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ICAS Announcement

Commentary

2020 ICAS Annual Conference: Prospects for U.S.-China Relations after the U.S. Presidential Election

Bide Our Time Together: Anchoring U.S.-China Relations under the Biden Administration

December 3, 9 a.m. – 1 p.m. (EST)

By Yilun Zhang

November 23, 2020
Vice President Joe Biden sits next to Chinese Vice President Xi during the roundtable with US and Chinese business leaders at the Beijing Hotel in Beijing, China, August 19, 2011. (Official White House Photo by David Lienemann)

Special Announcement

2020 ICAS Annual Conference:

Prospects for U.S.-China Relations after the U.S. Presidential Election

The Institute for China-America Studies is proud to announce that its 2020 Annual Conference will be held on Thursday, December 3, 2020, hosted out of Washington, D.C. and available to the public through Virtual access. The one-day event is comprised of a keynote bilateral dialogue and two sessions dedicated to debating the outlook on U.S.-China engagement and strategic rivalry following the U.S. presidential election. ICAS is proud to host the Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Cui Tiankai and Dr. Graham Allison of Harvard University as our Keynote Dialogue speakers, which will be moderated by Stephen Orlins, President of the National Committee on United States–China Relations. 

In the News

President-Elect Joe Biden: Official Transition Website

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Joe Biden Picks Antony Blinken for Secretary of State
By Ken Thomas
The Wall Street Journal, November 23

President-elect Joe Biden intends to nominate Antony Blinken to serve as secretary of state, turning to a trusted diplomat and foreign-policy adviser to oversee his work to rebuild U.S. relationships around the globe, according to people familiar with the decision.

GOP Report, Like Biden, Urges Multilateral Approach to China
By William Mauldin
The Wall Street Journal, November 18

Republican lawmakers are pressing for a more multilateral approach to confronting China with expanded help from Europe, a strategy that dovetails with the view of the incoming Biden administration. On Wednesday, Republicans from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a report on working more closely with European partners, the United Nations and other market-led democracies. [Full Report]

Scoop: Trump plans last-minute China Crackdown
By Jonathan Swan and Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian
Axios, November 15

President Trump will enact a series of hardline policies during his final 10 weeks to cement his legacy on China, senior administration officials with direct knowledge of the plans tells Axios.Trump officials plan to sanction or restrict trade with more Chinese companies, government entities and officials for alleged complicity in human rights violations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, or threatening U.S. national security.

TikTok Can Continue to Operate in the U.S., Commerce Department Says
By Alex Shermab
CNBC, November 12

The Commerce Department said Thursday it will abide by an Oct. 30 temporary injunction that prevented the government from effectively shutting down TikTok.TikTok continues to wait for more government guidance about how to proceed with its minority stake sale. President Donald Trump agreed to the deal in August. But the transaction never got the approval of the Chinese government, and Trump administration officials have gone silent on their demands in the weeks leading up to the election.

Latest U.S. Sanctions Show Trump Isn’t Finished Hitting China
By Nick Wadhams and Jennifer Jacobs
Bloomberg, November 9

The U.S. has imposed sanctions on four more officials accused of undermining Hong Kong’s autonomy, showing the Trump administration is ready to keep hitting out at China even after Joe Biden won last week’s presidential election.
The Trump administration has taken other tough measures against Hong Kong, including an executive order to end preferential trading treatment for the city. It also suspended its extradition treaty with the territory and ended reciprocal tax treatment on shipping.

U.S-China Trade Tensions Won’t be Going away Under Biden’s Administration
By Evelyn Cheng
CNBC, November 9

U.S.-China trade tensions are set for more predictability after Joe Biden’s presidential win — which likely means calmer rhetoric in a continued tough stance on Beijing. Analysts have pointed out that a Biden administration would be able to work with U.S. allies more effectively than Trump to pursue a more cohesive strategy against China. One of the few issues both Republicans and Democrats have come to agree on is tougher policy against the Communist Party-led country.

China Says U.S. Sends Out “Wrong Signals” To Taiwan On Proposed Drone Sale
By Reuters and The Associated Press
NBC News, November 4

China accused the United States Wednesday of sending out wrong signals to Taiwan’s military forces, after the Trump administration notified Congress that it has approved the sale of $600 million in armed drones to the island. China will take legitimate and necessary responses in light of the changing circumstances, Wang Wenbin, spokesman of China’s foreign ministry told a regular briefing in Beijing.The State Department said Tuesday it had approved Taiwan’s purchase of four “weapons ready” remotely piloted aircraft and related equipment, the latest in a series of arms transfers for the island.The move is likely to infuriate China, which regards Taiwan as a renegade province and has reacted angrily to previous weapons sales’ announcements to the island.

