Menu
Crystal Room, The Willard Hotel, Washington D.C.
April 25, 2019
On April 25th, the Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS) held its annual conference at The Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C. in collaboration with the National Institute for the South China Sea Studies (NISCSS), the China Institute, University of Alberta, the Carter Center, and the China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies, Wuhan University. The conference “China-U.S. Relations: Diagnosing Risks and Exploring Cooperation” featured two panels – the first one assessing the risks stemming from U.S.-China strategic competition, and the second one highlighting areas of U.S.-China cooperation in a global context. The panels featured distinguished American and Chinese experts and tackled many of the key issues within this important bilateral relationship. Following the two panels, a keynote address was delivered over lunch.
This year’s conference followed in the wake of a difficult year in Sino-American relations. The bilateral relationship was shaken to its core in 2018 and the set of Opening Remarks reflected this viewpoint. 40 years after the normalization of bilateral ties, the lead presenters noted that the relationship was at a grave inflection point. Crucially, it is neither clear what the U.S. exactly wants from China nor, for the matter, what China wants from the U.S. at this point of time. And in an ironic role reversal, it is the U.S. now that is accusing China of attempting to subvert the U.S. domestic political system than vice-versa.
Video: Opening Remarks by Dr. Wu Shicun, Dr. Gourden Houlden, and Dr. Liu Yawei
On the ground, matters have been worsened by the U.S.’ unhelpful freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea as well as provocative actions related to Taiwan, including more-frequent transits through the Taiwan Straits. While there is a ray of hope in terms of the useful progress made in the bilateral trade, investment, and intellectual property rights-related negotiations that is on-going, this détente remains shaky.
It is hoped – and it is necessary – that economics could once again serve as a ballast to the broader US-China relationship. Without this ballast, stable management of the relationship will be very difficult and third countries too, such as Canada, which have significant equities invested in the success of U.S.-China relations will also be gravely affected. The U.S.-China relationship is not just a bilateral one – it is one which has ramifications for all countries in the global system, big and small.
It was the panel’s view that U.S.-China relations are currently poised at a critical juncture. Not since the normalization of relations 40 years ago has the bilateral relationship been tested so severely. There have been a few instances during these four decades when U.S.-China relations faced significant near-term turbulence. But at these moments, senior policymakers at both ends were determined to manage disputes more responsibly and guide the bilateral relationship onto a healthier track. This does not seem to be the case any longer.
Video: Panel 1: Risks of U.S.-China Strategic Competition
To be clear, the U.S. and China are not in any immediate sense on the verge of a grave conflict. And to be sure, win-win competition is a good thing and healthy competition within U.S.-China relations needs to be nurtured. But without anchoring the relationship more firmly and anticipating and managing crises more proactively, the two countries could be on the verge of a multi-year-long – or even multi-decade-long – tumultuous relationship, going forward.
A good share of the blame for the severe state of the bilateral relationship resides with the U.S. side. Mature supervision at the highest levels is lacking and this has weakened the structural foundations of the relationship and opened it up to dangerously adversarial possibilities. A raft of self-interested actors with vested interests have filled this space vacated by responsible leadership and are disseminating the supposed notion that U.S. policy on China has failed or is failing, which is not the case.
In addition, the Trump Administration’s attempt to redefine the terms of U.S.-China competition on the basis of unilateralism and without regard to international rules has been a real setback. Beijing is not blameless either. Its assertive behavior in its own neighborhood, the reversal of civic space for political openness as well as the intrusive depth of its domestic surveillance apparatus has eroded the political and civic foundations on which the U.S.-China bilateral relationship is constructed. Propagandistic claims of ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘defensive intentions’ only accentuate U.S. suspicions. There is space for China to improve its policies and practices, both, at home and in its relations with the U.S. and Beijing should seize these chances so that stability and restraint can be restored to the bilateral relationship.
The South China Sea issue has not been immune to this toxicity within the bilateral relationship. Rather than tending the more complex aspects of their relationship, the two sides have sought to obtain one-sided advantage over each other. This has been the case with regard to the South China Sea too. Following the South China Sea arbitration case, it was – and remains – in the interest of China to exit from its assertive posture as well as from the reclaimed features in this body of water. And it is in the interest of the U.S. side to facilitate the political backdrop in which such Chinese retrenchment could take place, and the pacific-ity and security of this crucial waterway restored. Neither party has acted upon its interests; to the contrary, both sides have sort to entrench the existing unsatisfactory status quo. The adverse role played by the South China Sea arbitrators, too, should not be glazed over. The tribunal should never have reserved the jurisdiction for itself to weigh-in on the case. Issues related to sovereignty and territoriality are the preserve of nation states and damaging practical consequences flow when legal professionals inject themselves into such issues where there is no consensual buy-in from the states concerned.
