Washington D.C. and Virtual
December 3, 2020
On December 3rd, the Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS) organized its 2020 Annual Conference. Given the raging COVID-19 virus, the conference was conducted virtually, with almost 350 participants tuning in from both sides of the Pacific. The conference was inaugurated with brief introductory remarks by the chairman of ICAS’ advisory board, Dr. Wu Shicun. In his remarks, Dr. Wu was candid that U.S.-China ties were currently scraping the bottom; however, he expressed hope that President-elect Joe Biden would once again return the bilateral relationship to a more normalized track of dialogue and engagement. Mr. Biden’s multilateral over unilateral approach was positively evaluated and appreciated.
Dr. Wu’s remarks were followed by the highlight of the conference – a keynote dialogue featuring China’s long-standing and well-respected Ambassador to the U.S., Amb. Cui Tiankai, and Dr. Graham Allison, the Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University. The dialogue was moderated by Mr. Stephen Orlins, President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. In his initial submission, Ambassador Cui observed that 2020 will go down in history as the year that hastened the already-existing negative geopolitical and global governance trends of the early 21st century. The COVID-19 pandemic has turbo-charged these fast and complex changes in the international system – many of them for the worse. What is required at this point of time therefore is a consensual, shared vision of proposed common actions aimed at addressing these present and future challenges, particularly in the areas of climate change, global public health, inequality and deprivation, and international science and technology development. The burning question in this regard is whether we, as a global community of nations, are up to this task?
OPENING REMARKS:
KEYNOTE DIALOGUE:
Dr. Allison alluded to the ‘Thucydides Trap’ and admitted that a classic version of this trap seems to be playing out in the current relationship between the incumbent Great Power (the U.S.) and the rising Great Power (China). It is an undeniable structural reality. This having been said, there is no iron law of nature that the two sides must be destined to clash. There is a role for human agency to transcend this trap, and both the U.S. and China must display candor and wisdom if this is to be the case. Washington and Beijing can be rivals and yet work cooperatively for their larger common good as well as the good of the international system and planet. Dr. Allison concluded his initial submission by teasing the question whether the two sides could display the wisdom to hold two competing ideas at the same time: that they are, both, bilateral rivals and global collaborators.
There was a spirited exchange of views in the discussion segment of the Keynote Dialogue. When it was pointed out that a ‘values-based’ conflict was an inevitable feature of the ‘Thucydides Trap’, the Ambassador countered that ‘universal values’ should be those that were genuinely universal – as in, have wide multicultural embrace and are ideally centered in the attributes of peace, justice, development and freedom that are enshrined in the United Nations Charter. On the other hand, when the Ambassador sought understanding on the imperative for China’s reciprocal counteractions in the face of the Trump Administration’s numerous unilateral measures, an argument was tendered that there are a number of unhelpful Chinese measures that long predate the Trump years. A more forward-looking approach towards broadening the space for two-way civic society engagement, including China allowing wider space for exchange of information flows within its borders, would hold both parties in good stead, it was emphasized. Overall, there was a consensus nevertheless that top-level communication and a good working relationship at the leader’s level was essential to stabilize the ship of U.S.-China ties under the incoming Biden Administration.
The first panel of the ICAS 2020 Annual Conference featured five senior U.S. and Chinese academic and think-tank specialists who each delved into the underlying drivers of the burgeoning U.S.-China strategic rivalry, and thereupon provided thoughtful insights on constructive ways forward. Four structural factors are accentuating the drift downwards in bilateral ties, in their view. They are: U.S.-China ‘Great Power’ competition, and the potential hegemonic power transition that is underway; the competing foreign and economic policies linked to Great Power competition; the inherent ideological rivalry between the two countries stemming from their different political systems and cultures; and, finally, the disconnect in the minds of populations on both sides of the Pacific, which is derivative of the two countries’ ideological and cultural differences.
PANEL I: Outlook of U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry
MODERATOR: Gordon Houlden, China Institute, University of Alberta
SPEAKERS:
None of these four aforementioned factors are terribly new. They predate Donald Trump – although the Trump Administration’s mismanagement of the China relationship has hastened their development. These factors have indeed been evident for the better part of the last decade and the deterioration in bilateral ties has been fairly longstanding and gradual. Partly, this has to do with the relative lack of U.S.-China relationship management platforms that are essential, going forward. Domestic pressures too have weighed heavily, owing largely to a recent and toxic combination of nativism, aggrievement and nationalism, as well as the elevation of domestic economic security concerns on par with domestic national security concerns. In the U.S. in particular, there has been a huge domestic turnaround on views regarding China over the past three years, driven by a coalition of hardline Trump Administration officials and a core nucleus of bipartisan Congressmen. The COVID-19 pandemic has accentuated this hardened outlook on China, if anything. At the Chinese end, meanwhile, there is growing frustration, bitterness and letdown by the deliberate attempt on the part of motivated stakeholders in Washington to smear Beijing and tear down the foundations of U.S.-China relations.
