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By Rommel C. Banlaoi
U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea
Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State, July 13
“The PRC has no legal grounds to unilaterally impose its will on the region. Beijing has offered no coherent legal basis for its ‘Nine-Dashed Line’ claim in the South China Sea since formally announcing it in 2009. In a unanimous decision on July 12, 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention – to which the PRC is a state party – rejected the PRC’s maritime claims as having no basis in international law. The Tribunal sided squarely with the Philippines, which brought the arbitration case, on almost all claims. …Today we are aligning the U.S. position on the PRC’s maritime claims in the SCS with the Tribunal’s decision.”
“We are making clear: Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them. America stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law. We stand with the international community in defense of freedom of the seas and respect for sovereignty and reject any push to impose ‘might makes right’ in the South China Sea or the wider region.”
China Shoots Across US Bow with South China Sea Drills
Tsukasa Hadano
Nikkei Asian Review, July 27
“The Chinese military began live-fire drills in the South China Sea on Saturday in a challenge to U.S. freedom of navigation operations there, as the two powers trade shows of military and diplomatic force. The drills, which will run through Aug. 2, are taking place off the Leizhou Peninsula in southern China, in the northwestern part of the South China Sea, according to the People’s Liberation Army.”
South China Sea: Beware of US ‘Sabotage’, Beijing Warns Southeast Asia
Raissa Robles and Bloomberg
South China Morning Post, July 20
“China’s Ambassador to the Philippines has urged Southeast Asian countries to be on guard against US attempts to ‘sabotage’ the region’s stability by inserting itself into the South China Sea disputes.”
US Spy Drone Seen over South China Sea Headed for Taiwan, Chinese Think Tank Says
Laura Zhou
South China Morning Post, July 16
“The United States has sent a high-altitude spy drone over the South China Sea, a Chinese think tank said on Thursday. The US Navy MQ-4C Triton – a long endurance unmanned aerial vehicle – was seen flying towards the southeast of Taiwan at about noon on Wednesday, according to the SCS Probing Initiative (SCSPI), a Peking University think tank. While details of the air patrols were unclear, military observers said the US Navy appeared to be stepping up reconnaissance efforts in the strategic waterway that is seen as a potential flashpoint between Beijing and Washington.”
US Conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation Near China-Held Features in Spratlys
Ankit Panda
The Diplomat, July 15
“On Tuesday, a U.S. Navy warship conducted a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) near Chinese-held features in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The operation was the first publicly reported FONOP since May 28. USS Ralph Johnson, an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, sailed within 12 nautical miles of Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef — the sites of two Chinese artificial islands — in the South China Sea.”
US Upgrades Defensive ‘Buffer’ in Pacific as China’s Military Capabilities Increase
Minnie Chan
South China Morning Post, July 9
“The United States is planning to upgrade its facilities on a remote outpost in the western Pacific as a military fallback, satellite images suggest. The images taken by US-based Planet Labs show how existing infrastructure on Wake Island – an incorporated territory between Guam and Hawaii that is run by the US Air Force – is being improved and new facilities are being built. The American website The Drive, which published the photos on its War Zone blog, reported that the Pentagon has been pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into the stronghold in recent years, with the near 3km (1.9 mile)-long runway and other airfield infrastructure being upgraded, and a large solar plant and other facilities being built.”
US Consulate in Chengdu Officially Shuts in Retaliation for Houston Closure
David Culver and Ben Westcott
CNN, July 27
“The United States consulate in the Chinese city of Chengdu officially closed Monday morning, amid worsening relations between Beijing and Washington. Beijing ordered the US embassy to close on Friday in a tit-for-tat move, after Washington instructed China’s consulate in Houston, Texas, to cease operations, claiming it had been involved in a US-wide Chinese espionage effort. The Chinese government gave the Americans the same 72-hour time frame to close their Chengdu mission as Beijing had been given in Houston last week.”
US-China Relations: Washington Confirms Suspension of Fulbright Programme for Hong Kong, Mainland
Sarah Zheng
South China Morning Post, July 25
“The United States has confirmed the suspension of its Fulbright programme in mainland China and Hong Kong. In an email sent to US scholars preparing to take part in the programme, the US state department said the 2020-21 exchange ‘will not operate’, though participants would be allowed to apply to take part in different countries. Trump announced the termination of the exchanges in an executive order on July 14. It was part of a series of actions to remove the preferential treatment afforded Hong Kong.” [Trump’s Executive Order]
China’s First Mars Rover Launch Could Make History
Daniel Oberhaus
WIRED, July 24
“On Thursday, a Chinese Long March 5 rocket is expected to launch Chinese-made orbiter-lander-rover Tianwen-1 on a six-month mission to Mars. If the mission is a success, China would become the second country to deploy a rover on the surface of Mars.”