Articles and Analysis

Featured | Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump
By Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020

“China represents a special challenge. I have spent many hours with its leaders, and I understand what we are up against. China is playing the long game by extending its global reach, promoting its own political model, and investing in the technologies of the future. Meanwhile, Trump has designated imports from the United States’ closest allies—from Canada to the European Union—as national security threats in order to impose damaging and reckless tariffs. By cutting us off from the economic clout of our partners, Trump has kneecapped our country’s capacity to take on the real economic threat. The United States does need to get tough with China. If China has its way, it will keep robbing the United States and American companies of their technology and intellectual property. It will also keep using subsidies to give its state-owned enterprises an unfair advantage—and a leg up on dominating the technologies and industries of the future.”

The Elements of the China Challenge
By The Policy Planning Staff
Office of the Secretary of State, November 17

“China is a challenge because of its conduct. Modeled on 20th-century Marxist-Leninist dictatorship, the CCP eventually spurred rapid modernization and produced prodigious economic growth — thanks in no small measure to the party’s decision in the late 1970s to embrace free-market elements and to the decision by the United States and nations around the world to engage, and welcome commerce with, China. The party today wields its economic power to co-opt and coerce countries around the world; make the societies and politics of foreign nations more accommodating to CCP specifications; and reshape international organizations in line with China’s brand of socialism. At the same time, the CCP is developing a world-class military to rival and eventually surpass the U.S. military. These actions enable the CCP to credibly pursue the quest — proceeding outward through the Indo-Pacific region and encompassing the globe — to achieve “national rejuvenation” culminating in the transformation of the international order.”

“Grounded in America’s founding principles and constitutional traditions; invigorated by a bustling economy; undergirded by the world’s best-trained and best-equipped military; served by government officials who understand the American people and the American political system, recognize the diversity and common humanity of the peoples and nations of the world, and appreciates the complex interplay of ideas and interests in foreign affairs; and fortified by an informed and engaged citizenry — this multi-pronged approach will enable the United States to secure freedom.”

Biden Can Engage Southeast Asia and Still Promote Good Governance
By Michael J. Green and Gregory B. Poling
Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 13

“Southeast Asia is on the frontlines of U.S.-China competition and a vital arena for defending U.S. economic and security interests and those of its closest allies. The region itself is not of one mind when it comes to Beijing or Washington, but it generally favors a greater U.S. presence. Nevertheless, faith in American reliability has been shaken, and partners in the region are eager for signals that the United States is committed and ready to provide alternatives to Chinese hegemony.”

“The incoming Biden administration will face an apparent contradiction in U.S. objectives, though. On the one hand, it is critical to expand engagement and capacity building in Southeast Asia to reinforce resilience against coercion by Beijing. On the other hand, democratic governance in much of the region is deteriorating, and that has gone unaddressed over the last four years. Weak governance and lack of government accountability enables coercion and foreign interference. But more authoritarian states may lean away from the United States if Washington elevates these issues too much in the bilateral and regional policy agenda.”

China’s Planners Succeed, but What About China?
By Scott Kennedy
Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 11

“China is in the midst of drafting its 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted the general Proposal at its 5th plenum in late October, and the full plan will be adopted in March at the next annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC).”

“Although achieving so many individual targets is admirable, the challenges with services and R&D raise questions about whether China is on a path to escape the middle-income trap. More generally, China’s performance record with respect to their official targets should be the start of the conversation, not the end.”

Under Biden, America’s China Policy Will Be Tough Without Being Recklessly Provocative
By David Lampton
South China Morning Post, November 10

“As much as one might hope that this development would usher in efforts by both Beijing and Washington to improve bilateral ties, this is unlikely for two reasons. One is that the post-election political and economic conditions in America are unlikely to be hospitable to such moves. The other reason is that China’s recently concluded fifth plenary session of the Central Committee in Beijing signalled one thing clearly – Beijing does not intend to alter course either domestically or in terms of foreign policy in ways that would energise Washington to reciprocate.”

How Joe Biden Can Recalibrate US China Policy
By Michael D. Swaine
Responsible Statecraft, November 9

“A Biden presidency will be more balanced and professional, less ideological, somewhat more restrained toward sanctions, tariffs, and decoupling, and overall more engaged with China. But the devil is in the details, and such clearly called-for corrections by the Biden administration to Washington’s China policy will likely not fully address some other more fundamental realities regarding bilateral power relations, U.S. leverage, and America’s position in Asia.”

“In these areas, three questions need answering: First, will a Biden administration echo Trump in referring to China as an existential threat to the United States and the global order, thus continuing to justify worst case assumptions on virtually every policy issue? A second critical question is: will the Biden administration recognize that the era of clear American military dominance across maritime Asia has ended and will not return in any foreseeable time frame? A final question, derived in part from the previous one, is: will the Biden administration take a closer look at the U.S.-led “hub-and-spokes” alliance structure in Asia and relations with Asian democracies?”

