Search
Close this search box.

South China Sea Analysis

How “The Quad” Nations View the South China Sea Disputes

By Vivian Zhu, Yinchen Yan & Yadian Chen

May 30, 2018

View of the South China Sea horizon

Articles and Analysis

The Finance 202: Trump risks repeating Bush controversy with ZTE deal
Tory Newmyer
The Washington Post, May 29

“Trump on Friday announced he is letting ZTE ‘reopen’ in exchange for a fine and some governance changes as his administration prepares for trade talks with Beijing later this week. The move is drawing intense criticism from both parties on Capitol Hill.”

America Is Fumbling Its Most Important Relationship
James Fallows
The Atlantic, May 28

“China is an increasing problem for the United States. But the latest reactions and assumptions about China among America’s political-media leadership class hold every prospect of making China-related problems much worse. How can this be? It involves the familiar tension between short-term political shrewdness and longer-term strategic wisdom.”

“Handled right—or, in as error-minimizing a way as the governments of both countries more or less have handled it over the past four decades—this is a relationship that overall can be a force for greater prosperity, less environmental damage, and more diplomatic stability around the world. Handled wrong, it holds peril for everyone, in realms ranging from an accelerated arms race in Asia to hastened environmental disaster for the world as a whole.”

North Korea Nuclear Disarmament Could Take 15 Years, Expert Warns
William J. Broad, David E. Sanger
The New York Times, May 28

Despite President Trump’s demands of “rapid denuclearization,” Siegfried Hecker, a top federal government adviser and former director of the Los Alamos weapons laboratory in New Mexico, reports that North Korean disarmament could be a much longer process. Dr. Hecker, who has visited North Korea’s nuclear plants four times and is the only American scientist to see North Korea’s uranium enrichment facilities, released a report with two colleagues from Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation detailing the necessary steps and timetables for denuclearization.

Hecker’s report documents three overlapping phases of a disarmament process that, in total, would require at least 10 years: “the initial phase, taking up to a year, is the halt of military, industrial and personnel operations. The second, taking up to five years, is the winding down of sites, facilities and weapons. The final and hardest phase, taking up to 10 years, is the elimination or limiting of factories and programs.”

Korea Summitry
Richard N. Haass
Foreign Affairs, May 25

“Incoming U.S. presidents enjoy a good deal of discretion, but they have no choice when it comes to the problems they inherit. You cannot pick your in-box, only what to do about it.”

“It was inevitable that the 45th president of the United States was going to face a North Korea that had accumulated a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missiles able to carry them long distances. In the first year of Donald Trump’s presidency, Pyongyang made this reality abundantly clear by carrying out its sixth (and most powerful) nuclear test…”

Trump’s Gamble Hits Reality Check in North Korea Negotiations
David E. Sanger
The New York Times, May 25

“President Trump attempted a revolutionary approach to North Korea — a gamble that negotiating prowess and deal-making charm in a face-to-face meeting with Kim Jong-un could accomplish what no American president or diplomat had dared to attempt in the 65 years since an uneasy armistice settled over the Korean Peninsula.”

China won’t meet Trump’s $200 billion trade demand
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal
Inkstick Media, May 22

Despite Chinese leaders agreeing to US trade deficit reductions, economic realities make a reduction this large difficult to achieve. A deficit reduction could occur through decrease products sold by China to the US, or by an increase in products sold by the US to China. However, because American imports from China tend to be inexpensive, even a substantial decrease in reliance on Chinese goods would produce minimal decrease in deficit. Furthermore, the US economy has reached its production possibility frontier, thus limiting its ability to increase exports to China.

Energy exports to play ‘massive’ role in any breakthrough in the US-China trade talks
Tom DiChristopher
CNBC, May 21

“Energy will play a major role in a breakthrough in trade talks between the Trump administration and its Chinese counterparts, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin told CNBC on Monday.”

“U.S. and Chinese trade negotiators agreed this weekend to put on hold tariffs that they have threatened against one another, after China agreed to purchase more American goods. The concession could move the needle on one of President Donald Trump’s major goals: reducing the U.S. trade deficit with China.”

“Oil and natural gas production is one area of the U.S. economy that is indeed booming. Meanwhile, China, the engine of the global economy, is hungry for more fossil fuels as more drivers take to the nation’s roads and the government seeks to generate more electric power from cleaner-burning natural gas.”

