Critical Mineral Is Testing Climate Cooperation From the High Seas to the Arctic

The entry into force of the Agreement on Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction, widely known as the BBNJ Agreement or the High Seas Treaty, marks an important moment for global ocean governance. It reflects a growing international effort to strengthen the protection and cooperative management of marine spaces beyond national jurisdiction. Yet this moment of conservation arrives alongside another trend that points in a very different direction: the growing interest in the ocean as a potential source of critical minerals for renewable transition.

The clean energy transition is meant to reduce the environmental harms of fossil fuels, but it depends on minerals that must be extracted, processed, transported, and governed. Electric vehicles, batteries, grid infrastructure, and other clean technologies all require minerals such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, and rare earth elements. Since critical minerals become increasingly important to the future of clean energy systems, attention is increasingly focused on both their availability and the security of their supply chains. With the seabed believed to contain significant deposits of many of these minerals, the deep sea is increasingly discussed not only as an ecological frontier, but also as a potential resource frontier.    

This is the resource paradox of the clean energy transition. To move away from fossil fuels, societies need to expand renewable energy and other low-carbon technologies. Yet some of the material inputs required for that transition may create new environmental pressures, especially in fragile and poorly understood ecosystems such as the seabed. For example, deep-sea mining could disturb seafloor sediments, damage benthic habitats, and generate sediment plumes that affect marine communities beyond the immediate mining site. 

The deep sea ecosystems remain poorly understood, and the full consequences of mining activity are still debated. Critics warn that deep-sea ecosystems may be damaged by mining before they are even fully studied, while supporters argue that seabed minerals could help diversify critical mineral supply and support the technologies needed for decarbonization. 

The BBNJ Agreement does not regulate seabed mining directly. Its focus is the conservation and sustainable use of marine ecosystems. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) remains the central institution for mineral-resource-related activities in the international seabed Area under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. That distinction matters because BBNJ is not a mining regulator and does not replace the ISA. 

Yet the two regimes should not be treated as separate worlds. If seabed mining affects habitats, species, or broader ecosystem functions, it inevitably touches the biodiversity concerns that BBNJ was designed to elevate. The overlap is therefore not simply about licensing authority. It is about how different regimes, created for different purposes, respond to the same ocean space and the same environmental consequences. 

This is why the BBNJ Agreement’s “not undermine” principle matters. The agreement is meant to operate without weakening existing legal instruments, frameworks, and relevant legal bodies. In practice, that requirement raises a new question of how can institutions with different mandates work together to manage the shared goals of governance, development, and protection in the same ocean space? The answer is not yet clear, but the need for dialogue is clear, especially as climate change, resource demand, and ocean governance become more connected. 

In fact, some studies suggest that deep-sea mineral extraction could, under certain conditions, reduce some environmental pressures compared to land-based mining. Although significant uncertainties remain regarding biodiversity loss, habitat disruption, and long-term ecological impacts, these competing assessments reinforce the need for stronger coordination between institutions. In this context, the BBNJ Agreement could actually help strengthen environmental baselines and biodiversity considerations, and the ISA remains responsible for regulating mineral activities. If managed effectively, the relationship between the two frameworks could provide a more balanced approach to both environmental protection and resource development. 

The Arctic adds another layer to this dilemma. This region contains significant mineral resources and has long been central to discussions of energy, shipping, security, and climate change. It is also one of the regions most visibly transformed by global warming. The energy transition is raising the strategic value of Arctic minerals, while climate change is altering the region’s physical conditions and increasing attention to local development. 

The Arctic also introduces a second paradox. Beyond the resource paradox of the clean energy transition, there is a governance paradox in the Arctic itself: the region increasingly requires scientific cooperation, environmental transparency, and careful rules coordination, yet the same forces that make cooperation necessary also make it harder to sustain, because states may fear that stronger international rules could limit their own interests and influence in the region. Critical minerals, shipping routes, and resource access are increasingly viewed through the lens of supply chain security, industrial competitiveness, and great-power competition. As a result, the Arctic’s environmental and development challenges cannot be separated from the broader political context in which they are governed. 

In 2024, Norway’s parliament supported opening a large Arctic seabed area for mineral exploration, presenting the issue partly through the lens of metals needed for the green transition. However, later that year, the government paused the first licensing round after political pressure, environmental criticism, and broader international concern. The episode shows how quickly the clean energy transition and environmental protection can become entangled with resource access and international political concerns.

Ultimately, the environmental and political paradoxes of the energy transition share the same root. Developing new sources of critical minerals will support decarbonization, but it creates all kinds of challenges that no single country or institution can address alone. International cooperation is needed to ensure that efforts to support the green transition do not end up creating new environmental damage, and it is also needed to prevent competition over critical minerals from deepening political distrust and confrontation between states. 

Indeed, the effectiveness of international agreements depends on state behavior because their mandates are limited. Nevertheless, they can help shape the terms of debate. They may not be able to remove competition, but they can still shape whether competition takes place within a more transparent, science-based, and environmentally cautious framework. 

The larger question then is whether international governance can turn these overlapping pressures on climate change into a space for cooperation rather than confrontation in an era of great power competition. The search for critical minerals should not be allowed to undermine the environmental and cooperative principles that the clean energy transition is meant to advance.