship. August 12th, now, is the new due date to concentrate minds at both ends, as well as prepare scathing broadsides, full of lip and accusations, in the case of failure. 90-day pauses in U.S.-China trade ties under President Trump are hardly new; bilateral trade ties during Trump 1.0 were replete with 90-Day pauses, deadlines, and other artificially constructed timetables – almost all of which failed to deliver their requisite outcomes.

    In April 2017, the two sides hammered out a 100-Day action plan under the framework of the US-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue that was created at the Trump-Xi Mar-a-Lago meeting that month. Positive movement on the action plan did not forestall the announcement of Section 301 tariffs on China in March 2018. That announcement of tariffs – unlawful as they were like the reciprocal tariffs, in turn set in train a 90-day window to resolve the U.S.’ grievances listed in its Section 301 investigation. Once again, notwithstanding positive movement including a joint consensus on May 19, 2018, on the outlines of a trade and economic deal (which was walked back subsequently due to in-fighting in the White House), the List 1 tranche of Section 301 tariffs began to be applied starting July 6, 2018. Lists 2, 3 and 4 would follow subsequently. In December 2018, following a successful high-stakes leaders meeting on the sidelines of the G20 Leaders’ Summit that saw President Trump pause his 25% tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods (the goods were subject to 10% tariffs at the time), yet another 90-day negotiation period was inaugurated. Again, despite significant positive movement during that period, the negotiations collapsed in May 2019, triggering in this case the extension of the trade war into the technology arena with the issuance of the expansive ICTS (Information and Communications Technology and Services) Order and the imposition of heavy-handed export controls on Huawei that same month. In January 2020, the two sides were finally able to eke out a Phase One agreement that contained a number of market purchase targets as well as a reduction of some non-tariff barriers. Had COVID struck a month or two earlier, even this Phase One negotiation would have fallen by the wayside.

    Given this dismal record of 90-day negotiations, should one hold out for a different result from the trade theatrics this time around? There are three reasons to be more hopeful than not. First, the two sides already have a ready-made deal in hand … which is the market purchases agreement that has been held in abeyance. It could serve as an ‘early harvest’ deal, and Treasury Secretary Bessent has alluded to it as such following his return from the Geneva talks with his Chinese counterparts. Second, the administration is barely 150 days into office. There is no rush for either side to push the other off-the-cliff this early. Finally, the economic stakes are altogether higher. During Trump 1.0, the additional tariffs to be applied – and which were applied – in case of failure were in the 10-25% range. Today, they are in the 100-125% range. And even if that triple-digit figure might seem a tad-bit exaggerated, the tariffs that would be applied today are over the 50% figure. At these rates, and with additional tariffs kicking-in under separate heads (Section 232, Biden era 301 tariffs, de minimis, etc.) a wholescale decoupling of the US-China trade and economic relationship could potentially be in order. All-the-more reason, then, to draw out the negotiations and bring them to a (sort-of) successful conclusion.

Expanded Reading

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U.S. Pursues More Trade Deals as Tariff Damage Looms

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In One Sentence

  • President Trump and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced a “breakthrough” trade deal granting U.S. agriculture greater market access and reducing U.S. tariffs on UK steel, aluminum, and autos (including via a quota), though the baseline 10% tariff on most UK imports persists and full details are yet to be negotiated.
  • President Trump, meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, characterized the USMCA as a “transitional deal,” questioned its continued necessity, and signaled potential renegotiation, while Carney insisted the pact requires changes, especially to address U.S. tariffs.
  • Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau announced the State Department will prioritize “commercial diplomacy,” pledging to make it more responsive to private-sector concerns abroad and citing critical minerals as a crucial area of focus.
  • Trump’s new Executive Orders provide U.S. automakers a domestic production offset and expand the anti-stacking of duties to prevent cumulative steel, aluminum, and Canadian/Mexican tariffs beyond autos, mitigating negative tariff impacts, especially on auto parts.

Mark the Essentials

  • President Trump defended his administration’s trade policy despite new data showing a first-quarter economic contraction, attributing the downturn to the “Biden overhang” and reiterating his belief that tariffs will soon spur a domestic manufacturing boom.
  • Critics, including lawmakers and the IMF, have highlighted the negative impact of Trump’s tariff approach, linking it to the cooling economic picture evidenced by the Q1 GDP decline and rising imports to stock up on inventories, and warning of a potential recession.
  • South Korean trade officials deem a finalized trade pact with the U.S. as being unfeasible prior to their June presidential vote, significantly lowering expectations for an agreement before the expiration of President Trump’s 90-day tariff reprieve, even as American negotiators characterized their recent discussions positively.
  • The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has urged broad tariff exclusions for small businesses and non-U.S. sourced products due to potential harm, while the Trump administration, reflecting its auto offset strategy, maintains relief will come from reshoring and tax cuts, not widespread exclusions.
  • President Trump declared the U.S. will dictate trade deal terms, asserting that other countries need U.S. market access more than the reverse and plans to present non-negotiable tariff “numbers” to partners, while Treasury Secretary Bessent offered a more nuanced view of ongoing negotiations with numerous countries.
  • Fed Chair Powell, citing deep economic impact and uncertainty from President Trump’s tariffs and trade talks, has adopted a “wait and see” stance on interest rates, warning sustained tariffs risk inflation and slower growth.
  • March’s U.S. trade deficit soared to a record $140.5 billion, propelled by an unprecedented goods deficit and a surge in imports to front-run the tariffs, even as President Trump’s tariffs, intended to reduce such imbalances, have paradoxically contributed to this recent import spike.

