How Not to Win Allies and Influence Geopolitics: China’s Self-Defeating Economic Statecraft
By Audrye Wong
Foreign Affairs, May/June 2021

“China, it is often said, has mastered the art of economic statecraft. Observers routinely worry that by throwing around its ever-growing economic weight, the country is managing to buy goodwill and influence. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has exploited its dominance of manufacturing supply chains to win favor by donating masks and now vaccines to foreign countries. And it has long used unfair state subsidies to tilt the playing field in favor of Chinese companies.”

Four Ways a China-U.S. War at Sea Could Play Out
By James Stavridis
Bloomberg, April 25

“Over the course of my naval career, I watched China slowly, meticulously and cleverly improve every aspect of its naval capabilities. That trend has accelerated significantly over the past decade, as China has expanded the number of its sophisticated warships, deployed them aggressively throughout the region, and built artificial islands to be used as military bases in the South China Sea. It is now a peer competitor of the U.S. in those waters, and this has real risks.”

Critical Questions – A Dark Spot for the Solar Energy Industry: Forced Labor in Xinjiang
By William Alan Reinsch
Center for International and Strategic Studies, April 19

“Among policymakers, however, there is no moral dilemma when it comes to the question of combating China’s forced labor practices. There is bipartisan support for legislative and executive action to sanction China and curb imports of products with forced labor in their supply chains. However, there is a practical conundrum. The U.S.—and global—solar panel manufacturing industry is dependent on a supply of cheap critical components that are made in Xinjiang, the region of China where the Chinese government has detained and oppressed the Uighur population, including through forced labor. In this situation, the Biden administration and Congress must navigate carefully to align measures against China’s human rights abuses with domestic support for the U.S. solar industry and consumer market.”

“Still, unlike with the previously imposed ongoing trade remedies on PV cells, the U.S. government is compelled by law and policy to address China’s forced labor practices. Rather than push China to end its abuses, import restrictions—or voluntary rerouting of supply chains—could result in a shift of Xinjiang-produced components to the Chinese domestic market and foreign markets without human rights-driven import restrictions. Trade restrictions might not only fail to slow abusive practices but could make U.S.-made solar equipment more expensive relative to foreign-manufactured equipment with Chinese components.”

US-China rivalry in South China Sea must not turn into a great power game
By Shicun Wu
South China Morning Post, April 19

“In the past four years, the South China Sea has been at the centre of the strategic competition between Beijing and Washington. The United States views China’s increasingly assertive actions in the South China Sea as the most pressing threat to the existential order in the Indo-Pacific region. On one hand, in response to China’s territorial claims and military activities in the region, the US has been working closely with its allies and partners to contain and counter China’s efforts. On the other hand, the US has been enhancing its own deterrence, surveillance and combat readiness capabilities in the area.”

Japanese PM Suga’s Visit Repositions U.S. Asia Strategy
By Shihoko Goto
Wilson Center, April 16

“Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga is the first foreign leader to meet with Joe Biden as president in the White House. It’s a coup for Japan and a much-ballyhooed achievement for Suga himself. But beyond bestowing Japan bragging rights to get the much-coveted first meeting, it also makes clear the priority the United States now gives to Asia when it comes to foreign policy, and that Japan is a key partner for Washington to achieve its objectives in the Indo-Pacific.”

“The Biden administration has made clear its intentions to work closely with like-minded countries in tackling issues of mutual concern. Certainly, it is looking to gather a convoy of nations to push back against the China threat, from economic coercion to human rights violations to military aggressions….Focusing on the need for the two countries to ensure regional stability, especially cross-Strait relations and protecting Taiwan, will be an area that will ensure close cooperation between the two.”

How the Quad Can Match the Hype: It’s the Best Hope for Balancing China in the Indo-Pacific
By Dhruva Jaishankar and Tanvi Madan
Foreign Affairs, April 15

“Last month, a once obscure diplomatic grouping suddenly took center stage in the defining geopolitical competition of this century. When the leaders of the Quad—a coalition among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—met virtually on March 12, its members proclaimed a new chapter in Indo-Pacific competition. The four leaders called the gathering a “spark of hope to light the path ahead” and promised collaboration on everything from COVID-19 vaccination campaigns and maritime security to climate change and infrastructure investment.”

