August 26, 2026

ICAS Bulletin (online ISSN 2836-3418, print ISSN 2836-340X) is published every other week throughout the year at 1919 M St NW, Suite 310, Washington, DC 20036.
The online version of ICAS Bulletin can be found at chinaus-icas.org/bulletins/.

- What's Going On? -

Changing Tides in Indo-Pacific Diplomacy

Image of the USS George Washington. “USS George Washington arrival Brisbane-16=” by John, CC BY-SA 2.0

– On August 15, the USS George Washington, the United State’s last remaining aircraft carrier in the Pacific, departed the region to replace the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Middle East as the Trump administration’s war against Iran continues to draw resources away from Asia. 

– On August 16, President Trump instructed the Pentagon to “substantially reduce” joint military exercises with South Korea, citing their cost and Seoul’s refusal to join U.S. action against Iran. President Trump also stated on Truth Social that the exercises send “hostile” signals to North Korea, whose leader he has a “very good relationship with”.

– On August 18, the Pentagon announced to end the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield drills six days early on August 21.

– North Korea dismissed the move as an empty gesture, with Kim Yo Jong, sister of Kim Jong Un, saying on August 19 that “the U.S.’s hostile policy remains unchanged”. However, she noted that the relationship between Trump and Kim Jong Un remains “excellent”. 

– On the following day, North Korea launched roughly 10 short-range ballistic missiles towards the sea east of the Korean Peninsula.

– Coincided with these developments, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi started his visit to South Korea on August 19. Talking with his counterpart Cho Hyun, Wang Yi urged Washington to change its “hostile policy” toward North Korea.

– Meeting President Lee Jae Myung the following day, Wang Yi urged South Korea to pursue “genuine strategic autonomy” and avoid “taking sides”.

– On August 14, the U.S. sent a coast guard team to conduct a two-week training program with their Taiwan counterparts.

– Taiwan has deepened defense technology cooperation with the U.S. defense start-up Vatn Systems to expand the island’s underwater capabilities. The partnership includes jointly exploring AI-enabled command-and-control systems, deploying autonomous underwater vehicles, and establishing supply-chains in Taiwan.

– On August 21, China and Indonesia agreed to deepen defense, maritime, and technology cooperation with the two countries’ defense ministers planning to expand military personnel exchanges, while the foreign ministers launched the first Indonesia-China Comprehensive Strategic Dialogue and discussed a five-year action plan. Having established a defense partnership with the U.S. in April, the closer ties with China come as Indonesia seeks to balance relations with both Washington and Beijing.

Associated News References:

US Team Sent to Taiwan to Train Coastguards Amid Surge in Mainland Chinese Activity,” South China Morning Post, August 14

US Pulls Last Aircraft Carrier in Asia as Trump Focuses on Iran and the Western Hemisphere, ” AP News, August 15

Trump Says US Will Reduce Joint Military Exercises With Key Ally South Korea,” CNN, August 16

Taiwan Teams Up With US Start-Up On Underwater Drones To Boost Island’s Defences,” South China Morning Post, August 17

U.S. Cuts Back Military Drills With South Korea, as Trump Woos Kim Jong-un,” The New York Times, August 18

North Korea Shrugs off Trump’s Scaled-Back Drills With South Korea,” AP News, August 19

China’s Wang Yi in South Korea for Talks Amid Trump Push to Revive North Korea Diplomacy,” Reuters, August 19

China’s Top Diplomat Wang Yi Calls on US to Change ‘Hostile Policy’ on North Korea,” South China Morning Post, August 20

North Korea Fires 10 Missiles Day After Trump Curtails South Korea Joint Drills,” The Guardian, August 20

Trump Threatens Economic Pain for Countries That Help Iran,” The New York Times, August 20

China, Indonesia Agree on Closer Defense Ties in High-Level Talks in Jakarta,” Bloomberg, August 21

China ‘Actively Committed’ to Iran Talks With Tensions Rising,” Bloomberg, August 23

Trump Admin Unveils Anti-Iran Global Sanctions Plan, Signals China not Exempt,” CNBC, August 24

China Threatens Trump with Retaliation over Iran Sanctions,” The Telegraph, August 25

Trade Frictions Deepen Ahead of Trump-Xi Meeting

U.S. President Donald J. Trump participates in a welcome ceremony with Chinese President Xi Jinping, May 14, 2026, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

– On August 13, the Trump administration accused Chinese exporters of systematically routing goods through more than 40 third countries to evade U.S. tariffs, labeling the practice the “Great Transshipment Scam”. In response, China rejected the claim and warned against measures targeting Chinese interests through third country deals.

