6th “U.S.-China Plus” Roundtable

EVENT SUMMARY

On Friday, December 13, 2024, the 6th “U.S.-China Plus” Roundtable was held at the Institute for China-America Studies’ office in Washington D.C. Inaugurated in 2019 as the “China-U.S.-Canada” Trilateral Roundtable, this year marked the first time that the roundtable discussion has expanded beyond its original scope to include more third-party countries’ perspectives in order to inspire creative and pragmatic policy recommendations to promote peace, stability, and cooperation between the United States and China. The 6th “U.S.-China Plus” consisted of the following three panels: Panel I: The New Economic Nationalism: Assessing the Consequences of U.S.-China Derisking; Panel II: Geopolitical Hotspots and Implications for U.S.-China Bilateral Ties; and Panel III: Paths to Coexistence: Is Climate still an Area of U.S.-China Cooperation? 20 speakers participated in the Roundtable. 

During each panel, speakers first contributed short opening remarks based on a set of prepared guiding questions relevant to the panel theme. After their initial remarks, each panel engaged in an interactive group discussion, joined by questions, comments, and suggestions from all the gathered speakers. Dr. Nong Hong, Executive Director & Senior Fellow of the Institute for China-America Studies delivered the introductory remarks. Dr. Wu Shicun, Founding President, National Institute for South China Sea Studies and Chairman of the Advisory Board of ICAS, and Prof. Gordon Houlden, Director Emeritus, The China Institute, University of Alberta and Member of the ICAS Advisory Board, delivered the Opening Remarks. Ms. Han Hua, Secretary General of the Beijing Club for International Dialogue and Wang Sheng, former President of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies delivered the Closing Remarks.

The 6th “U.S.-China Plus” Roundtable was co-hosted with The Carter Center, National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Beijing Club for International Dialogue, and Institute for China-Europe Studies.

Panel 1: The New Economic Nationalism: Assessing the Consequences of U.S.-China Derisking

The first panel featured Mr. Prashanth Parameswaran, Global Fellow at Wilson Center; Mr. Yang Li, Executive Director of the Institute for China-Europe Studies; Dr. Enrique Dussel Peters, Professor at the Graduate School of Economics at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; and Dr. Zhao Hai, Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Senior Fellow, Beijing Club for International Dialogue. The panel was moderated by Dr. Denis Simon, Distinguished Fellow at the Institute for China-America Studies.

The panel explored the multifaceted consequences of U.S.-China economic competition, framed through the lens of economic nationalism and de-risking. Panelists generally agreed that de-risking was a long-term strategy that was reshaping global economic dynamics with uneven impacts across regions and challenges for global cooperation. The panel began with an acknowledgment that the political and economic ramifications of U.S.-China de-risking will spill over to other regions including Southeast Asia, Europe, and Latin America. In particular, moderator Simon set the tone of the discussion by emphasizing that the ripple effects of de-risking touch not only global markets but also geopolitical relationships, creating new risks for international stability.

Building on this foundation, the panelists examined how specific regions were being influenced by and responding to these shifts. In Southeast Asia, as highlighted by Prashanth Parameswaran, governments see de-risking as both a challenge and an opportunity. Domestic strategies such as Singapore’s outbound investment screening and quantum technology planning programs as well as the imposition of tariffs by ASEAN nations on Chinese goods like EVs prove the complexity of these dynamic economic relationships. Yet, regional coordination in Southeast Asia remains a challenge as individual nations pursue diverse agendas amidst issues such as competition for semiconductor investments and ASEAN’s own Vision 2045 initiative. He also stressed the importance of U.S. incentives to keep Southeast Asia aligned with its economic vision, particularly given projections that the region will constitute 30% of the global economy by 2055.

