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Hong Kong protests, Kwong Tong March on August 24, 2019. (Photo Credit: Studio Incendo, Flickr)
Issue Brief By:
Resident Senior Fellow
On 28 May 2020, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) endorsed a decision to pass a national security law for Hong Kong at the central government level. The law will establish a framework to prosecute four types of crimes committed on the territory’s soil. They are: (a) splitting the country; (b) subverting state power; (c) organizing and carrying out terrorist activities; and (d) foreign interference in the Hong Kong authorities’ affairs.
Hong Kong’s government is required by Article 23 of its mini-Constitution, the Basic Law, to enact local laws to prohibit the aforementioned four crimes. It has failed to do so, however, in the 23 years since the territory’s reversion to China’s full sovereignty. At the same time, the constitutionality of the territory’s colonial-era emergency powers is also under a legal cloud. In order to plug these loopholes and establish a tidy legislative instrument to prosecute the four crimes, a central government-level national security law for Hong Kong has now been endorsed.
A key trigger for the proposed law is the potentially landmark Legislative Council of Hong Kong (LegCo) election later this September. An equally important factor is the emergence of incidents involving explosives and firearms, and the open advocacy of ‘Hong Kong independence’ and ‘self-determination’ that was witnessed at the protests last year. China’s paranoia of U.S. interference and incitement against the larger backdrop of great power rivalry should not be discounted either.
The proposed national security law is at variance with the spirit of the ‘one country, two systems’ principle. The Basic Law reserves the responsibility for the ‘maintenance of public order’ to the Hong Kong government and, in this context, enjoins the local authorities to enact laws that criminalize treason, secession, sedition, subversion, and foreign interference. China’s and Hong Kong’s governments argue, though, that this national security and public order prerogative is not exclusive to the local government; it is concurrently exercised.
The proposed law is unquestionably consistent with the letter of the Basic Law. In instances that Beijing deems as falling within the purview of central government-Hong Kong relations – and the local application of an Annex III (of Basic Law)-listed national security law by promulgation categorically falls within this purview – it enjoys the interpretive power to frame the legal limits of the territory’s autonomy.
In response to China’s parliament’s decision to pass the national security law, the Trump Administration announced that it could no longer certify that Hong Kong was sufficiently autonomous from China to warrant special and differential treatment under U.S. law. The decertification opens the door to possible reprisals, from scrapping the bilateral extradition treaty to export controls on dual-use technologies. The overall economic ramifications are likely to be modest though. The United Kingdom too has protested the proposed law, citing it as a violation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 – a UN-filed international treaty, in its view.
Looking ahead, China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee should painstakingly draft the proposed law to adhere to Hong Kong’s common law principles and sensibilities. The law should not amend Hong Kongers’ fundamental rights and duties. And mainland officials and agents stationed on Hong Kong soil must abide by the territory’s laws. The ‘high degree of autonomy’ promised to Hong Kong in the context of the ‘one country, two systems’ model hangs in the balance.
On 28 May 2020, two landmark developments related to Hong Kong took place that will shape the territory’s political landscape for many years to come.
In Beijing, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) endorsed a decision to “establish and improve the legal system and enforcement mechanism for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) to safeguard national security.” Over the next two months, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) will draw-up and pass a national security law tailor-made for Hong Kong that is to “effectively prevent, stop and punish any acts or activities” of secession, subversion, terrorism and foreign interference in the territory’s affairs which could endanger China’s national security. Following its passage, the Act will be added to Annex III of the Basic Law and promulgated locally. The promulgation rather than local legislation route is envisaged in order to sidestep a lengthy delay as was faced by the national anthem law, which came into force on the mainland in 2017 and was listed in Annex III that November but cleared the Hong Kong legislature only this June.
The same day, in Washington, D.C., U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo submitted the Trump Administration’s 2020 Hong Kong Policy Act Report to Congress, as required under the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 and amended by the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019. As part of the submission process, the Secretary of State is required to annually certify whether Hong Kong continues to be sufficiently autonomous from Beijing’s political writ to warrant special and differential treatment under U.S. law. This certification stems from the “high degree of autonomy” promised in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 and the “one country, two systems” principle enshrined in the territory’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law, at the time of the territory’s reversion to Chinese rule in July 1997. In his submission on May 28th, Pompeo announced that he could no longer certify that Hong Kong was sufficiently autonomous to warrant such treatment. The next day, President Trump directed his administration to begin the process of eliminating the territory’s special and differential policy exemptions in U.S. law, ranging from the bilateral extradition treaty to export controls on dual-use technologies.