– Ahead of the September Xi visit, the U.S.-China Board of Investment has made little progress. Meanwhile, the Board of Trade, another key outcome of the May Trump-Xi meeting, has seen intensified negotiations towards non-sensitive products eligible for a USD 30 billion tariff-free trade.

– On August 15, reports say that Beijing is growing frustrated over disorganized U.S. preparations for the September Xi state visit, as the only concrete item on the agenda is the roughly USD 30 billion tariff reduction on Chinese goods.

– On August 18, Trump reportedly considered Canada’s deal to avert 50% U.S. tariffs on Canadian goods that would go into effect on August 19.

– On August 19, the two countries were nearing a trade deal that would halve tariffs on certain Canadian steel and aluminum exports to 25% and reduce Canadian auto duties to 15%. However, the negotiations collapsed at the last minute, triggering 50% U.S. tariffs on roughly USD 20 billion of Canadian goods and prompting Canada to pledge dollar-for-dollar retaliation.

– It was reported on August 23 that even close U.S. allies are increasingly resisting Washington’s unilateral trade pressure.

– On August 24, the U.S. is reported to consider a new 7.5% tariff on Chinese goods over alleged industrial overcapacity. Combined with the 12.5% tariff imposed in July over forced-labor concerns, the move would bring total additional tariffs on China to roughly 20%, the ceiling Beijing says Washington agreed to for the trade truce.

U.S.-China Rivalry Sharpens Across AI and Tech

Royalty Free Getty Images

– On August 13, the Trump administration announced tariffs of up to 100% on imported drones and components. Lower rates apply to trading partners including the EU, Japan, Switzerland, and Taiwan.

– On August 14, it was reported that the U.S. is preparing to tell countries they must pick sides in the AI race with China, warning signatories of a June “AI Opportunity Statement” that membership in Washington’s Pax Silica framework cannot be combined with Beijing’s competing initiative.

– On the same day, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said the Trump administration did not want Apple to purchase memory chips from Chinese manufacturers CXMT and Yangtze Memory Technologies.

– On August 19, it was reported that Chinese firms including ByteDance, Alibaba, and Tencent have been accessing Nvidia’s most advanced chips through cloud centers in Southeast Asian countries like Thailand and Malaysia, prompting U.S. legislation to close the gap. 

– Also on August 19, it was reported that Washington and Beijing have yet to settle the venue, participants, or scope of their planned AI dialogue.

– On August 22, Nvidia struck a USD 6 billion dollar deal to license technology from AI startup Poolside, aiming to build one of the world’s most powerful open-weight AI models to compete with Chinese rivals like DeepSeek and Kimi K3.

– On August 24, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Juan Pablo Segura warned Latin American countries of security risks posed by Chinese technology firms.

– In response, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian rejected the allegations as “blatant techno-bullying”, accusing Washington of engaging in intelligence activities in the regions, and calling on the U.S. to stop “interfering with sovereign nations’ right to independently choose cooperation partners”. 

In Other News

Xu Jiayin, former boss of Evergrande Group, stands trial at the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court in Shenzhen, Aug. 20, 2026. (Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court/Handout via Xinhua)

- What Are We Reading? -

Two themes stood out in Washington’s China policy discussions over the past week. The first centered on China’s open-weight AI strategy and what it means for global technology governance. Some argued that Washington is fighting the wrong battle: slow U.S. adoption stems from institutions failing to reorganize around AI, not insufficient export controls, and restricting American models abroad only pushes more users toward Chinese alternatives. Others focused on the strain this strategy puts on Chinese developers themselves, noting that fierce price competition among nearly 1,000 domestic large language models is forcing firms to experiment with new pricing and revenue-sharing structures just to stay afloat. These dynamics suggest that the U.S.-China AI race may turn less on which country builds the more capable model, but on which country’s institutions and firms can support sustainable adoption and monetization. The second theme focused on growing anxiety among U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific following Washington’s abrupt scaling back of military exercises with South Korea. Analysts characterized the move as part of a broader pattern eroding regional confidence in U.S. security commitments, noting that it hands China further opportunity to position itself as the more reliable partner. 