With regard to Europe amidst this U.S.-China de-risking, Yang Li explained that the EU’s de-risking approach has focused on reducing overdependence on Chinese supply chains while mitigating potential disruptions. Policies have targeted supply chain resilience in critical sectors like EVs. In regards to disruptions, Yang suggested that the EU fears that the diversion of Chinese exports from the U.S. could lead to a surge in goods entering the EU, potentially disturbing its market and trade balances. The EU is also worried about potential coercive trade policies to be imposed by the incoming administration, such as tariffs on European goods. Yang addressed the broader implications of the U.S. leadership change too, emphasizing European anxieties about trade wars and strategic alignment under both the Trump and Biden administrations. Further complicating matters are geopolitical challenges like the Ukraine war and perceptions of China’s support for Russia, which have eroded trust between Europe and China and pushed the EU toward a more hawkish stance.

Enrique Dussel Peters provided a Latin American perspective, framing U.S.-China de-risking as a full-scale confrontation with significant implications for the region. He described a region deeply intertwined with China, particularly Mexico, which relies heavily on Chinese intermediate goods that are subsequently exported to the U.S. He noted that China has been Mexico’s second-largest trading partner since 2003 and a major supplier of intermediate goods for manufacturing with 87% of Mexico’s imports from China being intermediate goods. He argued that U.S. calls for decoupling fail to account for the complexities of the China-Mexico relationship, where efforts to reduce reliance on Chinese imports will oftentimes end up impacting American companies that source these intermediate inputs from their manufacturing facilities in China. Influenced by both the strong link and the huge gap in understanding, he observed that Washington’s de-risking is both economically risky and unlikely to succeed.

The final panelist Zhao Hai critiqued de-risking as a concept, arguing that it has generated more risks for global development rather than mitigating them. For the U.S., Zhao warned that its effort to reindustrialize by reshoring jobs and reducing dependence on China would only result in higher inflation and reduced competitiveness. He also noted that the U.S.’ attempt to block China’s technological advancement via strategic trade controls risks disrupting the development pathway for other countries—an argument that echoed with the other three panelists. For example, by pressuring allies like Costa Rica to exclude Huawei, the U.S. destabilized international trade systems and undermined benefits for all. 

The discussion revealed both commonalities and differences in regional approaches to de-risking. While panelists agreed that the U.S.-China rivalry is reshaping the global economic order, their perspectives highlighted the unique challenges and opportunities faced by different regions. Southeast Asia is leveraging its economic adaptability, Europe is grappling with security-driven policy shifts, and Latin America is navigating its economic interdependence with China. Together, these insights underscore the complexity of the forces unleashed by global economic nationalism and the intertwined fates of the U.S., China, and the rest of the world.

Panel 2: Geopolitical Hotspots and Implications for U.S.-China Bilateral Ties

The second panel featured Dr. Jan Willem Blankert, Senior Fellow at Europe Asia Analysis; Dr. Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute; Ms. Margaret Myers, Director of Asia & Latin America Program at Intern-American Dialogue; and Dr. Yu Tiejun, President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies and Professor of the School of International Studies at Peking University. The panel was moderated by Mr. Eric Richardson, Founding President of NGO INHR and China Coordinator at PAX sapiens.

The panel examined the influence of geopolitical hotspots on U.S.-China relations, focusing on whether these issues create opportunities for cooperation or deepen competition. The panelists generally agreed that while flashpoints like Ukraine, Taiwan, and the South China Sea tend to aggravate tensions, they also offer potential, albeit limited, avenues for coordinating approaches. However, the ability of both countries to work together is increasingly constrained by geopolitical rivalries, national interests, and evolving alliance dynamics.

Eric Richardson opened the discussion by framing geopolitical hotspots as dual-faceted, presenting opportunities for both conflict and collaboration. Drawing on his experience in the Korean Peninsula-related Six-Party Talks, he highlighted how multilateral mechanisms could help foster trust even when their objectives remain unfulfilled. He emphasized that issues like Ukraine, Syria, and Iran should not be viewed solely as arenas for competition but also as potential platforms for stabilizing U.S.-China relations through coordination and cooperation.