How China and the US Threaten the World Trading System
By Yukon Huang and Jeremy Smith
The Diplomat, November 4

“Doing business with great powers creates a dilemma: The deeper the commercial ties, the greater the benefits and, at the same time, the greater their capacity to leverage economic power for coercive purposes. China has become more assertive in lashing out to defend its interests in ways that subvert the rules-based trade that made China into the economic power that it is.”

Charting a Transatlantic Course to Address China
By Julie Smith, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Carisa Nietsche and Ellison Laskowski
The German Marshall Fund of the United States, October

“Mounting competition between China and liberal democracies will shape the course of the 21st century. The gravity and scope of the challenges that China poses have permeated the transatlantic policy agenda and become a focal point in U.S.-Europe relations. Whereas China has long been a source of disagreement and even tension between the transatlantic partners, in the past two years views have converged. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) assertive actions—its “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, aggressive influence operations, human rights violations at home, and elimination of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong—have increased concerns in both the United States and Europe. There is now fertile ground for transatlantic cooperation on everything from reducing dependency on Chinese trade and investment to setting global norms and standards for the future. Yet, despite this convergence of views and interests, there is still no roadmap for how such cooperation should progress.”

“This report outlines such an approach. It … lays out a roadmap for doing so, outlining concrete recommendations across the four sectors of technology, investment, trade, and global governance. By working together, the United States and Europe can pool the resources and leverage needed to push back against the CCP in these areas and develop preferred alternatives that advance strategic priorities for both sides of the Atlantic.”

Past Events

Online Event: China’s Power: Up for Debate 2020 – Debate 1

Event by Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 19

The Emerging Maritime Contest in Eurasia

Event by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 19

What Does the World Expect of President-elect Joe Biden?

Event by the Wilson Center, November 17

Charting a Transatlantic Course to Address China

Event by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, November 16

The Emperor’s New Road: China and the Project of the Century

Event by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 16

Online Event: Doubling Down on China, Inc.: An Initial Analysis of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan

Event by Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 12

Online Event: Asian Architecture Conference 2020, Session One: East Asia Summit

Event by Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 10

State of the Unions: The U.S. 2020 Elections and U.S. Foreign Policy Post-2020

Event by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, November 9

Carnegie Connects: The World Reacts to a Biden Presidency

Event by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 9

The Korean Peninsula After the U.S. Election

Event by the Wilson Center, November 5

Upcoming Events

ICAS 2020 Annual Conference: Prospects for U.S.-China Relations after the U.S. Presidential Election [RSVP Here]

Event by the Institute for China-America Studies, December 3

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The Biden Presidency and the Future of America’s ‘Forever Wars’

Event by the Brookings Institution, November 24

Online Event: China’s Power: Up for Debate 2020 – Debate 2

Event by Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 24

What Awaits the U.S.-Japan Alliance under New Leadership?

Event by the Stimson Center, November 24

The Arctic in a Post-Election World

Event by the Wilson Center, November 30

Where Great Powers Meet: America & China in Southeast Asia

Event by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, December 1

Online Event: China’s Power: Up for Debate 2020 – Debate 3

Event by Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 3

Video Event | Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Disruption: Navigating North Korea Policy in 2021

Event by Hudson Institute, December 4

Instruments of Influence? Chinese Financing in South Asia

Event by the Stimson Center, December 7

Joe Biden’s Trade Policy Challenge

Event by the American Enterprise Institute, December 8

Commentary

Bide Our Time Together: Anchoring U.S.-China Relations under the Biden Administration

By Yilun Zhang

What is the upcoming Biden administration going to do with the current U.S.-China relationship? Speculations and analyses have focused on the differences between President-elect Biden and President Trump in terms of their approach to China. Aside from assessing Biden’s good will, it is equally worth assessing the president-elect’s capability of improving the U.S.-China relationship within a rather short period of time.

It would be legendary, albeit daydreaming, to expect the president-elect to reset the bilateral relationship. A more realistic expectation is to see Biden bring professional diplomacy and channels of engagement back to U.S. foreign policy. This would allow Beijing and Washington to resume candid dialogue to start repairing what has been damaged by Trump over the last four years, to find common ground on contentious issues related to security and human rights, and to facilitate a crisis prevention mechanism to allow both countries and the world to avoid another tragedy from an uncooperative U.S.-China relationship. In the current state, the bilateral relationship needs to be re-anchored and stabilized in order to bide time for both countries to restore confidence and trust and commence their cooperation in a new era.