The main purpose of the National People’s Congress proposed national security law is to establish a framework for prosecuting national security crimes committed on Hong Kong soil. Four crimes are specified: (a) splitting the country; (b) subverting state power; (c) organizing and carrying out terrorist activities; and (d) foreign interference in the HKSAR’s affairs.
At this point of time, there is no clean framework for prosecuting national security crimes committed on Hong Kong soil. There exists on the books an imperfect British colonial era emergency law, the Emergency Regulations Ordinance (ERO), which authorizes Hong Kong’s Chief Executive to “make any regulations which s/he may consider desirable in the public interest” on any occasion s/he considers “an occasion … of public danger.” In a Court of First Instance challenge in Fall 2019 (the Prohibition on Face Covering Regulation case), the court ruled that the ERO was “not compatible with the constitutional order laid down by the Basic Law”, given its unchecked and wide-ranging scope. The Court of First Instance’s ruling was overturned on appeal by the Court of Appeals, which judged the Prohibition on Face Covering Regulation to be reasonable and valid, but the latter court nevertheless went on to pronounce that the constitutionality of the ERO – and therefore the extent of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers – was “still subject to judicial scrutiny.” A tidy legislative instrument to prosecute national security crimes committed on Hong Kong soil remains, as such, lacking. This was recognized by the United Kingdom government too during the fading days of colonial rule. A year before Hong Kong’s reversion, the colonial governor introduced a bill to deal with the crimes of subversion and secession, but it failed to find traction in the legislature.
At the same time, the Hong Kong authorities are required by way of Article 23 of the Basic Law, the territory’s mini-Constitution, to enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, theft of state secrets, and foreign interference on its territory against the central government. In the 23 years since its reversion to China’s full sovereignty, the Hong Kong authorities however have failed to enact these laws, and no legislative attempt to do so appears to be forthcoming. The last attempt was made in 2003, in fact. By contrast, Macau SAR enacted its equivalent national security law within 10 years of reversion in 2009. To cut a path through this gridlocked state of political affairs on the territory, particularly in the wake of the increasingly violent protests last year, the mainland authorities have now decided to establish a national framework for prosecuting national security crimes committed on Hong Kong soil in lieu of the still-absent Article 23 law.
One of China’s key implementation goals with regard to the proposed law, down-the-line, seems to be to authorize the establishment of an intelligence body modelled on the now-disbanded colonial-era Special Branch of the Hong Kong Police. Mainland national security agencies, it is expected, will be posted to the territory to facilitate in the creation of this body from the ground-up. In Beijing’s view, there should be no reason why a special branch embedded within the criminal division of the local police force cannot cooperate with the Hong Kong government to protect China’s national security when a similar organ performed likewise duties on behalf of Britain’s colonial rulers. At minimum, it cannot be the case that in this far corner of Chinese sovereign territory, it is foreign intelligence agencies that enjoy a freer rein than their Chinese counterparts.
A key trigger for Beijing’s drive to impose the national security law at this moment is the potentially landmark Legislative Council of Hong Kong (LegCo) election later this September. In November 2019, the pro-democracy opposition camp swept the District Council elections and there is a view that they might be able to finally muster a majority in the LegCo for the first time since Hong Kong’s reversion to the mainland 23 years ago. This will make passage of a locally enacted national security law, which the territory is obliged to pass and has been delayed for 23 years, even more remote. It will also raise the political bar for introducing any future national security law for Hong Kong.
Just as important, the mainland authorities were shaken by the widespread protests and escalating violence in Hong Kong last year. The emergence of incidents involving explosives and firearms posed risks of terrorism, and the open advocacy of ‘Hong Kong independence’ and ‘self-determination’ challenged the sway of the central government and the HKSAR authorities. Paranoia of U.S. interference and incitement added to this anger and anxiety. And anger gave way to exasperation when in mid-November – almost 25 weeks into the protests – the Hong Kong Court of First Instance drew a narrow interpretation of the Hong Kong chief executive’s colonial era-remnant emergency powers, as noted earlier, and shot down a fairly innocuous order banning the wearing of facial coverings at unauthorized protest gatherings. The larger backdrop of great power rivalry, introduced by the U.S. in its December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), as well as serial Taiwan and Xinjiang-related Congressional sanctions which challenge China’s territorial and sovereignty bottom line, should not be underestimated either.
