A Test for the Future of Global Ocean Law

The trajectory of deep-sea mining remains uncertain. The U.S. and China represent opposite ends of the governance spectrum — one unilateral and rapid, the other multilateral and cautious. Whether these paths will converge or remain in tension is unclear. 

U.S. President Donald Trump issued an executive order in April authorizing government agencies to grant commercial licenses to companies seeking to mine in areas beyond national jurisdiction — meaning the ocean floor. This marked a significant shift in U.S. ocean policy, emphasizing national interest and access to critical minerals. The move reinforced longstanding U.S. concerns over the regulatory authority of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and intensified global competition around the governance of the seabed — a space considered the common heritage of humankind.

In contrast, China continues to pursue deep-sea mining through formal cooperation with the ISA. It holds multiple exploration contracts and is investing in the technologies and regulatory systems needed for future development. While the U.S. promotes a sovereignty-first approach outside the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China remains engaged within that multilateral framework. This divergence reflects differences in legal strategy, institutional engagement and vision for global ocean governance.

Trump’s order is grounded in the 1980 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, which was originally enacted to enable U.S. seabed mining outside the UNCLOS framework. It revives the long-dormant statute and signals a return to unilateralism by asserting U.S. regulatory authority over international seabed mining.  Proponents argue that it secures access to critical minerals like cobalt, nickel and rare earth elements vital to clean energy and national security.

However, the move has sparked environmental and legal backlash, with critics warning of ecological risks and the erosion of multilateral norms. The ISA secretary-general expressed concern that unilateral actions may undermine collective efforts to manage the seabed as a common heritage. Even the United States’ traditional allies — particularly European countries that remain committed to the ISA framework — have voiced concerns about the risks of regulatory fragmentation

China’s strategy, by contrast, embodies embedded multilateralism with strategic depth.  Through state-backed entities such as the China Ocean Mineral Resources R&D Association and China Minmetals Corp., China currently has multiple exploration contracts with the ISA, covering polymetallic nodules in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone and Western Pacific Ocean, polymetallic sulphides in the southwestern Indian Ridge and cobalt-rich crusts in the Western Pacific.

This approach not only ensures legal access to potential mining sites but also allows China to influence rule-making — particularly the Mining Code, which is currently in negotiation. That said, China’s approach is not without its challenges. The critics have questioned whether ISA mechanisms provide sufficient transparency, and environmental groups have called for more rigorous oversight of seabed mining practices globally, including Chinese initiatives. Like other major players, China must also confront growing global calls for a moratorium on deep seedbed mining until stronger environmental protections are in place.

Beyond the immediate environmental and legal concerns, the contrast also reveals divergent philosophies of governance. The U.S. prioritizes regulatory autonomy and flexibility, viewing multilateral regimes as constraints on innovation and competitiveness. China, meanwhile, values shaping global rules from within, aligning its corporate and technological ambitions with institutional legitimacy. Yet, both come with trade-offs: U.S. unilateralism risks legal uncertainty and diplomatic tension, while China must confront scrutiny over environmental governance and institutional credibility.

Observers warn that the divergent strategies could fragment global seabed governance. Should more states follow the U.S. in bypassing the ISA, regulatory coherence may erode, spurring a race to the bottom. If the ISA fails to finalize binding Mining Code rules, key actors might explore alternative legal paths, undermining its authority. Even China, despite its current commitment to the ISA, could be pressured to recalibrate its strategy should the ISA’s authority diminish.

In addition, both countries face growing pressure over environmental risks. Deep-sea ecosystems are fragile and poorly understood, and mining poses threats such as sediment plumes and toxic discharges. China has stepped up its environmental baseline studies, mainly in response to ISA requirements. The United States, despite having a well-established regulatory framework for environmental protection, has not put forward a coherent environmental strategy alongside its licensing announcement, raising concerns that its approach may prioritize resource access over long-term sustainability.

Globally, civil societies and small island states are rallying behind a global moratorium, calling for a pause on mining until stronger safeguards are in place. Whether China and the U.S. will internalize these environmental norms or treat them as geopolitical constraints will shape the ethical and legal foundation of seabed governance for decades to come.

The ISA remains the key platform for legal harmonization. If it succeeds in finalizing a credible and enforceable Mining Code, a balance between commercial and environmental interests may yet be achieved. If not, legal uncertainty and geopolitical tensions could deepen.

Beyond institutional debates, the competition reflects deeper geopolitical tensions over critical mineral supply chains. With China dominating global terrestrial rare earth production, the U.S. sees seabed mining as a strategic alternative to reduce dependency. Both powers are exerting economic and diplomatic pressure on allies and partners to support their respective visions for seabed governance. The race is also technological and military: Investments in subsea exploration and surveillance have implications for naval operations, undersea communications and intelligence gathering.

Looking ahead, deep-sea mining’s trajectory remains uncertain. The U.S. and China represent opposite ends of the governance spectrum — one unilateral and rapid, the other multilateral and cautious. Whether or not these paths will converge or remain in tension is unclear. To transform this arena from a strategic contest to a cooperative stewardship, a more evidence-based governance model is needed that balances sovereignty, sustainability and shared responsibility.

Deep seabed mining is not merely a race for resources; it is a test case for how international legal pluralism and collaborative governance can be harnessed to manage shared global spaces under conditions of strategic asymmetry. The choices made by the United States and China will shape not only the future of the ocean’s last frontier but also the trajectory of global environmental governance more broadly. By integrating regulatory innovation, multilateral cooperation and cross-sectoral engagement, both powers can move beyond zero-sum competition toward a more equitable, transparent and ecologically sustainable governance regime. 

This article was originally published on the website of China-US Focus on June 2, 2025.