U.S. Charges Chinese Researcher with Lying, as Tensions Rise
Luke Denne and Michael Kosnar
NBC News, July 23
“Federal prosecutors have charged a Chinese cancer researcher at the University of California, Davis, with lying about her ties to the Chinese military and Communist Party when seeking a visa to come to the U.S. The FBI believes she is evading arrest by staying at China’s consulate in San Francisco.”
Meng Wanzhou Accuses U.S. of Misleading Canada in ‘Poisoned’ Extradition Proceedings
Steven Chase
The Globe and Mail, July 23
“The Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou is accusing the U.S. government of not only using her as a bargaining chip in negotiations with China, but also misleading Canada’s government and courts about the evidence gathered against her. The U.S. government, her lawyers say, has misled the B.C. (British Columbia) Supreme Court by selectively quoting a PowerPoint presentation that Ms. Meng delivered to HSBC bankers in Hong Kong. They contend that the U.S. record of the case against Ms. Meng and Huawei omits ‘highly relevant information’ from two slides and in doing so leaves the impression that the tech executive never told HSBC that Skycom did business with Huawei in Iran or that Huawei and Skycom had an ongoing business relationship.”
Risch, Gardner, Romney, Young Introduce Landmark Legislation to Compete with China
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 22
“U.S. Senators Jim Risch (R-Idaho), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Cory Gardner (R-Colo.), Mitt Romney (R-Utah), and Todd Young (R-Ind.) introduced the Strengthening Trade, Regional Alliances, Technology, and Economic and Geopolitical Initiatives Concerning China Act (The STRATEGIC Act) to advance a comprehensive strategy for U.S. competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).”
“Key provisions of the senators’ legislation are:”
US Announces Sanctions on Huawei, Citing Human Rights Abuses
Laura Kelly and Chris Mills Rodrigo
The Hill, July 15
“Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Wednesday announced that the State Department will impose visa restrictions on employees of the Chinese tech giant Huawei, saying the restrictions are meant to punish complicity in human rights abuses. Pompeo said Huawei is ‘an arm’ of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ‘surveillance state that censors political dissidents and enables mass internment camps in Xinjiang and the indentured servitude of its population shipped all over China.’ A spokesperson for Huawei told The Hill that the company ‘operates independent of the Chinese government.’”
New Book Examines Neil Bush’s China Links
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian
Axios, July 14
“A new book documents China’s influence in North America and Europe, zeroing in on how the Chinese Communist Party co-opts the elite in democratic societies. In ‘Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World,’ co-authors Clive Hamilton and Mareike Ohlberg argue that the CCP has carefully cultivated elite ‘friends’ abroad who can be relied on to speak up on China’s behalf, subtly influencing the policy-making environment. ”
U.S. Threatens to Restrict WeChat Following TikTok Backlash
Rita Liao
TechCrunch, July 13
“Amid intense scrutiny over TikTok as a potential national security risk in the U.S., WeChat, the essential tool for Chinese people’s day-to-day life, is also taking heat from Washington. White House trade advisor Peter Navarro told Fox Business on Sunday that ‘[TikTok] and WeChat are the biggest forms of censorship on the Chinese mainland, and so expect strong action on that.’ TikTok said in a statement to TechCrunch that ‘protecting the privacy of our users’ data is a critical priority for TikTok’ and it has ‘never shared TikTok user data with the Chinese government, and would not do so if asked.’”
China to Impose Retaliatory Sanctions on GOP Senators Over Xinjiang Penalties
Josh Chin
The Wall Street Journal, July 13
“China’s Foreign Ministry on Monday said it planned to impose corresponding sanctions on several senior GOP figures in retaliation for penalties the Trump administration imposed last week on senior Chinese officials accused of carrying out human-rights abuses against Turkic Muslims in the remote Xinjiang region.”
Defying U.S., China and Iran Near Trade and Military Partnership
Farnaz Fassihi and Steven Lee Myers
The New York Times, July 11
“Iran and China have quietly drafted a sweeping economic and security partnership that would clear the way for billions of dollars of Chinese investments in energy and other sectors, undercutting the Trump administration’s efforts to isolate the Iranian government because of its nuclear and military ambitions. The partnership — first proposed by China’s leader, Xi Jinping, during a visit to Iran in 2016 — was approved by President Hassan Rouhani’s cabinet in June, Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said last week.”