The one relatively bright spot in an otherwise tense U.S.-China relationship pertains to the trade, investment and intellectual property rights (IPR) negotiations that are underway. As the productive engagement between the two sides over the past 5 months has shown, decoupling the economic relationship is a totally unrealistic course of action. China is still a huge market for U.S. companies, compared to all other global markets. And the U.S. is increasingly becoming an important market for Chinese companies. There are immense gains to be made from two-way commerce, but the foundations of that commercial exchange need to be fair, reciprocal and non-discriminatory. Hopefully, the trade negotiators will get to this point soon and restore stability to U.S.-China economic interactions.
It was the panel’s view that U.S.-China strategic competition is not the sum of their bilateral relationship. The two countries can – and do – cooperate on issues of important global concern. These issues range from global development, philanthropy, climate change, pandemics, piracy, overfishing to transnational crime and the trafficking of illicit drugs. There is ample global cooperation involving the two sides; it’s just that much of this cooperation flies under the radar and is not well appreciated within the policy community.
Video: Panel 2: U.S.-China Cooperation in a Global Context
Cooperation on oceans policy and fisheries is a good example. Chinese and American coast guard personnel have sailed on their counterparts’ vessels to enforce rules related to driftnet fishing. At the multilateral level, China was a keen participant in the ‘Our Ocean’ conferences initiated by the Obama Administration. In Antarctica’s Ross Sea, both countries have worked hand-in-hand in creating the world’s largest marine protected area (MPA). In the Arctic, that cooperative effort has been directed towards scripting a Polar Shipping Code. China and the U.S. also work together on a range of other oceans issues, such as marine pollution and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. China and the U.S. can cooperate in the maritime realm and are doing so responsibly.
In Africa, the two countries have proactively cooperated on South Sudan, pandemics and anti-piracy efforts. In South Sudan, where China holds important oil concessions, the two sides worked together to facilitate political approaches that could tamp down the bitter civil war. Following the outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa, the two countries coordinated the deployment of Chinese aviation and military medical teams on the ground. The naval outposts of both countries in Djibouti has provided a useful foundation to consult and cooperate on anti-piracy missions. Going forward, the U.S.’ Defense Department’s AFRICOM (Africa Command) and China should strike-up an institutionalized framework for deeper cooperation on the continent. And in areas of public health, such as the fight against malaria, both the U.S. and China are in a good position to cooperatively share best practices with African countries.
Even in the area of high-technology cooperation, deemed hitherto by many in the policy community as a next frontier ripe for Cold War-style contestation, the imperatives – and incentives – to cooperate far exceed those of separation and rivalry. U.S.-China interests are aligned, in fact, at a fundamental level with regard to two-way technology flows. China aspires to perpetuate a symbiotic high-technology trade and investment relationship with the U.S. It seeks to ensure that its dynamic home-grown army of innovators are not excluded from acquiring American and Western core technologies overseas or working them at home.
For the U.S., hugs sums stand ready to be earned in the form of license fees for applications-based usage of these core or foundational technologies. Additionally, in certain narrow areas within the global technology ecosystem, China already enjoys significant technological capabilities and standards-setting power. As such, it is in the U.S’ interest to cooperate and work on these technologies with Chinese compatriots. All told, aside from a narrow category of military and dual use technologies, technological decoupling is a totally unfeasible alternative. The two sides might in fact be on the cusp of a great ‘recoupling’ if the bilateral trade, investment and IPR talks are successfully concluded.
The annual conference concluded with a Keynote Luncheon Address by former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ms. Susan Thornton. She concurred with previous speakers that the U.S.-China relationship is at a delicate juncture. Particularly at the U.S. end, there is growing view that China is going from being an opportunity to becoming a threat – although opinion in America beyond the Beltway on China is much more relaxed. This threat perception is unfortunate. 40 years of unprecedented peace and prosperity was constructed on the principle of engagement, and such engagement must be preserved and deepened. The biggest risk at this point of time today is that both sides will become prisoners of their own narrative regarding the other and the existing mutual divides will harden and, in time, become permanent.
Video: Luncheon Speech with Ms. Susan Thornton
China could do much in allaying U.S. fears about the ‘threat’ that many within the Beltway argue it poses. It must play by international rules in its neighborhood, it should afford greater civic, political and religious space to its citizens at home, and it should not overtly challenge the U.S.’ international economic primacy head-on. Most importantly, the Chinese government must reduce state direction and involvement in its economy, and the advertised new round of domestic economic ‘reform and opening up’ must be implemented actively and sincerely. The extent to which China is willing to create a fair, reciprocal, non-discriminatory and level playing field for U.S. businesses to operate, and succeed, in China will go a long way in determining if the unprecedented 40 years of peace and prosperity in U.S.-China ties can be sustained to the mutual benefit of both parties into the future. At the end of the day, both sides need to have a clear-eyed view of the important bilateral, regional and global equities at stake in their relationship, and there is a pressing need for wise and enlightened leadership in this regard.
The Institute for China-America Studies is an independent nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization dedicated to strengthening the understanding of U.S.-China relations through expert analysis and practical policy solutions.
1919 M St. NW Suite 310,
Washington, DC 20036
icas@chinaus-icas.org
(202) 968-0595
© 2024 INSTITUTE FOR CHINA-AMERICA STUDIES. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.