Trump-Kim Summit Changes China-U.S. Relationship
Sampson Oppedisano
China U.S. Focus, May 21

“In an effort to show their supposed commitment towards rebuilding relations, North Korea has made several gestures of good faith, including releasing three American prisoners, as well as promising to dismantle its nuclear test site this month. With the historic summit between the United States’ Donald Trump and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un set for June 12th in Singapore, a global audience will be watching, hoping that one of the most challenging security dilemmas in the world will finally come to an end.”

“Should the Trump-Kim summit in Singapore yield positive results, China risks losing North Korea as a check on the United States. Recently, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo indicated that once North Korea denuclearize, the United States would be able to send capital to develop the country’s infrastructure. This would allow the United States to exert more influence in the region. China knows better than anyone the leverage economic incentives gives, having used economic development initiatives to displace U.S. influence in the region.”

“China is likely to retain its control over North Korea. China has been one of the few countries to stand up for the Kim regime and advocate, if nothing else, for a diplomatic solution. In recent months, China has acted more as an intermediary between the United States and North Korea, demonstrating its desire for peace in the region, and assuming an important role on this key issue.”

Trump’s Charm and Threats May Not Be Working on China. Here’s Why.
Keith Bradsher
The New York Times, May 21

“China has called President Trump’s bluff. Chinese negotiators left Washington this weekend with a significant win: a willingness by the Trump administration to hold off for now on imposing tariffs on up to $150 billion in Chinese imports. China gave up little in return, spurning the administration’s nudges for a concrete commitment to buy more goods from the United States, and avoiding limits on its efforts to build new high-tech Chinese industries.”

Past Events

New Frontlines in China’s War on Pollution: Expanding Government and NGO Efforts to Protect Water
Event hosted by Wilson Center’s China Environment Forum, May 23

Jennifer L. Turner, director of the China Environment Forum, hosted a discussion with experts from a variety of backgrounds in water protection programs in China. Panelists discussed broad trends regarding environmental NGOs in China, as well as the specific efforts of NGO, governmental, and local projects to crack down on pollution in China.

Mr. X and the Pacific: George F. Kennan and American Policy in East Asia
Event hosted by East-West Center, May 23

Dr. Paul Heer, an adjunct professor at The George Washington University, and Dr. Satu Limaye, Director of the East-West Center, hosted an Asia Pacific Foreign Policy and Defense Seminar and Book Discussion. Dr. Heer offered the first in-depth study of George F. Keenan’s involvement with U.S. policy towards Asia-Pacific nations, including Korea, China, Japan, and Vietnam; and the implications on U.S. policy towards the region today.

Watch the webcast here.

The Rise of China’s Private Security Companies
Event hosted by Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, May 8

Carnegie’s Michael Swaine spoke with Alessandro Arduino on the position of private security companies in President Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative and their implications for U.S foreign policy issues. Arduino is the co-director of the Security and Crisis Management Program at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and Michael D. Swaine is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

On grand strategy: A conversation with John Lewis Gaddis
Event hosted by Brookings Institution, May 8

“On May 8, the Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings hosted John Lewis Gaddis, the Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military & Naval History at Yale University, for a discussion of his new book ‘On Grand Strategy’ (Penguin Press, 2018). A leading historian and one of the founders of Yale’s Brady Johnson Program in Grand Strategy, Gaddis has taught on these themes for nearly two decades. In a ‘book that should be read by every American leader,’ Gaddis reflects on the lessons learned through a series of vignettes assessing strategy in theory and practice from the ancient world to World War II.”

“Following his remarks, Gaddis was joined for a discussion on these themes by Robert Kagan, Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings, and Mara Karlin, associate professor of the Practice of Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where she serves as associate director of the school’s Strategic Studies Program.”

“Thomas Wright, senior fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy, provided introductory remarks. Following the discussion, panelists took questions from the audience.”

Watch the webcast here.

Chinese Influence Operations in the U.S: Shedding Some Light on all the Heat
Event hosted by Wilson Center, May 9

Kissinger Institute senior associate Sandy Pho moderated a discussion of the Chinese Communist Party’s influence on US interests, economics, and institutions with Kaiser Kuo, host of the Sinica Podcast and editor-at-large at SupChina.com, and Robert Daly, director of the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States. Watch the webcast here.