China Says U.S. Policy is Driven by ‘McCarthy-Style Paranoia’
Bloomberg News, July 9
“China’s top diplomat blasted U.S. policy toward Beijing while also proposing a blueprint for getting spiraling relations between the world’s biggest economies back on track. ‘Current U.S. policy toward China is based on strategic misjudgments that lack factual evidence, and is full of emotional catharsis and McCarthy-style paranoia,’ Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said during a pre-recorded address for a China-U.S. think tank and media forum.” [Official translation of Wang’s remarks.]
Google Scrapped Cloud Initiative in China, Other Markets
Ryan Gallagher and Mark Bergen
Bloomberg, July 8
“Google has reportedly abandoned plans to offer a major new cloud service in China and other politically sensitive countries due in part to concerns over geopolitical tensions and the pandemic. In May, the search giant shut down the initiative, known as ‘Isolated Region’ and which sought to address nations’ desires to control data within their borders, the employees said.’”
Washington’s China Policy Has Lost Its Wei
Scott Kennedy
Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 27
“The U.S. federal government has adopted a multipronged strategy to crush Huawei and decouple the Western world from China’s telecom and semiconductor industries. Although well-intentioned, this effort could seriously harm the United States’ economy and national security. The U.S. semiconductor industry, which is the bedrock of the U.S. economy, has thrived like never before in a globalized industry. The campaign to isolate Huawei and the greater technology decoupling enterprise threatens this historic success and accelerates China’s technological independence. Decoupling would also harm the United States’ military preparedness and reduce the costs of Chinese aggression, most importantly, with respect to Taiwan. … [T]he U.S. needs a strategy that ameliorates these vulnerabilities while also preserving the relationship. The approach, what I call ‘principled interdependence,’ would require U.S. policy toward Huawei and the related industries to shift along several dimensions.”
The Tragedy of Vaccine Nationalism: Only Cooperation Can End the Pandemic
Thomas J. Bollyky and Chad P. Bown
Foreign Affairs, July 27
“Absent an international, enforceable commitment to distribute vaccines globally in an equitable and rational way, leaders will instead prioritize taking care of their own populations over slowing the spread of COVID-19 elsewhere or helping protect essential health-care workers and highly vulnerable populations in other countries.”
What Mike Pompeo Doesn’t Understand About China, Richard Nixon and U.S. Foreign Policy
Richard Haass
The Washington Post, July 25
“Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered a blistering speech about China on Thursday. The problem was not simply that the nation’s chief diplomat was decidedly undiplomatic. Worse was his misrepresentation of history and his failure to suggest a coherent or viable path forward for managing a relationship that more than any other will define this era. Yes, China continues to flex its muscles in the South China Sea, but Pompeo failed to note it has not fought a war with another country since its 1979 border conflict with Vietnam.”
What China Learned From Cold War America
David P. Goldman
The Wall Street Journal, July 24
“China thinks that power is the arbiter of world affairs, and that technology is power. That’s something it learned from Ronald Reagan. He won the Cold War with a military buildup that catalyzed an economic revolution. Military research and development produced countless inventions of the Digital Age, from fast and cheap microchips to the internet. The Soviet Union folded in the face of America’s superior arms and entrepreneurial growth. China watched and learned.”
How Significant Is the New U.S. South China Sea Policy?
Gregory B. Poling
Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 14
“Pompeo’s statement does not alter U.S. neutrality on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Washington still has no interest in wading into the historical morass of which country has sovereignty over each of the Spratly and Paracel Islands. But it does now explicitly take a position on the maritime disputes over water and seabed rights. …”
“Of course, there will also be downsides to this policy. It will raise tensions between Beijing and Washington in the short term. The next time China does engage in illegal harassment of its neighbors within their EEZs, a more forceful U.S. response might lead China to double down out of a sense of nationalism. This seems especially likely amid the current pandemic, which has led Chinese diplomats to favor chest-thumping nationalism over de-escalation with its neighbors. But in the long term, if successfully couched within a broader policy combining pressure on Beijing and greater international coalition building to support Southeast Asian parties, it could help steer China toward a compromise that the international community could live with.”
Hidden Harbors: China’s State-backed Shipping Industry
Jude Blanchette, Jonathan E. Hillman, Maesea McCaplin and Mingda Qiu
Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 8
“Chinese companies are increasingly dominant across the maritime supply chain, aided by a complicated and opaque system of formal and informal state support that is unrivaled in size and scope. Combined state support to Chinese firms in the shipping and shipbuilding industry totaled roughly $132 billion between 2010 and 2018, according to CSIS analysis. This includes financing from state banks ($127 billion) and direct subsidies ($5 billion).”