Building on this perspective, the panel explored regional nuances in U.S.-China competition. Jan Willem Blankert focused on Europe, arguing that continuity rather than upheaval would characterize U.S.-China relations under a potential Trump 2.0 presidency, given that the Biden administration largely maintained Trump-era policies. He also emphasized Europe’s cautious approach amidst uncertainties between the U.S. and China. Europe will take a nuanced position, aligning itself with the United States on strategic issues and looking to explore areas of cooperation with China, while retaining its autonomy and managing its own economic interests. 

By contrast, Zack Cooper presented a much bleaker view of U.S.-China relations, predicting significant challenges in the years ahead. He argued that cooperation on issues outside Asia would be minimal and ineffective in fostering meaningful change, while tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea would remain intractable due to the fundamental disagreements between the two countries. Cooper noted that since neither side is likely to compromise, “agreeing to disagree” is the only viable path for now. He speculated that a Trump 2.0 administration would adopt an even more hawkish stance, potentially questioning the One China Policy and bolstering military commitments to Taiwan. He noted that the recent relative stability in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea has been maintained through mechanisms like the Sullivan-Wang Yi dialogue but expressed skepticism that such backchannels would persist under Trump. Cooper also pointed out that economic issues, intertwined with national security concerns, could become more critical than traditional security disputes but are unlikely to be resolved easily.

Margaret Myers shared Cooper’s pessimism, particularly in the context of Latin America. She described U.S. policy in the region as reactive, driven more by emotional responses to China’s growing influence rather than by strategic planning. Myers also differentiated between Ukraine and Taiwan from a geopolitical standpoint. While China’s economic activity in South America continues to expand, Myers noted that many Latin American countries remain sympathetic to Taiwan, partly due to historical ties. On the other hand, Ukraine only garners sympathy in Latin America. To Latin America, a Taiwan conflict is more concerning because it would have a far greater ripple effect on global supply chains and economic stability. Myers also discussed the divergent views within Latin America on U.S.-China competition. There is still a heterogeneity of views in the region regarding U.S.-China as well as in terms of responses to global geopolitical hotspots.

The final panelist Yu Tiejun shifted the focus of the discussion to the Indo-Pacific region, arguing that U.S.-China competition will largely center around the U.S.-led alliance system. He underscored the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the cornerstone of this system while suggesting that there might be potential instability in the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral arrangement due to leadership transitions in the U.S. and South Korea. Yu also discussed China’s strategy of fostering regional integration with the ASEAN countries and others to counterbalance the U.S.’ alliances and prepare for potential escalations under Trump. On Ukraine, Yu noted China’s nuanced position, pointing out that Beijing has refrained from providing military aid to Russia or recognizing territorial annexations, indicating an effort to balance its relations with Moscow, Washington and Brussels. He concluded by emphasizing that alliances are key instruments of statecraft that are being leveraged to navigate an increasingly multipolar world.

The panelists diverged in their outlook on U.S.-China cooperation. Richardson began by highlighting the potential for collaboration in specific areas but there was no consensus on this view. Blankert discussed the likelihood of a similar trajectory in U.S.-China relations under Trump 2.0, contrasting with the more significant changes anticipated by others. Yu focused on China’s preparation through regional integration and alliances amidst heightened competition. Cooper and Myers shared pessimistic views, pointing to entrenched tensions and limited avenues for meaningful engagement. Together, their insights reveal the complexity of global geopolitical hotspots and the varied implications these hotspots have for U.S.-China bilateral ties and broader global international relations dynamics.

Panel 3: Paths to Coexistence: Is Climate still an Area of U.S.-China Cooperation?