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- What's Happening Around Town? -

Upcoming Events

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- What ICAS Is Up To -

MAP Commentary

Before Exploitation Begins: What the NORI and TOML Orders Mean for ISA Accountability
By Nong Hong
August 21, 2026

On 18 July 2026, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea issued orders on requests for provisional measures submitted by Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. (NORI) and Tonga Offshore Mining Ltd. (TOML) in their respective proceedings against the International Seabed Authority (ISA). The Chamber did not suspend the ISA’s ongoing inquiry into possible contractor non-compliance. It nevertheless prescribed procedural safeguards governing how the inquiry must be conducted. The orders thus preserve the ISA’s supervisory role while making clear that the exercise of that authority is subject to judicial scrutiny where procedural fairness is at stake.

 

L.E.A.D. Legislative Issue Brief

A Congress Reacting to an Executive-Led U.S.-China Relationship
By Yilun Zhang and Youngseo Kim
August 19, 2026

During much of the past decade, Congress frequently played an agenda-setting role in U.S.-China strategic competition, identifying emerging risks and pressing successive administrations toward new restrictions, safeguards, and policy frameworks. In the first half of 2026, that role became noticeably more reactive as the Trump administration increasingly set the pace and parameters of U.S.-China policy.

Congressional attention to China remained substantial. Members of the 119th Congress introduced 67 pieces of China-related legislation between January and June 2026, with technology, Taiwan, supply chains, security, and geopolitics accounting for much of the activity. The volume of legislation, however, contrasts with the limited number of bills that made substantial progress toward enactment.

 

Issue Brief

The Blind Spot: Coupang, Shipbuilding, and a Misread Alliance
By Youngseo Kim
August 13, 2026

In July 2026, two seemingly unrelated events in Washington told the same story twice. The House Judiciary Committee released a staff report describing a “whole-of-government assault” on Coupang, a U.S.-incorporated e-commerce company, while the House Armed Services Committee advanced an amendment barring federal funding for warships built in the Korean shipyards Washington had spent a year courting.

The two disputes are mirror images of a single structure. Korea’s enforcement against Coupang follows from Korean domestic politics, its chaebol-regulation tradition and privacy-law enforcement; the stalling of shipbuilding cooperation follows from American domestic politics, district-level shipyard jobs and appropriations rules. Each government is serving its own constituency rather than a shared alliance objective.

ICAS In the News

On Thursday, August 20, 2026, Senior Fellow Sourabh Gupta was interviewed by CGTN’s Dialogue on the resurgence of the “China shock” narrative and Western accusations of Chinese industrial overcapacity.

  • “There is some merit in [the overcapacity] accusations, but that is being used as a shield to be protectionist and block China’s entry and market access in many of these sectors. Ultimately, it is those doing the blocking who will be the losers.”
  • “There are countries, say the Western Europeans, who understand the nature of the challenge and are anxious about what might happen, but also realize they need to up their own game and be more competitive. China will find partners with whom it can find win-win, bespoke solutions to this manufacturing crisis in Western markets. But if you go down the protectionist route, you exclude yourself from a major industry that will determine our future going forward.”

 

On Thursday, August 20, 2026, Sourabh Gupta was quoted by South China Morning Post on Elbridge Colby’s remarks dismissing “middle power” alliances and their implications for U.S.-China strategic competition.

  • “It is a somewhat narrower, unenlightened and self-interested one, but it is not a mere negotiating tactic. The United States is in relative decline, which in the national security arena means it is unable and perhaps unwilling to fully underwrite all its alliance burdens. The middle powers – individually or collectively – are unable to make up for this slack.”
  • “The dilution or softening of bloc-like formations has always been a cardinal priority of Chinese post-Cold War international relations. The more distributed the global power structure, the more amenable it is to Chinese diplomatic management.”

 

On Wednesday, August 19, 2026, Sourabh Gupta, was quoted by South China Morning Post on whether FCC restrictions on Chinese technology risk destabilizing the U.S.-China trade truce ahead of the Xi-Trump summit.

  • “I assess it as a shot across the bow, especially as the FCC actions began to add up. You could call it a case of the ‘new normal’ in ties taking shape, one uncoupling at a time.”
  • “The very fact that the administration took recourse to the FCC in the first place rather than have Commerce’s BIS issue the order – say, by dumping the Chinese vendor on the Entity List – itself suggests that the administration is attentive to avoiding miscalculation.”

 

On Thursday, August 13, 2026, Sourabh Gupta was quoted by South China Morning Post on new U.S. restrictions on scientific collaboration with Chinese institutions ahead of the Xi-Trump summit.

  • “The US is welcome to drop out of the race of its own volition and cede its leadership spot. But that will not stop the Chinese side from powering ahead – by itself, and in collaboration with others.”
Senior Fellow Sourabh Gupta on CGTN Dialogue on August 20, 2026.