EVENT SUMMARY
On Wednesday, October 18, 2023, the 5th China-U.S.-Canada Trilateral Relations Roundtable was held at the Institute for China-America Studies’ (ICAS) office in Washington, D.C. The 5th Trilateral Roundtable was conducted under Chatham House rules and consisted of two panels: Panel 1 on Politics & Security and Panel 2 on Trade & Climate, with a total of 13 expert participants gathered from across China, the United States and Canada. During each panel, every participant first contributed short opening remarks in response to a set of prepared questions relevant to the topic of their choice. After their initial remarks, each panel engaged in a moderated group discussion, joined by questions and comments from all gathered participants. The event began and was concluded with introductory and closing remarks, respectively, by senior officials from the institutions co-sponsoring the roundtable: the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, The Carter Center, and the China Institute, University of Alberta.
PANEL 1: Politics & Security
Following a set of introductory remarks framing recent events in China-U.S.-Canada relations, the panelists offered a depiction of Canada as a self-conscious, open-minded middle power situated between two great powers that are deeply engaged in competition; a theme that was given repeated attention throughout the Roundtable. On the one hand, Canada, like the other Group of 7 countries, is a uniquely important ally of the United States in both the political and security realms. Although some participants recounted their concern about Canada’s limited inclusion in formal U.S. frameworks in the Indo-Pacific region, it was generally agreed that Canada’s diplomatic and strategic cooperation is currently considered to be “healthy” with its giant neighbor, the United States. On the other hand, several participants pointed out that Canada-China relations, itself tied to the state of U.S.-China relations, is both evolving independently of its own accord and has been marked by a significant mutual decline in favorability in recent years. Even so, there was broad agreement and emphasis on the fact that, while Canada is an essential partner of the United States and an evolving partner with China, it is still understood as its own country in terms of enjoying agency to prioritize its needs, first and foremost. In this context, Canada’s priorities of “security, freedom and prosperity” have not changed, even in light of its new Indo-Pacific Strategy, issued in late-2022, and participation in increased activities in the region. A few scholars queried the purpose of some of these activities, though.
Speaking specifically with regard to politics and security issues, participants were able to point to several past, present, and potentially upcoming instances of tension. First, are the ongoing military close encounters, especially in the Indo-Pacific where Canada’s military has been participating more in joint exercises and operations, usually alongside its U.S. counterparts. One panelist submitted that there is no point in arguing over the structural disagreements in international law anymore, given that it has been a futile basis for stabilizing the region. Instead, the focus should now be on managing these tensions to mitigate the risk of collisions, both in air and at sea, and the potential clashes that could follow thereafter. Several of the panelists agreed with this sentiment, which sparked a brief discussion on how each governments’ reactions to the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East were being perceived by the other parties. Differing perceptions on events and appropriate responses, it appears, is a specific hurdle that is necessary to acknowledge and overcome insofar as each party is concerned.
Second, there was a broad consensus that the sudden and extensive drop in academic and scientific engagement in the U.S.-China-Canada trilateral relationship, most of it credited to mistrust between the U.S. and China but also arising specifically from the Covid-19 pandemic, is alarming and in urgent need of repair. One panelist described the current research exchanges—or their lack of—as “operating in a vacuum” while another panelist depicted the dangers associated with working as a U.S.-China relations scholar, both situations which have fueled misunderstanding and frustration at all levels of governance and society. Despite these obstacles, the participants took care to continually emphasize the importance of working towards open dialogue, if not active cooperation, and the increasing necessity of such cooperation to be realized as soon as possible. Several of the experts made mention of the upcoming elections in the U.S., Taiwan, and Canada as particular timelines of concern, and that self-centered and protectionist appeals by candidates would only intensify as the election dates draw closer.
While Panel 1 was fairly split on whether or not trilateral relations would actually be able to improve over the next 1-2 years—with some openly acknowledging the unlikelihood of improvement given the backdrop of the upcoming domestic elections in each of the three nations—there was also an agreed-upon need to convey optimism and forward-thinking strategies in the midst of these dark diplomatic times. Parties must acknowledge the differing perceptions that governments have of situations, but understanding true intent is virtually impossible without trust. The perceived pressure of a “ticking time bomb” is not conducive to positive thinking. The panelists agreed that face-to-face communication, subsequently paired with cooperative action, is crucial in making any progress in this trilateral relationship. This includes Track I and Track II level dialogues as well, which several participants mourned the recent decline of.
