- Issue Brief
- Sourabh Gupta
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Resident Senior Fellow
On March 18, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan will meet their Chinese counterparts, Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi, in Anchorage, Alaska, for the first high-level meeting of the two sides since the inauguration of President Joe Biden. The meeting comes on the heels of a hectic bout of early Indo-Pacific regional diplomacy by the administration, including the Quad Leaders’ Summit and the ‘2+2’ consultations with Tokyo and Seoul.
The Anchorage meeting does not constitute the inauguration of a new high-level structured dialogue framework on the lines of the Obama Administration’s Strategic and Economic Dialogue. That said, the meeting should not be dismissed as inconsequential. After four turbulent years of Trumpism, Anchorage will provide an early glimpse into the (likely) sizeable gap between the ‘old normal’ under Barack Obama and the ‘new normal’ under Joe Biden on U.S.-China ties.
The most significant takeaway from the meeting is that the Indo-Pacific region continues to be treated head-and-shoulders above the other regions of the world, including Europe, as the foremost geopolitical theater of priority where U.S. interests are engaged. The Trump Administration laid the foundation for this shift by prioritizing the Indo-Pacific theater above others in its National Security Strategy of December 2017 – the first time that such a strategy document had prioritized Asia over Europe since the U.S.’ rise as an internationally engaged superpower more than 100 years back.
The Biden Administration has already described China as “the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system” in its Interim Strategic Guidance. In Anchorage, both sides are expected to firmly reiterate their national concerns and red lines, but there will also be an effort by each side to convey a degree of reassurance to the other. The emphasis on talk rather than threats over the public microphone is to be welcomed.
Substantive U.S.-China deal-making will have to wait, however, for the completion – or near-completion – of the numerous internal Executive Branch reviews of China policy or strategy. These reviews are as much an effort to reach an unfiltered, whole-of-government consensus on China policy or strategy as much as they are about reviewing the reach, and overreach, of the Trump Administration’s China measures (and of which there were many in the last 18 months of the Trump term).
In Anchorage, Alaska, later tomorrow, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan will meet their Chinese counterparts, Yang Jiechi, Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, and Wang Yi, State Councilor and Foreign Minister. The meeting is rightly being billed as the highest-level meeting of the two sides since Secretary Mike Pompeo sat across the table fruitlessly with Director Yang in Hawaii last June. The meeting comes on the heels of a hectic bout of Indo-Pacific regional diplomacy conducted in short order by the Biden Administration. On Friday, March 5, President Joe Biden held a Leaders Summit with the heads of government of the other ‘Quad’ countries – Australia, India, and Japan – and jointly pledged to roll-out an ambitious vaccine partnership to distribute a billion COVID-19 vaccines across the Indo-Pacific region. Earlier this week, Secretaries Blinken and Austin held ‘2+2’ meetings with their counterparts in Tokyo and Seoul. On the day after the Anchorage meeting, Secretary Austin is scheduled to hold consultations in New Delhi. Moreover, just earlier, over the previous two weeks, the U.S. reached an agreement on new cost-sharing deals related to host nation support for U.S. troops and bases with South Korea and Japan. The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance that will serve as a placeholder until the finalization of the Administration’s National Security Strategy later this year, was also released earlier this month.
Much chatter related to the high-level meeting in Anchorage has concerned whether this engagement constitutes the start of a high-level strategic dialogue – likened to the Strategic and Economic Dialogue of the Obama Administration and the multiple initial dialogue formats, including the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, of the Trump Administration – or is something else entirely. Judging by the U.S. sides’ view, the high-level meeting falls squarely in the latter category. Regardless of whether the Anchorage meeting is the start of a structured or ad hoc dialogue format, it is instructive to bear in mind that it is still very early going in U.S.-China relations under the Biden Administration. An early meeting is not necessarily representative of the twists-and-turns that might – or might not – follow in the ensuing months and years. It is particularly instructive to bear in mind that about this time (i.e., early-Spring) into the Trump Administration, President Trump and President Xi held a remarkably cordial meeting in Mar-a-Lago. The moderate and conciliatory tone of the U.S. president was followed by a detailed 100 Day Action Plan, whose tenth and final provision – the United States recognizes the importance of China’s One Belt and One Road initiative and is to send delegates to attend the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing May 14-15 – seems bizarrely anachronistic today. The Mar-a-Lago meeting was succeeded with an even more successful ‘State Visit-plus’ summit in Beijing in November that year. Of course, as we all know, the bottom fell out of the relationship during the last two years of the Trump presidency.
This having been said, the U.S.-China meeting in Anchorage should certainly not be dismissed as an inconsequential one. With a ‘new normal’ in U.S.-China relations probably on the anvil after a turbulent four years of Trumpism, Anchorage might provide an early glimpse into the (likely) sizeable gap between the ‘old normal’ under Barack Obama and the ‘new normal’ under Joe Biden on U.S.-China ties. This Issue Brief, via a colloquial discussion format, provides a quick summary of the expectations going into Anchorage and the key takeaways that are likely to derive from the meeting. The discussion is preceded though by an interactive representation of the policy positions on China articulated by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, during their current (short) stint in the Biden Administration, as well as in their previous Obama-era government and Trump-era non-governmental roles. This interactive representation of their policy positions on China is drawn from ICAS’ ongoing Biden Administration International Affairs Personnel Tracker project.