Looking ahead, mutual reassurance – not just deterrence – must once again become a priority for both sides, if the relationship is to heal and thereafter prosper again. Whether this is achievable remains in question and, at this moment, it doesn’t look realistically possible. There is too much selfishness and self-regarding-ness on both sides. Also, it is not entirely clear what precisely the two countries must do to redress the balance between reassurance and deterrence. As a first step though, China must take a less coercive approach to human rights issues at home, particularly in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. It must also match many of its flowery words with follow-through deeds. There has been a persistent gap over the past decade in this regard on a number of fronts, but particularly on the structural economic reform front. For its part, the U.S. needs to learn to give up on its unrealizable quest for permanent primacy in the Asia-Pacific. It is simply not achievable. The U.S. needs to pivot to a more regional ‘denial-oriented’ military and geo-strategic approach, which will go a long way to reducing geo-political and mil-mil tensions in Asia. And at a more fundamental level, Washington must re-commit itself once again to a more consensual approach to bilateral and multilateral relations, jettisoning its knee-jerk unilateralism, protectionism and sense of aggrievement.
Restoring civility and purpose to a reset bilateral dialogue process would be a good first start. On this front, there was cautious optimism on both sides that the incoming Biden Administration was just the tonic that the bilateral relationship needed – although the Chinese panelists did not want to get too far ahead in their enthusiasm for a Democratic Party-led White House. Both sides agreed too that the U.S.-China relationship was far more complex and nuanced than the counterpart U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War. This, in turn, necessitates that it has to be carefully managed and controlled. At the end of the day, the panelists – like the Keynote Dialogue speakers – noted that there is nothing inevitable about the two sides getting mired in a ‘Thucydides Trap’, and that such a trap must not be allowed to prevail.
In this dreadful year of COVID-19 as well as a number of extreme global weather events, there has never been a greater need – and a greater lack – of the provision of global ‘public goods’. The good news though is that with the election of President-elect Joe Biden – and, in particular, his early nomination of ex. Secretary of State John Kerry to be his Special Climate Envoy as well as the U.S.’ rejoining of the Paris Climate Agreement, 2021 should see a qualitative shift in Washington’s approach to global transnational challenges. And given China’s clearly articulated desire for a multilateral approach to pressing global governance challenges, a common approach on transnational issues could serve as a useful binding glue that holds the U.S. and China together at a difficult moment in their bilateral relationship. This, in a nutshell, was a key takeaway from the Panel Two discussion.
PANEL II: Outlook for U.S.-China Engagement on Trade, Technology and Environment
MODERATOR: Liu Yawei, Carter Center
SPEAKERS:
Panelists were unanimous in their view that the global challenges linked to climate change as well as oceans management are steep. Neither the oceans nor the planet is in a healthy state. Nevertheless, from unsustainable – including illegal, unreported and unregulated – fishing practices, to ocean pollution, to the creation of marine protected areas (MPA), and to sea level rise to the limiting of the pace of global warming, there is much that China and the U.S. can accomplish together. Further, the template of healthy ‘win-win competition’ in areas such as incentivizing and developing green technologies and supply chains to abate climate change could also provide a template for the management of the larger U.S.-China relationship in the years ahead. This significant opportunity to work together however must be based on candor as well as the fulfilment of pledges. Ambitious targets have been announced but must also be kept.
On the other hand, there was less optimism within the panel on the outlook for trade and technology cooperation – and coupling – between the two sides in the years ahead. This is because a new and unfortunate dynamic has also now crept within the framework of U.S.-China economic ties. This is the introduction and integration of broad-brush national security considerations within trade and technology policy decision-making. Two-way trade and technology exchanges are a positive-sum game; by contrast, national security concerns tend to be zero-sum in nature. In this regard, it was pointed out that although Washington might feel that it has the upper hand vis-à-vis Beijing because of its current lock on many core technologies, these gains are likely to be short-term and pyrrhic. Longer-term, the injection of national security considerations into bilateral economic decision-making could have severe negative implications for the U.S. as China races towards developing its own competing technologies and U.S. inputs are progressively ‘designed out’ of global and regional supply chains. Policies to implement economic and technology decoupling, while seemingly appealing today, might have a boomerang effect down the line.
Looking ahead over the next couple of months, it is unlikely that Biden Administration will implement drastic changes to the prevailing economic, trade and technology policies that have been instituted by the Trump Administration. Gradually over time though, there are likely to be subtle policy changes. The technology measures will be kept in place but winnowed down somewhat. The import tariffs, which have failed to realize their intended effect, will progressively but slowly be rescinded. Overall, these measures will ease and enhance the environment for commercial cooperation between the two sides. For the bilateral economic relationship to be restored to an altogether more stable footing however, China will need to follow through on significant structural reforms, including of its state-owned enterprises and industrial subsidies policy regime. The Biden team, too, faces mounting domestic economic challenges at home. As such, both sides should not look, nor expect great breakthroughs in their immediate bilateral economic ties. But panelists were united in their view on one significant point: the worst is behind us and the trajectory of U.S.-China trade and technology ties in the Biden Administration can only be upwards – albeit, from a low base and at a gradual pace.
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