ICAS Roundtable: Previewing the Trump/Kim Summit
Event hosted by ICAS, May 10

An on-the-record roundtable discussion that previewed the June 12 summit between President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un was held at the office of the Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS) on May 10, 2018. The roundtable was conducted in an open format and featured participants who brought a wide range of policy perspectives to the table. Read a detailed summary here.

Forty Years of U.S.-China Relations
Event hosted by Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 11

Commemorating forty years of formal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China, CSIS held a conference examining the past forty years and looking forward to the future of U.S.-China relations. Panelists included politicians and scholars of U.S.-China diplomacy. Watch the webcast here.

The U.S.-China Digital Economy: Opportunity, Compromise and Peril
Event hosted by Wilson Center, May 14

Robert Daly, director of the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, moderated a discussion of the role of social networks and e-commerce in Chinese and American economic markets. He was joined by Wenhong Chen, associate professor at the University of Texas at Austin and a visiting fellow at the East-West Center, and Aynne Kokas, Kissinger Institute fellow and assistant professor of Media Studies at the University of Virginia.

The Future of Nuclear Power in China
Event hosted by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 14

Mark Hibbs, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program, Jake Nakano, senior fellow at CSIS’s Energy and National Security Program, and James Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program and senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, met to discuss the challenges facing Chinese decision makers in developing and deploying nuclear power technology. Listen to the recording here.

How to Talk to North Korea
Event hosted by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 14

“As a possible Trump-Kim summit draws closer, Carnegie hosted a conversation about what negotiating with North Korea is really like. Previous U.S. negotiators and experts talked about what lessons have been learned in previous rounds of talks, and what the United States should know going forward. The New York Times’ Mark Landler moderated.”

View the webcast here.

Perspectives on a Trade War: The Trade and Investment Disputes between the U.S. and China
Event hosted by American Security Project, May 15

“On May 15, the American Security Project hosted an event on the prospects of a trade war between the United States and China. The panel included Carolyn Bartholomew, Vice Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and Ivan Schlager, from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP and Affiliates and head of his firm’s CFIUS practice.”

View the webcast here.

Upcoming Events

Schieffer Series: Previewing the Trump-Kim Summit
Event hosted by Center For Strategic International Studies, May 30th

Military challenges in the Asia Pacific: US responses to regional competition
Event hosted by American Enterprise Institute, June 1st

Getting to the Heart of China’s Controversial Marshall Plan
Event hosted by The Institute of World Politics, June 5th

USCBC 45th Annual Membership Meeting
Event hosted by US-China Business Council, June 5th

ROK-U.S. Strategic Forum 2018
Event hosted by Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Korea Foundation, June 5th

U.S.-North Korean Summit: Cancelled or Postponed?
Event hosted by The Heritage Foundation, June 5th

Press Briefing: Preview of the Proposed Trump-Kim Summit
Event hosted by Center for Strategic International Studies, June 8th

Korean Peninsula Security Challenges: The First Year under President’s Moon and Trump
Event hosted by Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies and The Institute of World Politics, June 28th

South China Sea Analysis

How “The Quad” Nations View the South China Sea Disputes

By Vivian Zhu, Yinchen Yan and Yadian Chen

United States

The United States’ interest in the South China Sea disputes is ultimately about leadership in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. government does not have an official stance on the underlying sovereignty disputes in the SCS, but remains involved because it perceives China’s actions as a threat to the U.S.-led rules-based order in the region and seeks transparency in China’s activities in the region.

Regarding legal issues, the United States wants China to clarify its legal claims and to adhere to the existing legal framework (set by UNCLOS). Although the international arbitral tribunal in The Hague had rejected China’s claims in the South China Sea in 2016, the Chinese foreign ministry dismissed the court’s award in favor of the Philippines. China has carried forth acting as it sees fit, although it has modified certain practices to bring them into de facto compliance with the tribunal’s award.

For militarization of the SCS, the United States is concerned because China’s military presence directly challenges the U.S.’ military capability and presence in the region, and continued development could escalate tensions and compromise security in the Asia-Pacific. During a crisis, the freedom of navigation of commercial and military vessels through this important international waterway could also be denied by China.  