U-Turning an Aircraft Carrier

Can President-elect Biden repair the U.S.-China relationship which was badly damaged over the past four years under the Trump Administration? Will he? The discussion following Biden’s historic victory mostly focused on the latter question. President Trump’s approach to China, with the vague goal being to “out-China China” has gradually sabotaged the international norms and, in some cases, prioritized hurting over solving the issues. This is likely to change under the Biden administration. The president-elect’s long career of serving on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and past engagement with China as Obama’s right-hand man will inevitably bring a more professional approach to the interaction between Washington and Beijing. Moreover, Biden’s rather flexible position on some of the less-critical issues would provide opportunity for a conversation. Analyses that focused on Biden’s past and present legislative and policy positions on China have found that the president-elect has not always been wedded to specific positions on economic, societal, and security issues with China. This could help Biden have a ‘fresh start’ with China in order to cooperate over some of the issues at the top of his agenda, such as climate change.

However, there is also a preliminary but fundamental question to be asked: Can Joe Biden help improve the relationship and potentially reset the relationship back to the pre-Trump normalcy? Expectations from both the United States and China should be adjusted based on the assessment of Biden’s resource and strategic prioritization. Biden’s resources are limited. The time limit is one significant factor to consider. Even if the president-elect decided to make a difference with a full four-year period as a ‘transitional’ president, he has too much on his plate to prioritize China policy-making above other foreign and domestic issues. On the domestic front, the fighting against the novel coronavirus pandemic alone could take at least a year, which means the president-elect would have to spend most of his effort dealing with public health issues and the economic challenges that follow. On the international front, Biden has committed to rejoining the Paris accord and reestablishing global American leadership through other multilateral efforts such as the Summit for Democracy. Given their high complexity and sensitivity, there is little space left for the president-elect to tackle the fundamental trade, human rights and security issues which have troubled the bilateral relationship over the past four years.

President-elect Biden is also entering the field with limited political resources to undo or ameliorate the damage done by his predecessor. These include the withdrawal of CDC experts from China, the closing of the consulates in Houston and Chengdu, and the visa ban that has targeted select Chinese graduate students and researchers. Each of these wounds would take both time and diplomatic interactions to heal. ‘Face politics’ too makes a difference. Diplomats from both countries would struggle with who takes the first step to initiate the confidence-building process and get the ball rolling. Moreover, it would be almost impossible for the president-elect to completely halt some of the recent developments on fundamental issues that have catalyzed the freefall of the bilateral relationship, such as on the South China Sea issue. Furthermore, the president-elect’s prioritization of democracy and international democracy-building will initiate new turbulence between Beijing and Washington, given known disagreements in the past. 

In a sense then, it is almost impossible for Biden to completely reset the bilateral relationship and both Washington and Beijing should not employ unrealistic expectations that seek a complete U-turn of the bilateral relationship. Even if Biden were to successfully turn the bilateral relationship during his presidency, it would be like u-turning an aircraft carrier operating at high speed, which requires a powerful engine and inevitably faces and creates countless currents in the process.

Anchor the Bilateral Relationship

A more realistic expectation on the part of President-elect Biden would be to anchor the bilateral relationship more judiciously, so as to begin the process of healing some of the wounds inflicted over the past four years. Foremost, a mechanism needs to be established to facilitate a consensus on agreeing to disagree on some of the fundamental issues dividing China and the United States. The current U.S.-China relationship is unprecedented. The coexistence of elements of cooperation and competition is pervasive across every domain where the two countries interact. And the president-elect has himself also noted that while such “competition” between China and the U.S. is inevitable, “competition can only be mutually beneficial if the rules of the game are understood, agreed upon and followed.” With neither strategic competition nor disagreements resolvable within four or eight years, Beijing and Washington need to find a means to ‘agree to disagree’ in order to ‘kick the can down the road’ on contested issues so that they can re-establish habits of cooperation on other issues.

Crucial in this regard, then, is the establishment of a crisis-prevention mechanism that identifies and tackles the serious consequences brought about by a potential global or bilateral crisis. The coronavirus pandemic is tragic evidence of the negative impact of such a noncooperative U.S.-China relationship. The foundation—and central goal—of such a mechanism is to keep the overall bilateral relationship on a relatively steady keel. This requires both parties to maintain and expand upon the various channels of communication that have gradually been terminated over recent years. ‘Red lines’ need to be drawn, and disagreements should not be ignored in order to construct the common basis for coordinated crisis prevention. These channels of communication would serve as an stabilizing anchor for the bilateral relationship and prevent it from drifting away by the emerging currents. Both Biden and Beijing will need to display goodwill and patience for such a crisis-prevention mechanism to be constructed, and thereby give their bilateral relationship a chance to start healing and stabilizing for the betterment of their citizens.


Yilun Zhang is a Research Associate at the Institute for China-America Studies