ICAS Trade ‘n Tech Dispatch (online ISSN 2837-3863, print ISSN 2837-3855) is published about every two weeks throughout the year at 1919 M St NW, Suite 310, Washington, DC 20036.
The online version of ICAS Trade ‘n Tech Dispatch can be found at chinaus-icas.org/icas-trade-technology-program/tnt-dispatch/.
In One Sentence
Mark the Essentials
Keeping an Eye On…
Given this dismal record of 90-day negotiations, should one hold out for a different result from the trade theatrics this time around? There are three reasons to be more hopeful than not. First, the two sides already have a ready-made deal in hand … which is the market purchases agreement that has been held in abeyance. It could serve as an ‘early harvest’ deal, and Treasury Secretary Bessent has alluded to it as such following his return from the Geneva talks with his Chinese counterparts. Second, the administration is barely 150 days into office. There is no rush for either side to push the other off-the-cliff this early. Finally, the economic stakes are altogether higher. During Trump 1.0, the additional tariffs to be applied – and which were applied – in case of failure were in the 10-25% range. Today, they are in the 100-125% range. And even if that triple-digit figure might seem a tad-bit exaggerated, the tariffs that would be applied today are over the 50% figure. At these rates, and with additional tariffs kicking-in under separate heads (Section 232, Biden era 301 tariffs, de minimis, etc.) a wholescale decoupling of the US-China trade and economic relationship could potentially be in order. All-the-more reason, then, to draw out the negotiations and bring them to a (sort-of) successful conclusion.
Expanded Reading
In One Sentence
Mark the Essentials
Keeping an Eye On…
Finally, China was not at the table but on the table in the US-UK negotiations. In more than one section of the deal, its general terms essentially specify that the UK must strip China out of critical or industrially salient US-centric supply chains and, in the case of steel and aluminum, even from ownership of relevant production facilities in the UK. Given the U.S.’ ever-lengthening list of sectors to be subjected to supply chain resiliency considerations (steel and aluminum; autos and auto parts; truck and truck parts; pharmaceutical and biotechnology; semiconductors; critical minerals; food supplies and farmland; ports and shipping terminals; AI; quantum; hypersonics; aerospace; advanced manufacturing; and directed energy), UK-China trade cannot but be impacted, going forward. The third-party provisions in the US-UK deal bear a faint resemblance to the infamous “China Clause” in the USMCA agreement (Article 32.10) which essentially allows the U.S. to terminate the USMCA agreement with either one or both of the signatories if one or both enters into a free trade agreement with China. Administration officials have hinted for a while that the reciprocal tariffs on partners and allies could be reduced in exchange for isolating China from their markets. The US-UK deal seems to be the first of perhaps a select few deals that puts this call into practice. The operative question then is which country will be the next to follow the UK’s lead?
Expanded Reading
Legislative Developments
Hearings and Statements
Expanded Reading
The Institute for China-America Studies is an independent nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization dedicated to strengthening the understanding of U.S.-China relations through expert analysis and practical policy solutions.
1919 M St. NW Suite 310,
Washington, DC 20036
icas@chinaus-icas.org
(202) 968-0595
© 2025 INSTITUTE FOR CHINA-AMERICA STUDIES. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.