The third panel featured Dr. Joanna Lewis, Provost’s Distinguished Associate Professor and Director of Science, Technology and International Affairs at Georgetown University; Mr. Li Shuo, Director of China Climate Hub and Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis at Asia Society; and Mr. Brian Mukhaya, Program Manager for Energy and Climate Innovation, Africa at Clean Air Task Force. The panel was moderated by Mr. Sourabh Gupta, Senior Fellow and Head of Trade ‘n Technology Program at the Institute for China-America Studies.

This panel explored the evolving dynamics of U.S.-China climate cooperation, focusing on how geopolitical tensions, domestic policies, and international collaboration among the two countries and relevant third party countries are shaping global climate action. The panelists generally agreed that while there is still some potential for engagement, the space for cooperation has narrowed significantly in recent years, and further challenges lie ahead particularly with an upcoming Trump 2.0 presidency. They emphasized the importance of including additional parties in climate discussions and addressing critical issues like climate financing and technology leadership to sustain progress.

Sourabh Gupta opened the discussion by highlighting the need to expand climate cooperation beyond the existing frameworks between  the U.S. and China. He highlighted the potential for broader collaboration, particularly through mechanisms like climate financing. He suggested that the global community could better navigate the current geopolitical tensions by incorporating additional stakeholders.

Building on this, Joanna Lewis discussed both the historical trajectory and the present state of U.S.-China climate cooperation. She noted that despite some progress during the Biden administration, including Track I and II engagements, the space for collaboration is shrinking. She also discussed the evolution of U.S. domestic climate policies, emphasizing the significance of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and its growing level of support even in ‘red’ states due to the investments that have been committed. She observed that there is an economic imperative for the U.S. to invest in clean energy. However, she warned that protectionist policies would harm U.S. competitiveness. With regard to China, Lewis noted the significant policy shift within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with 75% of its projects now focused on renewable energy compared to just 25% a decade ago. She speculated on potential U.S. counter-initiatives, such as reviving the Blue Dot Network. Lastly, she expressed her concern over the fate of U.S.-China climate agreements and initiatives under Trump 2.0, given that prior efforts had either lapsed or lacked continuity.  

Li Shuo focused on the geopolitical dimensions of climate financing, emphasizing the critical interplay among the U.S., EU, and China in shaping the global climate agenda. He highlighted China’s recent announcement of providing climate financing support to other countries as a notable shift in its diplomacy. Li also reflected on the deterioration of the overall U.S.-China relationship under Biden, noting especially the Pelosi visit to Taiwan as a major setback that had a spillover effect into bilateral climate relations. Nevertheless, he acknowledged attempts to mend ties from late-2022 onwards. Looking ahead, he expressed skepticism about the potential for U.S.-China climate cooperation after Trump’s return, especially given the likely weakening of U.S. domestic climate action and increased bilateral tensions. Li stressed the importance of Track II diplomacy as a means to sustain communication and foster mutual understanding between the two sides. Li concluded by emphasizing the pivotal role of technology leadership in driving global climate progress, noting that China currently leads in solar and wind development as well as in a number of green technologies.

Brian Mukhaya provided an African perspective, focusing on the challenges faced by the continent in the course of updating its UNFCCC Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). He expressed doubts about substantial progress being made without significant international financial support, including debt reduction. His comments underscored the urgent need for capital inflows to help African nations meet their climate targets and integrate into the global climate agenda. Financial equity is often overlooked by major countries in addressing global climate change.

The panel revealed a shared understanding of the critical role that U.S.-China cooperation plays in addressing global climate challenges but also highlighted significant obstacles and complexities. Lewis expressed concerns about the shrinking room for U.S.-China collaboration and communication, a point echoed by Li, who attributed it to both the deterioration of overall relations and Trump’s reelection. Thus, Li also stressed the importance of Track II dialogues to maintain channels of engagement. Mukhaya brought a unique perspective from Africa by underscoring the importance of ensuring financial support to assist developing nations to address their climate goals. Together, these insights display the necessity but also challenge of sustaining meaningful climate cooperation in a fragmented global landscape.