Click on each image to learn more about the positions and past actions of Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, and National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan.
The most important significance of the meeting is that the Indo-Pacific region is being treated head-and-shoulders above the other regions of the world, including Europe, as the foremost geopolitical theater of priority where U.S. interests are engaged. The Anchorage meeting cannot be seen in isolation; it must be viewed more holistically in the context of the Quad Leaders’ Summit, Secretaries Blinken and Austin’s meetings in Seoul and Tokyo, and Secretary Austin’s meeting in New Delhi. And, of course, Prime Minister Suga of Japan will be at the White House in April.
Essentially, within two months of the administration’s inauguration, there will have been in-person cabinet secretary-level meetings with key Asian allies, partners, and competitors. This treatment of the Indo-Pacific region by the Biden Administration, which, in keeping with the importance and seriousness that the region commands, deserves to be commended. Of course, this is not just this administration’s doing. It was the Trump Administration that made this profound shift by prioritizing the Indo-Pacific theater above others in its National Security Strategy of December 2017 – the first time that such a strategy document has prioritized Asia over Europe since the U.S.’ rise as an internationally engaged superpower more than 100 years back. And it is a welcome sight to witness the Biden Administration continue along this strategic pathway.
One should expect to see a firm reiteration of national concerns and red lines but also an effort by both sides to convey a degree of reassurance to the other. And on that basis, start laying the ground for a future structured dialogue framework. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the espousal of concerns and red lines will dominate the conversation in Anchorage. Moreover, given that this administration is new (while China’s senior diplomatic representation remains the same), it will be Secretary Blinken and National Security Advisor Sullivan marking this new administration’s ‘lines on the ice’ in Anchorage. Good communication begins with clear communication, and decent working relations must be built atop a clear-eyed view of priorities and interests without illusions. This is essentially the purpose of the meeting from the perspective of the American side, going in.
Beijing would be correct in interpreting the conversation in Anchorage as the start of a reset process, albeit a difficult one that will not revert to the ‘old normal’. And it will probably discount some of the excessive hawkishness that might be on tap from the American end, including the administration’s very recent sanctioning of Chinese officials involved in eroding Hong Kong’s democracy, rationalizing it as a new administration’s effort to politically cover its flanks. But overall, it will welcome this (very) early high-level political emphasis on talk and not threats (over the public microphone).
… We must also contend with the reality that the distribution of power across the world is changing, creating new threats. China, in particular, has rapidly become more assertive. It is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.
… Taken together, this agenda will strengthen our enduring advantages, and allow us to prevail in strategic competition with China or any other nation. The most effective way for America to out-compete a more assertive and authoritarian China over the long-term is to invest in our people, our economy, and our democracy. By restoring U.S. credibility and reasserting forward-looking global leadership, we will ensure that America, not China, sets the international agenda, working alongside others to shape new global norms and agreements that advance our interests and reflect our values. By bolstering and defending our unparalleled network of allies and partners, and making smart defense investments, we will also deter Chinese aggression and counter threats to our collective security, prosperity, and democratic way of life.
At the same time, revitalizing our core strengths is necessary but not sufficient. In many areas, China’s leaders seek unfair advantages, behave aggressively and coercively, and undermine the rules and values at the heart of an open and stable international system. When the Chinese government’s behavior directly threatens our interests and values, we will answer Beijing’s challenge. We will confront unfair and illegal trade practices, cyber theft, and coercive economic practices that hurt American workers, undercut our advanced and emerging technologies, and seek to erode our strategic advantage and national competitiveness. We will ensure that our supply chains for critical national security technologies and medical supplies are secure. We will continue to defend access to the global commons, including freedom of navigation and overflight rights, under international law. We will position ourselves, diplomatically and militarily, to defend our allies. We will support China’s neighbors and commercial partners in defending their rights to make independent political choices free of coercion or undue foreign influence. We will promote locally-led development to combat the manipulation of local priorities. We will support Taiwan, a leading democracy and a critical economic and security partner, in line with longstanding American commitments. We will ensure that U.S. companies do not sacrifice American values in doing business in China. And we will stand up for democracy, human rights, and human dignity, including in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet. On all these issues, we will work to forge a common approach with like-minded countries.