Opinion: Don’t Help China By Hyping Risk Of War Over Taiwan
By Richard Bush, Bonnie Glaser, Ryan Hass
NPR, April 8

“A growing chorus of officials and experts in the United States has been raising alarm about the risk of a Chinese attack against Taiwan. Adm. Philip S. Davidson, the United States Indo-Pacific commander, recently handicapped the threat of a Chinese assault on Taiwan as “manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years”. China is preparing to invade and unify Taiwan by force, the thinking goes, as soon as it gains the capabilities to do so. Such doomsday predictions deserve interrogation.”

“Coercion without violence is not just a threat; it’s an everyday reality. China does pose a kinetic threat to Taiwan, and Taiwan and the United States must strengthen their capacity to deter war. But the proximate threat is not just military, it’s also psychological. Hyping the threat that China poses to Taiwan does Beijing’s work for it. Taiwan’s people need reasons for confidence in their own future, not just reminders of their vulnerabilities.”

“If American policy makers want to help Taiwan, they will need to go beyond focusing on the military threat. They need to modernize the U.S.-Taiwan economic relationship, help Taiwan diversify its trade ties and provide platforms for Taiwan to earn dignity and respect on the world stage.”

The Quad: The Military Powerhouse Built to Take on China?
By Kris Osborn
The National Interest, April 2

“Whether or not a formal alliance is made, all four countries are powerful and are sharing high-tech weapons development and coordination.”

The Longest Telegram: A Visionary Blueprint for the Comprehensive Grand Strategy Against China We Need
By C. Lee Shea
War on the Rocks, April 1

“The defining challenge facing the United States in the 21st century is the rise of China. This is an uncomfortable truth for the Washington foreign policy establishment to admit. Since the turn of the millennium, while the American eagle should have been soaring over the cerulean waters of the Indo-Pacific, its head instead has been buried, ostrich-like, in the Middle East’s sterile sands. But while Washington has been dozing, Beijing has been dreaming — and China’s dreams are the stuff of American nightmares. At long last Americans are slowly rousing from their strategic slumber — awakening to the reality that they have been sleepwalking into disaster. After a long, dark night of geopolitical confusion, can it be morning in America again?”

“The answer is yes it can — but time is running out. The world is approaching an unprecedented inflection point. Global geopolitics is undergoing a historic paradigm shift. After centuries of Euro-Atlantic supremacy, the balance of power — not only military and economic, but ideological, technological, teleological, and geospatial — is pivoting to the East.”

Positive Visions, Powerful Partnerships: The Keys to Competing with China in a Post-Pandemic Indo-Pacific
By Stephen Tankel, Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt and ​Coby Goldberg
Center for a New American Security, March 31

“The United States was losing ground to China in the Indo-Pacific when the COVID-19 crisis began. China’s growing economic might, military modernization, and aggressive diplomatic efforts were already eroding America’s competitive advantage and shifting the regional balance of power. A year after the virus first spread, it is possible to identify where the pandemic is affecting diplomatic, economic, and defense trends in ways that could accelerate declines for the United States, but also might create opportunities to reverse or mitigate some of them.”

“Restoring U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific is critical to competing effectively against China, and President Joe Biden has made this a top foreign policy priority. In particular, his administration is making the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a strategic forum commonly known as the Quad, which comprises the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—a core component of its approach to the Indo-Pacific. Chinese post-outbreak behavior has driven increased cooperation among these four countries in the diplomatic, economic, and defense domains to address shared challenges from China. Seizing the opportunities this cooperation creates is critical for the United States.”

China’s Huawei Is Winning the 5G Race. Here’s What the United States Should Do To Respond
By David Sacks
Council on Foreign Relations, March 29

“U.S. officials have frequently claimed that Huawei is effectively an extension of the Chinese Communist Party. Under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, Huawei, like all Chinese companies and entities, appears legally required to conduct intelligence work on behalf of the Chinese government. According to this analysis, the Chinese government has the ability to use Huawei-built fifth-generation (5G) networks to collect intelligence, monitor critics, and steal intellectual property. There are also worries that the company might bow to government demands and disable networks to exert coercive pressure on a country.”

“While the U.S. pressure campaign has had some success, it is likely meeting its limits. The threat of the loss of intelligence sharing and security partnerships is unlikely to persuade countries that are not formal allies or close security partners with Washington.”

“Washington cannot expect countries to sit on the sidelines and forego upgrades to their networks while the United States gets its act together. Instead, the United States should work with allies and partners to offer a viable alternative and prepare for a future in which China controls a large part of the 5G infrastructure.”