Keeping an Eye On…

  • So, what did we learn from President Trump’s first of probably many “beautiful” trade deals that was struck with Keir Starmer’s United Kingdom on May 8th? The UK happens to be the rare case of a major economy that runs a goods trade deficit with the U.S. – hence, the UK was only hit with the baseline 10% reciprocal tariff and no additional reciprocal duties. Mr. Trump, furthermore, holds a soft spot for the “mother country” and like many of his hardy republican-minded citizenry, tends to bubble over at the first sight of the British monarchy. As such, the general terms of the US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal might not be the best yardstick to measure Trump’s dealmaking modus operandi with all-and-sundry. Be that as it may, there are useful insights to be gleaned.

    First, the general terms are overwhelmingly goods trade and tariffs related. The considerable differences between the two sides on non-tariff barriers, safety standards, data (digital services taxes), etc. have been kicked into the long grass for the time being. Trump has learnt his lessons well that adjusting such behind-the-border barriers can be a protracted process, especially with other advanced economies. Second, the base 10% reciprocal tariff that is being levied on all is not set in stone. That base 10% tariff will come off the UK’s steel and aluminum exports to the U.S., in addition to the removal of the 25% Section 232 tariff on these metals. The Trump administration’s fact sheet even speaks of a new US-UK “trading union” for steel and aluminum being created. On the other hand, the base 10% reciprocal tariff will remain on the UK’s auto exports to the U.S. Although the 25% Section 232 auto tariffs will come off and a quota of 100,000 cars (almost equivalent to the number of UK cars exported to the US in 2024) will be created, the base 10% reciprocal tariff will remain. Japanese negotiators have more-or-less been told the same thing regarding the base tariff by their U.S. counterparts. It is worth clarifying that both the Section 232 auto and steel tariffs are standalone tariffs; they are not stacked on top of the base reciprocal tariff.

    Finally, China was not at the table but on the table in the US-UK negotiations. In more than one section of the deal, its general terms essentially specify that the UK must strip China out of critical or industrially salient US-centric supply chains and, in the case of steel and aluminum, even from ownership of relevant production facilities in the UK. Given the U.S.’ ever-lengthening list of sectors to be subjected to supply chain resiliency considerations (steel and aluminum; autos and auto parts; truck and truck parts; pharmaceutical and biotechnology; semiconductors; critical minerals; food supplies and farmland; ports and shipping terminals; AI; quantum; hypersonics; aerospace; advanced manufacturing; and directed energy), UK-China trade cannot but be impacted, going forward. The third-party provisions in the US-UK deal bear a faint resemblance to the infamous “China Clause” in the USMCA agreement (Article 32.10) which essentially allows the U.S. to terminate the USMCA agreement with either one or both of the signatories if one or both enters into a free trade agreement with China. Administration officials have hinted for a while that the reciprocal tariffs on partners and allies could be reduced in exchange for isolating China from their markets. The US-UK deal seems to be the first of perhaps a select few deals that puts this call into practice. The operative question then is which country will be the next to follow the UK’s lead?   

Expanded Reading

On the Hill

Legislative Developments

  • Two new bills were introduced by Reps. Raul Ruiz (D-CA) and Gabe Evans (R-CO), and Reps. Jay Obernolte (R-CA) and Susie Lee (D-NV) respectively, to reduce U.S. dependence on China for critical minerals by extending clean energy manufacturing tax credits and establishing an intergovernmental task force.
  • Senate Democrats, led by Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA), introduced a bill to exempt small businesses from President Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs, citing threats to their survival.
  • A Senate resolution to end President Trump’s worldwide “reciprocal” tariffs, imposed under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act, failed to pass due to a 49-49 deadlock after two supportive senators failed to cast their vote.
  • A bipartisan group of House and Senate lawmakers are backing the Safe American Food Exports Act of 2025, which would formally authorize the USDA to negotiate agreements ensuring U.S. animal product exports can continue from disease-free regions during outbreaks.

Hearings and Statements

  • At the American Leadership Initiative’s annual summit, Sen. Elissa Slotkin (D-MI) criticized President Trump’s China policy as erratic and confusing to allies, arguing it lacks strategy, overestimates his negotiating ability, and weakens U.S. soft power while hurting domestic industries and fostering perceptions of favoritism.
  • In a May 1 virtual press call, Sen. Alex Padilla (D-CA), joined by Sens. Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Patty Murray (D-WA), warned that Trump’s steep tariffs will “devastate” California ports, citing a projected 30% drop in cargo and predicting “empty shelves, rising prices… and more Americans out of work.” 
  • Also on May 1, 19 Senate Democrats—including Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-OR) and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)—condemned President Trump’s tariffs as “disastrous” for housing costs, warning in their letter that these tariffs could add up to $10,000 to home prices, increase interest rates and mortgage costs, and worsen the housing crisis.
  • On April 29, the Senate confirmed former Sen. David Perdue (R-GA) as U.S. Ambassador to China in a 67–29 vote; during his confirmation hearing, he pledged to promote strategic reshoring and strengthen alliances to form a united front against Beijing.
  • Earlier, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) called on Apple CEO Tim Cook to explain the company’s reported behind-the-scenes lobbying for tariff exemptions, raising concerns about “influence-peddling” and noting that Apple appeared to be the primary beneficiary of carveouts following Cook’s private outreach to Trump administration officials.

Expanded Reading