On 1 July 2017, at a gathering to celebrate the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s reversion to Chinese rule, President Xi Jinping had laid down three ‘red lines’ for handling Mainland-Hong Kong relations. Any attempt to endanger national sovereignty and security, challenge the power of the central government and the authority of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, or use Hong Kong to carry out infiltration and sabotage activities against the mainland would be met with a resolute response. Three years on, with the protest activity of 2019 and the Hong Kong authorities’ forcibly restrained response fresh in mind, the central government’s response has now arrived.
The proposed national security law appears to be at variance with the spirit of the Basic Law’s ‘one country, two systems’ principle. Article 14 of the Basic Law reserves the responsibility “for the maintenance of public order” locally to the Hong Kong government. Article 23 compels the local authorities to enact laws that prohibit treason, secession, sedition, subversion, state secrets theft, and foreign interference against the central government. Article 22 overarchingly enjoins the central government to desist from interfering in local matters. And while Article 18 does envisage that “defence and foreign affairs” as well as “other matters outside the limits of autonomy” fall within the jurisdiction of the central government, this provision begs the operative question: isn’t the passage of a tailored national security law for Hong Kong that criminalizes acts which are specifically listed in Article 23 a matter that falls within – not outside – the limits of the territory’s autonomy?
Article 12: The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a local administrative region of the People’s Republic of China, which shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy and come directly under the Central People’s Government.
Article 13: The Central People’s Government shall be responsible for the foreign affairs relating to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region …
Article 14: The Central People’s Government shall be responsible for the defence of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be responsible for the maintenance of public order in the Region.
Military forces stationed by the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for defence shall not interfere in the local affairs of the Region. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, when necessary, ask the Central People’s Government for assistance from the garrison in the maintenance of public order and in disaster relief. In addition to abiding by national laws, members of the garrison shall abide by the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region …
Article 18: … National laws shall not be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region except for those listed in Annex III to this Law. The laws listed therein shall be applied locally by way of promulgation or legislation by the Region.
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress may add to or delete from the list of laws in Annex III after consulting its Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the government of the Region. Laws listed in Annex III to this Law shall be confined to those relating to defence and foreign affairs as well as other matters outside the limits of the autonomy of the Region as specified by this Law.
In the event that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress decides to declare a state of war or, by reason of turmoil within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region which endangers national unity or security and is beyond the control of the government of the Region, decides that the Region is in a state of emergency, the Central People’s Government may issue an order applying the relevant national laws in the Region.
Article 22: No department of the Central People’s Government and no province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government may interfere in the affairs which the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region administers on its own in accordance with this Law …
Article 23: The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.
Beijing could contend though that the “maintenance of public order”, as enumerated in Article 14, is amenable to the central government’s concurrent jurisdiction when its breakdown impinges on the state’s essential security interests (as President Xi seemed to hint in his 20th anniversary reversion speech). Maintaining law and order may be a local prerogative, but its breakdown is certainly a matter of national interest to the central government. In Russia v. Ukraine (April 2019), a World Trade Organization (WTO)-constituted dispute settlement panel ruled that “maintenance of law and public order internally” was a quintessential function of the state that impinged on the state’s “essential security interests.” On similar lines, the central government could contend that the local presence of the mainland’s intelligence organs is not inconsistent with Basic Law’s “defence and foreign affairs” remit. The U.S. State Department, after all, considers intelligence gathering activities at sea to be a subset of “military activities”, insofar as its engagement with the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention is concerned. Besides, the People’s Liberation Army is already garrisoned on the territory via the Annex III route, so the presence of intelligence services is not a significant departure from the status quo.
On the other hand, the proposed national security law is incontestably consistent with the letter of the Basic Law. As per the Chapter II of the Basic Law, which regulates the relationship between the central authorities and the HKSAR, “defence and foreign affairs” as well as “other matters outside the limits of the autonomy” of Hong Kong (which are specified and listed in Annex III of the Basic Law), fall under the central government’s authority. Specifically, with regard to Annex III laws, in instances that Beijing deems as falling within the purview of central government-Hong Kong relations – and the local application of an Annex III law by promulgation categorically falls within this purview – it constitutionally enjoys the power to frame the legal limits of the territory’s autonomy. This includes the right to interpret that the NPCSC-authored national security law for Hong Kong is a matter that falls outside the limits of the territory’s autonomy. Article 158 of the Basic Law vests this power of interpretation with regard to central government-Hong Kong autonomy matters in the NPCSC, and Hong Kong courts are required (“shall”) to seek an interpretation of the relevant act or provision from the NPCSC through the territory’s Court of Final Appeal. And when applying the provisions locally, the courts are “under a duty to follow” the NPCSC’s lead (although they could review for implementation-related conflicts with the Basic Law). At the end of the day, the national security law for Hong Kong, as an Annex III law, will not – and cannot – be ruled unconstitutional.