Specifically referring to U.S.-China bilateral relations—which inevitably impacts the circumstances of China-U.S.-Canada trilateral relations—many of the panelists made positive references to the potential upcoming meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the APEC Summit, expressing strong hope that not only such a meeting take place but that it is constructive in “rebuilding trust” among the leadership of these countries. Given the aforementioned concerns about the impact of upcoming elections in the U.S. and Taiwan, it is especially important if positive signals and some mutual understandings could be reached at the Biden-Xi meeting. Some participants also suggested that Canada should aim to develop a more active position both in the region and in the trilateral relationship, either as a middle power with its own interest-based approach or as a mediator of regional tensions and of the U.S.-China relationship. Some of the specific suggestions included finding a specific development niche in trade, better managing inaccurate public opinion, and conducting multilateral outreach at the ministerial as well as provincial levels. Some panelists also proposed that Canada and China increase and improve their bilateral diplomatic engagements, strengthen civil society exchanges, and increase mutual understanding of each other’s values and interests.
PANEL 2: Trade & Climate
The second panel of the 5th China-U.S.-Canada Trilateral Relations Roundtable focused on how the three countries could enhance, and benefit from, their trade and climate-related engagements, including on issues such as climate financing, climate policies, and electric vehicle supply chains. The trilateral trade and economic relationships remain a vital area of cooperation and competition in U.S.-China-Canada relations. The panelists broadly agreed that trilateral cooperation on climate policy is not only possible but also beneficial in terms of promoting mutual understanding and facilitating technological advancement and sharing. One panelist provided a detailed depiction of how such a cooperation could feasibly come to pass specifically in the Cascadia Maritime Region along the Western coast of North America. At the same time, it was equally acknowledged by the panelists that competition-driven ideas such as “de-risking” and “decoupling” still dominate the discussion of climate-related development plans among the three countries, and the insufficient trust among the authorities is one of the major causal factors in this regard.
The panelists highlighted the importance of restoring the confidence of foreign businesses in China’s economy, given that China is experiencing a period of slow growth amid its economic transition. The panelists acknowledged recent Chinese government public statements on stimulating and attracting foreign investment but also contended that speeches and statements alone are not sufficient, especially at this time of derisking if not decoupling. This places third parties such as Canada in a very difficult position as Ottawa’s economy is deeply reliant on regional and global trade.
The panelists suggested that the three countries should jointly work on climate-related development issues to strengthen ties and produce tangible and mutually beneficial outcomes. Some specifically suggested that the three countries pay more attention to carbon emissions reduction as well as standard setting in this regard, given that all three countries share a common interest in coordinating and establishing new norms and rules for carbon policy and its regulation. Other panelists suggested that infrastructure development programs such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), currently in the midst of its 10-year anniversary celebration, should include more climate focused initiatives. The BRI had, after all, come in for criticism from the West on the climate sustainability front following its initial launch. The panelists broadly agreed that deepening cooperation and developing new opportunities for cooperation is critical to stabilizing the trilateral relationship.
Multiple panelists echoed the sentiments expressed in the first panel with regard to the pressing necessity for greater people-to-people exchanges in this post-Covid-19 era. The three countries are still working on restoring these relationships. Some panelists suggested that restoring people-to-people exchanges could serve as a “low-hanging fruit” for the three countries while others disagreed and suggested that the rhetoric of competition, especially from the U.S. side, has made it difficult to resume normal communication and exchanges. A few panelists suggested that more attention be paid to inter parliamentary communication, especially as both U.S. Congressional and Canadian domestic politics begin to overlap on the China-related international trade and economic affairs front. Regardless, resuming close people-to-people exchanges could help reduce misunderstandings and lower the likelihood that domestic legislation drawn up by the parliamentary branch in all these countries becomes an aggravating factor in what already is a fragile trilateral relationship.
The roundtable concluded with the panelists collectively suggesting that Canada should be viewed, and embraced, as a more proactive actor within the trilateral relationship. Some panelists suggested that instead of analyzing the impact of U.S.-China interactions on Canada, more attention should be paid to discussing how Canada-and also other third parties, such as Australia, view the U.S.-China bilateral relationship and the role and interests that they see therein for themselves. Given that Canada is geographically closer to China than is Australia, the view was that the scope for Canada-China trade still had ample room for growth.