“While most analysis focuses on more traditional types of state backing, most notably direct subsidies, we find that China has evolved increasingly sophisticated financial tools to select and support winners that render our traditional understanding of China’s state capitalist system largely outdated.”
China’s Second Wave of Coronavirus Censorship Is Here
Tracy Wen Liu
Foreign Policy, July 7 [Paywall]
“My Weibo account was blocked on May 19. I had been using this account on the Chinese equivalent of Twitter for more than nine years, published thousands of posts, and accumulated around 90,000 followers. On the same day, five of my friends who are writers and influencers also lost their Weibo accounts. We were all familiar with China’s growing censorship and had avoided using words and phrases that the Chinese government didn’t like—but we fell victim to an expanding system anyway.”
Global China Webinar: Assessing China’s Growing Regional Influence and Strategy
Event hosted by the Brookings Institution, July 29
Decoupling Kabuki: Japan’s Effort to Reset, Not End Its Relationship with China
Event hosted by Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 28
WEBCAST: China’s Role in Saving the Wild Southern Ocean: Creating a Network of Marine Protected Areas (as part of the Wilson Center’s Polar Week: July 2020)
Event hosted by the Wilson Center’s Polar Institute, July 28
A Pivot To Asia? NATO at 71
Event hosted by German Marshall Fund of the United States Asia Program, July 23
Current trends and challenges in the Chinese banking sector
Event hosted by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, July 22
Asia on the Brink? Live from Taiwan with William Yang
Event hosted by The German Marshall Fund of the United States, July 17
Online Event: Allied Cooperation on China
Event hosted by Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 15
Online Event: Countering Chinese Influence Activities in Australia
Event hosted by Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 15
Online Event: Tenth Annual South China Sea Conference, Keynote and Session One
Event hosted by Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 14
Bilateral Breakdown: Views From our Allies
Event hosted by National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, July 9
Party on the Bridge: Political Commissars in the Chinese Navy
Event hosted by Center for Strategic & International Studies, June 29
Online Event: The New China Rules
Event hosted by Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 5
Bilateral Breakdown: Science and Education in the Crossfire
Event hosted by National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, August 6
Tensions in the Taiwan Strait
Event hosted by Vermont Council on World Affairs, August 13
China Aerospace Studies Institute Conference 2020 – PRC Space
Event hosted by the Air University, September 17
By Rommel C. Banlaoi, PhD*
Security tensions in the South China Sea are rising again due to escalating major power rivalry between the United States and China. The US and China have increased their military presence in the South China Sea by sending their warships to conduct air-sea battle exercises while the whole world continues to struggle against the scourge of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Two American aircraft carriers, USS Nimitz and the USS Ronald Reagan, started its military drills in the South China Sea on 4 July 2020 during the commemoration of American Independence Day. The US government regards those exercises as part of its commitment of “standing up for the right of all nations to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows”.
China, on the other hand, just concluded on 5 July 2020 its military exercises near the Paracel Islands “to counter the US” and to push back against the Pentagon for having “ulterior motives” in sending two aircraft carriers in the South China Sea.
These military exercises of competing major powers have heated up tensions in the South China Sea as both up the ante of its military activities in the contested maritime domain that is considered to be one of the major flashpoints of armed conflicts in Asia where the two major powers can collide. In fact, those military exercises were so proximate, making US Rear Admiral James Kirk on the Nimitz to comment “they have seen us and we have seen them”.
Prior to these military exercises, the Philippine government, through Secretary Teodoro Locsin of the Department of Foreign Affairs, issued a strong statement on 3 July 2020 expressing concerns over China’s drills. Locsin stressed that the Philippines would “severely” respond if China would encroach on Philippine territories. Locsin exclaimed, “Should the exercises spill over to Philippine territory, then China is forewarned that it will be met with the severest response, diplomatic and whatever else is appropriate.”
China concluded its military drills without untoward incident.
But the growing major power rivalry between China and the US in the South China Sea has raised a big question if the Philippines is pushing back against China and is shifting back to the US as its only military ally considering that Manila has earlier suspended the termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). How will this new situation affect the Philippines’ “comprehensive strategic cooperation” with China? Is President Rodrigo Duterte flip-flopping again in its foreign policy amidst US-China rivalry in the South China Sea?
Some are quick to conclude that Duterte is flip-flopping in the guise of pursuing an independent foreign policy.
But what is not fully understood is the fact the Philippine government has been applying the grand strategies of small states in dealing with great powers within an anarchic international system.