China and Hong Kong, on one side, and the Anglo-American countries (U.K., U.S., Australia, Canada), on the other, hold contrasting positions on the validity of the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 to the proposed national security law.
For Beijing, now that Hong Kong has reverted to Chinese rule, the Joint Declaration is purely a “historic document [that] no longer has practical significance and it is not binding for the central government’s management over Hong Kong.” The commitments in the Joint Declaration were memorialized in the 160-article Basic Law to the last detail and, post-1 July 1997, there is no role for the United Kingdom in the affairs of Hong Kong. The Hong Kong SAR government’s view is no different. The implementation of the ‘one country, two systems’ policy in the HKSAR is entirely the internal affair of the PRC and “every other state has no right to intervene, directly or indirectly, in those internal affairs”. The Hong Kong SAR government abides by the terms and obligations memorialized in the Basic Law – the mini-constitution of the territory and, post-1 July 1997, the Joint Declaration is effectively outdated insofar as the constitutional and political life of Hong Kong is concerned.
The view of the United Kingdom and Anglo-American government’s (U.S., Australia, Canada), on the other hand, is that Joint Declaration is a United Nations-filed international treaty and London bears a legal responsibility to ensure China abides by its obligations under the Declaration, which run through 2047. To this end, the U.K.’s Foreign and Commonwealth office issues a Six-Monthly Report on Hong Kong on the status of the territory’s autonomous standing. And specifically, with regard to China’s national security law for Hong Kong, the proposed legislation is “in conflict with its international obligations under the principles of the legally-binding” Joint Declaration. The “principles” being referred to here is the “high degree of autonomy” principle which underpins the ‘one country, two systems’ formula.
A chief complication between the two viewpoints stems from their respective differential understanding of the extent of jurisdiction enjoyed by Beijing under the “high degree of autonomy” injunction. As per the Joint Declaration, all matters except those relating to foreign and defense affairs are within the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong local government. In the Anglo-American view, the maintenance of public order is a local subject and enacting legislation that proscribes the crimes enumerated in Article 23 of the Basic Law is a HKSAR right and responsibility. By overstepping this clearly demarcated limit, the central government has set in train a chain of measures that will inevitably dissipate Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy”. On the other hand, in Beijing and HKSAR authorities’ view, as per the Basic Law, foreign and defense affairs as well as “other matters outside the limits of autonomy” of Hong Kong to fall within the jurisdiction of the central government. The central government enjoys the power of interpretation and gets to define which matters reside outside, and within, the limits of the territory’s autonomy (and thereafter list the relevant national law in Annex III and apply it locally). Despite Article 23 of the Basic Law, the central government is not precluded from legislating at a state level for national security purposes.
At the end of the day, the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law are not entirely in harmony, with the latter affording Beijing a wider perimeter of authority. And, ultimately, the test of constitutionality of a provision of law can only be based on the Basic Law (because, as a mini-Constitution, it is a legal document), and not the Joint Declaration (because it is just a political declaration of intentions and objectives).
On 28 May 2020, U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, decertified the Hong Kong SAR as being “sufficiently autonomous from the People’s Republic of China” to warrant special and differential treatment under U.S. law. The laws referred to here are the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 and as amended by the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019. The decertification opens the door to a number of possible measures, ranging from the bilateral extradition treaty to export controls on dual-use technologies.
SEC. 5. ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROL LAWS AND UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS OCCURRING IN HONG KONG.
(a)(3) an assessment of whether sensitive dual-use items subject to the export control laws of the United States are being
(A) transshipped through Hong Kong; and
(B) used to develop:
(i) the Sharp Eyes, Skynet, Integrated Joint Operations Platform, or other systems of mass surveillance and predictive policing; or
(ii) the ‘‘social credit system’’ of the People’s Republic of China;
(4) an assessment of the efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to use the status of Hong Kong as a separate customs territory to import items into the People’s Republic of China from Hong Kong in violation of the export control laws of the United States, whether as part of the Greater Bay Area plan, through the assignment by Beijing of Hong Kong as a national technology and innovation center, or through other programs that may exploit Hong Kong as a conduit for controlled sensitive technology;
SEC. 7. SANCTIONS RELATING TO UNDERMINING FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND AUTONOMY IN HONG KONG.
