Donald Trump is about to meet Kim Jong-un face to face, the first time a sitting U.S. president has sat down with a North Korean leader since the armistice that froze the Korean War. In the three months since Trump impulsively decided to meet with Kim, the summit has received both condemnation and support. Current U.S. policy fails to consider its past dealings with North Korea. By ignoring the lessons that can be derived from studying past diplomatic failures, the United States is at real risk of letting history repeat itself. To minimize that risk, here are some key points that Trump should keep in mind as he sits down at the negotiating table in Singapore.

Miscommunication and misunderstanding

One of the biggest divides that must be crossed is to agree on a definition of denuclearization. Melissa Hanham has observed that, for North Korea, denuclearization refers to the entire peninsula and the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the region, not just North Korea’s arsenal. North Korea has also insisted that American forces in South Korea be removed and military drills near the Korean Peninsula be halted as a part of denuclearization efforts. The United States is focusing on Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID) and demands that it be unilateral. As it stands, these two positions are irreconcilable, and it is unclear that either party will yield on this particular point.  

Up until this now, the Trump administration has consistently underestimated Kim. That needs to stop. Kim is a smart and ruthless leader who has advanced his country’s economic agenda and developed an operational nuclear weapons program, all while enduring crippling international sanctions. Kim has also deftly consolidated his power at home by imprisoning and executing anyone he views as an obstacle to his agenda. This includes his powerful uncle, Jang Song-thaek and his half-brother, Kim Jong-nam.

The United States should also be realistic about the prospects of North Korea agreeing to completely eliminate its nuclear weapons program, at least in a short amount of time. The top priority for the Kim dynasty is to secure its survival, and its recently completed nuclear weapons program provides an ironclad guarantee to that end. Kim often refers to his nuclear weapons as a “treasured sword.” Economic aid, sanctions relief and written security guarantees can never fill that role, and the Trump administration must be prepared to offer the North Koreans a bargaining chip of comparable value. Determining what that “treasured sword” is will likely be the single biggest obstacle to the success of the summit.   

The conventional approach will not work with North Korea  

The negotiations in Singapore will likely focus on economic sanctions and military posturing. Most of the negotiators involved in the process are heavily influenced by the tactics of the Cold War and will resort to what they perceive as tried-and-true methods of diplomacy. This strategy is unlikely to succeed with North Korea. For decades, military threats and economic sanctions have failed to coerce the Kim regime into abandoning its nuclear ambitions. On the contrary, it has steeled their resolve and led them to double their efforts.  

Given that North Korea already has demonstrated nuclear weapons capabilities, Trump needs to consider the extent to which Pyongyang already poses an immediate security threat to the United States. As Mark Bowden points out, “as the latest head of a family that has ruled for three generations, one whose primary purpose has been to survive, as a young man with a lifetime of wealth and power before him, how likely is he to wake up one morning and set fire to his world?” It is far more likely that Kim wants nuclear weapons as a deterrent, not weapons that he actually intends to use. This makes North Korea no more of an immediate threat to the United States than Russia, China or any other nuclear weapons state.

Keys to a successful summit

If the American president is cognizant of these issues and adapts his negotiating strategy accordingly, there is a real possibility that tomorrow’s summit could yield positive results. In this case, a “positive result” is any outcome that further reduces tensions and keeps denuclearization on the table. It is extremely unlikely that a grand bargain will be reached in Singapore in which North Korea immediately surrenders its nuclear weapons. However, there are other, more achievable outcomes that can enhance strategic stability and reduce the risk of a catastrophic military confrontation on the Korean peninsula. This includes formally ending the Korean War with a peace treaty. Even an agreement analogous to the Panmunjom declaration that outlined specific benchmarks to end the war, would be a historic victory.

Hongbo Xu is a research assistant at the Institute for China-America Studies.