Small states and great powers have different survival instincts amidst international anarchy. Realist theory of international relations contends that great powers seek their survival by balancing each other. But small states, by virtue of their inherent vulnerability in the anarchic international system, find their survival by forging relationships with great powers balancing each other. Because of their inherent vulnerable situation, small states pursue relationships with great powers depending on the situation. Small states respond to situations according to their own national interests and not the interests of major powers in competition.
The Philippine government is pushing back against China in the South China Sea because of the current situation that threatens Manila’s security interests. China’s recent military activities in the South China Sea, particularly around the waters of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) in the Spratlys, are causing security anxieties in the Philippines. There is a tendency for the Philippine government to cling with the US to address common security interests as the US continues to be the only security ally of the Philippines that can effectively balance China.
When the situation is calm in the South China Sea and Manila’s security interests are not compromised, the Philippines has a tendency to shift its gear towards China being a close giant neighbor for centuries. The Philippine government continues to have an interest to pursue a comprehensive strategic cooperation with China for economic purposes.
The Philippine government has economic needs that China can provide. But the Philippine government also has security needs that the US can provide. If China can allay Manila’s current fear of the situation in the KIG and can provide Manila’s current security needs in the South China Sea, the Philippines will find no reason to reach out to its only security ally, the US, as this alliance always reminds the Philippines of its colonial experiences. But the Philippines government is compelled to pivot back to the US because the current situation dictates so.
In 1991, the Philippine government terminated the US-Philippines Military Bases Agreement because of the post-cold war situation. When China established full control of the Mischief Reef in 1995, the Philippines invited the US back by signing the VFA that came into force in 1999. The VFA became very useful in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks as both countries cooperated in the global war on terrorism.
Meanwhile, the South China Sea enjoyed a calm moment in 2002 when China and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. But when the Philippine government withdrew its troops from Iraq in 2004, the US became lukewarm to the Philippines encouraging Manila to pursue “comprehensive engagement” with China. In 2005, the Philippines and China enjoyed the “golden years” of their bilateral ties with the dismay of the US.
In 2009, the situation went wrong in the South China Sea. China became more assertive legally and militarily that renewed security tensions in the area. Legally, China submitted to the United Nations on 7 May 2009 a map of its nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea. Militarily, China fortified its military structures in its occupied areas in the Spratlys and Paracels. This situation encouraged the Philippines to deal with the US again.
When China occupied the Scarborough Shoal in 2012, the Philippines filed an arbitration case against China in 2013. The arbitration case led to the deterioration of Philippines-China relations reaching its lowest moment in its recent bilateral history. The arbitration case, however, motivated China to pursue land reclamation activities, which led to the building of artificial islands in seven geographic features in the Spratlys. Under this situation, the Philippines signed the Enhance Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the US in 2014.
The situation changed in 2016. The International Arbitral Tribunal made its landmark decisions in favor of the Philippines. The Philippines under Duterte who had personal animosity against the US, decided to pursue a paradigm shift to China.
The Philippines and China have started to enjoy a new era of closer friendship under Duterte who described his relationship with China like the blooming of a big and beautiful flower. Duterte’s policy of paradigm shift to China ushered in the new age of cooperation between the two countries. Duterte even threatened to separate with the US.
When President XI Jinping visited the Philippines in 2018, the two countries declared their comprehensive strategic cooperation to have an all around relationship, which is a rapid turn-around in their bilateral ties. They celebrated another golden age of their bilateral ties during this visit. The Philippines and China signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to facilitate their joint cooperation on the development of oil and gas resources in the South China Sea, particularly in areas being claimed by the Philippines called West Philippine Sea (WPS).
Situations were going very well in the Philippines-China relations. Under President Xi JinPing and President Duterte, the Philippines and China enjoyed the highest moment of their bilateral relations. Both countries even established the Bilateral Consultative Mechanism in the South China Sea to promote peace, friendship and cooperation.
But the COVID-19 pandemic altered the security situation in the South China Sea as a result of China’s continuing assertion of sovereignty. The Philippines and its neighbors have also expressed their security anxieties on the current situation. Again, the Philippines government needs to pivot to the US.
In other words, situation in the South China Sea greatly affects Philippine foreign policy towards China and the United States. When the security situation is tense, the Philippine government embraces the US. When the security situation is calm, the Philippine government engages China.
The Philippine government is just applying the grand strategy of small states when dealing with major powers.
*Rommel C. Banlaoi, PhD, is a Professorial Lecturer at the Department of International Studies, Miriam College. He is also the President of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies (PACS), President of the Philippine Society for Intelligence and Security Studies (PSISS), and the Chairman of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR). This piece was originally posted on the ICAS blog.
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