(a) IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR UNDERMINING FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND AUTONOMY IN HONG KONG.
(1) IN GENERAL. The President shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees, in accordance with paragraph (2), that identifies each foreign person that the President determines is responsible for
(A) the extrajudicial rendition, arbitrary detention, or torture of any person in Hong Kong; or
(B) other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in Hong Kong.
(b) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.
The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to each foreign person identified in the report required under subsection (a)(1).
(c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED. The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:
(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The President shall exercise all of the powers granted to the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of a foreign person identified in the report required under subsection (a)(1) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or come within the possession or control of a United States person.
(2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.
(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE. An alien described in subsection (a)(1) is
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(3) PENALTIES. The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a foreign person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of paragraph (1) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section 206.
(d) IMPLEMENTATION. The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.
(e) WAIVER. The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a person identified in the report required under subsection (a)(1) if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such waiver is in the national interest of the United States.
The economic ramifications of the decertification are likely to be fairly modest to Hong Kong, for the most part. The U.S. and Hong Kong do not share a preferential trade agreement and the U.S. enjoys a consistent bilateral merchandise balance of payments surplus. The U.S. and Hong Kong have not inked a bilateral investment treaty either. And while Hong Kong is treated more leniently than China by the U.S. Commerce Department for purposes of export licensing of high technology and dual use goods (Hong Kong is designated under Country Group B; China under Country Group D), the impact of the leveling of the territory’s status – if that is to be the case – will be fairly modest. The amounts involved in the territory’s imports of mass spectrometers, thermal imaging cameras, semiconductor chips, and telescopic sights for firearms from the U.S. are small and access to alternative suppliers available. If anything, the U.S. is more dependent on Hong Kong in important respects. The territory serves as an economic conduit to China and 1,300 American companies based there are treated in exactly the same way as local Hong Kong companies when accessing the mainland market. 85,000 U.S. passport holders enjoy visa-free access to Hong Kong too, which is not reciprocated by the U.S. So, leverage frankly runs the other way.
One potential sector where Hong Kong could be impacted though is in the area of digital commerce. In the case of telecoms and digital issues, the U.S. authorities already make less of a distinction between Mainland and Hong Kong-based entities in terms of “threat” analysis. This distinction could get further circumscribed in areas such as data flows, data privacy and cybersecurity. These measures could hold back Hong Kong’s commercial ambitions in the digital sphere, especially its goal of becoming an ecommerce and digital hub within the Asia-Pacific region.
Additionally, beyond the economic dimension, a punitive decertification-linked domestic legal instrument in the hands of the Administration to punish China – actually Chinese officials and their Hong Kong accessories – is the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act of 2016. The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 also provides a framework to sanction Chinese and HKSAR officials that are complicit in the suppression of basic freedoms in Hong Kong, and sanctions under either law could be utilized to impose travel bans and financial asset blockages as well as sanctions on financial institutions found to have evaded these strictures. For its part, the Boris Johnson government in London has promised to revise the nation’s immigration rules and allow holders of British National Overseas (BNO) passports in Hong Kong to enter and work in the United Kingdom for a renewable 12 month period – should China impose the national security law. A path to citizenship would also be opened to them. There are conservatively 300,000 BNO passport holders in Hong Kong and an additional 2.9 million Hong Kongers could be eligible for the passport.
The National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s (NPCSC) has commenced the drafting of the proposed national security law for Hong Kong. It enjoys immense drafting and interpretive powers. This wide interpretive latitude obliges the NPCSC to travel the extra mile and craft the national security law to Hong Kong’s common law principles and sensibilities. The law’s scope must be limited to its express legislative purpose, i.e. plugging the “defenseless” national security gap in the legal system and enforcement mechanism. Its penalties must not extend beyond the four crimes of secession, subversion, terrorism, and foreign interference. Offences need to be defined with precision, investigatory powers governed by local law, and trials conducted as per the Prosecution Code in open court and guilt established beyond a reasonable doubt. The law must not touch upon, let alone amend, the Basic Law provisions on residents’ fundamental rights and duties. And mainland officers and agents stationed and active on Hong Kong soil must abide by the territory’s laws, just like their garrisoned PLA counterparts.
China’s National People’s Congress’ May 28th decision comes at a critical juncture in Hong Kong’s post-reversion history. While its impact on Hong Kong’s rights, freedoms and lifestyle may be less than what most have prophesized, this can only be confirmed once the legal text is finalized. The “high degree of autonomy” promised in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and enshrined in the Basic Law hangs in the balance.
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