Recommendations for U.S. involvement in the SCS are framed in the lens of American leadership; experts suggest that the United States must counterbalance China by strengthening the rules and norms-based international order (such as by ratifying UNCLOS, clarify and establish stronger legal framework, support other SCS claimants) as well as continue FONOPs and reinstate the Quad dialogue. Washington does not want Beijing to establish an alternative order in the region, especially by coercive means.

Australia

Australia is not a party of to the South China Sea disputes, and takes no stance on relevant territorial sovereignty questions. Its national interests include freedom of navigation in the region and Australia has been paying close attention to the development.

Australia has consistently advocated for a peaceful resolution to the regional dispute under the international legal framework, emphasizing adherence to UNCLOS. The Australian government strongly criticized the Chinese government for rejecting the decision of the South China Sea Arbitration, which Australia considered legally binding under international law.

Australia emphasizes the maintenance of the rules-based international order and the rule of law, and is supportive of the Code of Conduct negotiations. Domestic public opinion, however, is divided as many Australians criticize China for challenging the rules-based order; others recognize that countries in the region, including China, play a role in shaping an updated international order and advocate for a just and even-handed resolution to the dispute.

Australia is a staunch advocate of freedom of navigation and overflight and is supportive, but not openly involved in joint FONOPs-related activities so far. It is concerned with Chinese island-building activities, opposed to militarization of islands, and alert of the possibility of the establishment of a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).

Japan

Although Japan is not a claimant in the South China Sea disputes, it has significant interests in the region and thus has been paying close attention to this waterway.

With regard to the international law issues, Japan is a strong advocate of the United Nations Convention of Law of the Sea and has been urging China to implement the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal. Japan’s official think tank JIIA argues that China’s refusal of compliance to its legal obligation is unwise. Japan wants the Code of Conduct to be finalized in a timely manner, legally binding, effective and consistent with international law. Japan also wants the negotiation process be taken with the participation of multiple parties, including itself.

Japan values freedom of navigation in the South China Sea because it includes Japan’s major trade routes. Despite the open support for the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has explicitly stated that the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) will not be directly engaged in FONOPs.

Japan supports de-militarization of the South China Sea, even though it has been increasing its own military budget for the past six years and launched frequent military activities. These include a Maritime Capacity Improvement project with Philippines, multiple military drills with the United States (e.g. PASSEX2017 June joint drillASW), and maritime cooperation with Australia. Domestically, a large portion of the Japanese public also supports strengthening its military posture. Japan has also frequently voiced its concerns about China’s land reclamation, of which the increasing scale and speed exceed those of other states and indicates increased Chinese influence over the South China Sea. This could shift the regional balance of power.

India

While India is not a claimant of the South China Sea disputes, it is still an interested party. Its primary concerns are the freedom of navigation and balance of power in the region.

India has clearly expressed its support for the freedom of navigation and principles of international law when it comes to the South China Sea Arbitration. In the Statement published by Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India stated that it had taken “note [of] the Award of Arbitral Tribunal.” India’s attitude toward the South China Sea is one of “deliberate ambiguity,” allowing it to maintain close ties with both ASEAN countries and China, as it knows that the South China Sea is one of China’s core interests. India has also repeatedly emphasized its own record of dispute resolution with Bangladesh through arbitration, and this contrast in compliance with international law has helped burnish its image as a responsible regional power.

Freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea has always been of significance to India because according to its Annual Report 2016-2017, the Indian Ministry of Defense cites that over 55% of India’s trade require passage through the South China Sea. An India-based think tank Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) criticized China for employing “the dialogue of freedom of navigation selectively.”

With regards to militarization, India would like to contain China’s growing military strength. It has increased its naval presence in the Indian Ocean in the last couple of years, as evidenced by the US-Japan-India trilateral Malabar Naval Exercise in July 2017 and the “Milan” Exercise with Australia and ASEAN countries in March 2018. However, India naval activities are relatively less active in the South China Sea and its maritime strategy towards China is comparatively mild. This is because India’s primary interest in this region remains the freedom of navigation, and Sino-India cooperation beyond the region has basically accorded with India’s security priorities. India has ruled out participation in joint patrols with the U.S. or other countries in the South China Sea.

 

Vivian Zhu, Yinchen Yan and Yadian Chen are research assistants at the Institute of China-America Studies.