Dr. Chase has written extensively on China and the Indo-Pacific region. His view aligns with the Biden administration that it is crucial to mobilize and rally U.S. allies to address the competition with China. In an opinion piece he published on The Diplomat in 2018, Dr. Chase suggested that “If Washington is to most effectively leverage the advantages its alliances and partnerships offer in a long-term competition with China, it could consider finding ways to further strengthen its diplomatic and economic engagement”. Before joining the Department of Defense, Dr. Chase’s research at RAND Corporation focused on regional responses to U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific region. The research concluded with three recommendations for the U.S. to work more effectively with allies and partners:

• While direct, bilateral cooperation should remain the primary effort, the United States should do more to coordinate with Australia, India, and Japan in Southeast Asia.
• Coordinating with allies and partners to engage third countries provides four main benefits to the United States: Coordination (1) pools resources, (2) facilitates division of labor that leverages unique allied and partner strengths and relationships, (3) counters PRC influence in countries with which the United States cannot fully engage, and (4) achieves U.S. objectives without asking regional countries to explicitly align themselves with the United States (which regional countries are wary of doing).
• There are five main challenges to effective coordination: (1) government biases and processes favor bilateral efforts instead of cooperation in engaging third countries; (2) the dominant narrative portrays U.S.-China competition in bilateral terms and does not take into account allied and partner contributions; (3) regional countries seek unique and separate relationships with the United States, and there are divergences in interests between the United States, allies, and partners; (4) Chinese influence in allies and partners could undermine their ability and willingness to coordinate with the United States; and (5) differing U.S., allied, and partner planning and budget cycles complicate efforts to develop coordinated or joint plans.