We also recognize that strategic competition does not, and should not, preclude working with China when it is in our national interest to do so. Indeed, renewing America’s advantages ensures that we will engage China from a position of confidence and strength. We will conduct practical, results-oriented diplomacy with Beijing and work to reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculation. We will welcome the Chinese government’s cooperation on issues such as climate change, global health security, arms control, and nonproliferation where our national fates are intertwined. As we do, we will rally our allies and partners to join us, pooling our negotiating leverage and showing our collective power and resolve
Source: White House, March 2021
For red lines to be meaningful, they must be both enforceable and have a deterrent effect on Beijing’s conduct. The administration is in a position to both enforce and deter on issue areas such as Chinese armed action against Taiwan, the rules-based order in the East and South China Seas (so long as the red lines are crafted narrowly regarding the latter water body and overlap with President Xi’s promise to non-militarize its Spratlys outposts), on commercial espionage and cyber theft, and on a subset of predatory economic practices in the high-technology segment which can be answered with export controls and licensing denials. On the other hand, regarding Xinjiang and Hong Kong, the Biden Administration would do well to articulate its displeasure with ongoing developments but not be too prescriptive in laying down stringent red lines. The main reason is that while it can enforce its red lines through unilateral sanctions policy, it cannot do much beyond that in terms of deterring Beijing’s conduct. After all, these issues fall within the remit of China’s internal affairs and hence not easily amenable to the creation of broad-based international coalitions to bring pressure on Beijing.
On the issues that divide the two countries, not much at this stage, frankly. The Biden Administration is conducting numerous China strategy/policy reviews across a number of Executive Branch agencies and departments, including at the White House, USTR, Defense and Commerce Departments. Before it approaches the last lap in its review process, the administration is highly unlikely to place anything substantial on the table. For its part, Beijing would prefer to hash the hard issues out within a high-level structured dialogue framework rather than on an ad hoc basis. Further, it would much prefer that a very high-level individual be designated within the administration who could more-or-less serve as the ‘control tower’ on China policy.
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and NSA Susan Rice had played this role during the second Bush and Obama Administrations, and China benefited from their stabilizing hands-on approach. By contrast, there was rarely a ‘control tower’-type individual through most of the Trump years, leading every irate Tom, Dick and Harry in the administration to jump into the fray, freelance on occasion on China policy, and curse Beijing at will. Of course, ‘control tower’ individuals are harder to establish during an administration’s first term since everybody wants a piece of the China pie. Therefore a structured dialogue framework with even two leads (such as Hillary Clinton and Tim Geithner during the first Obama administration) is better than none from China’s perspective.
In any case, what China and the U.S. are likely, or willing, to put on the table at Anchorage will relate to issues on which there is fair convergence of viewpoints. Primarily, these relate to climate change where the two sides could discuss the agenda and hoped-for outcomes related to Biden’s ‘Earth Day’ climate summit. Additionally, they could discuss the pressing issue of expanding access to vaccines globally under the aegis of, and beyond, the COVAX facility (even though the U.S. has already chosen to prioritize vaccine distribution via the Quad framework). Another area of discussion would be an extension and expansion of the official lenders’ debt suspension and debt relief framework for lower-income countries under the aegis of the G20 and the IMF.
For its part, China could easily come to the table with pledges, if it so chooses, on three important issue areas where it has already committed itself to concerted action. These are:
By-and-large, no. The purpose of the many China strategy reviews is as much to reach an unfiltered internal – and ideally whole-of-government – consensus on, and formation of, China strategy under the Biden Administration as much as it is to review the reach, and overreach, of the Trump Administration’s China measures (and of which there were many in the last 18 months of the Trump term).
The keyword here is ‘unfiltered.’ Introducing purported Chinese pledges in Anchorage could skew the very purpose of the reviews, which is to draw up a resilient and durable strategy but one which can also be informed by and flexibly reshaped, depending on Beijing’s responses. A high-level Chinese expression in Anchorage to play (fair) ball on a number of issues could, at the margin, ensure that the China strategy is drawn up on more extensible lines so as to incorporate greater flexibility, as opposed to rigidity, in the implementation of China policy. However, the fundamental outlines of the strategy – be it moderate leaning or harder-line leaning – is not up for grabs by way of external input or influence.
Both yes and no. Yes, to the extent that, at the end of the day, the Biden Administration’s China policy will most probably resemble a much more realism-informed Obama Administration policy. Besides, a president’s worldview, including formative views on China, is deeply imprinted at a fundamental level on every administration’s foreign and strategic policies. And the 40-plus years of Biden’s political life, which has neatly dovetailed with China’s reform and opening-up period, have left a distinctly dovish rather than hawkish residue on China policy. Joe Biden is, in a sense, the last of an earlier generation of U.S. presidents and politicians who saw China through relatively more rose-tinted lenses.
On the other hand, the world under the feet of the U.S.-China relationship has literally shifted during, and by, the intervening Trump years. On issues like strategic trade controls, military-civilian fusion, high-technology exchanges, and critical supply chain security, there will be (much) more Trump than Obama in the Biden Administration’s politics and policies. Moreover, Beijing operates at its peril if it chooses to treat the Biden Administration as simply a hardline version of Obama III. In which case, it could be in for a shock as to what the Beltway political machine might spit out in its general direction.
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