Bridging the Gap Between Science and Policy in Arctic Climate Cooperation

During the 2026 Arctic Circle Rome Forum – Polar Dialogue, a familiar pattern emerged across discussions on climate change and international cooperation. Policy-focused panels repeatedly emphasized the importance of sustaining international climate cooperation amid ongoing geopolitical tensions and escalating climate risks. At the same time, scientific sessions covered a wide range of ongoing research and highlighted the practical challenges they face, many of which could be better alleviated through broader international collaboration. 

These two conversations—one focused on policy principles and the other on scientific practice—often unfold in parallel, yet are only weakly connected. While the urgency of Arctic climate change is widely recognized and the potential benefits of scientific cooperation are clearly understood, there is still a limited alignment between the needs articulated by scientific communities and the frameworks discussed in policy circles. What remains missing is a clearer pathway to connect these two domains. Closer collaboration between policy research and scientific institutions may help align priorities and make Arctic climate cooperation more actionable and fruitful in multiple domains.

Arctic climate research is inherently international, as environmental changes in the region extend across national boundaries and carry global implications. Phenomena such as sea ice loss, permafrost thaw, and ocean circulation affect both Arctic and non-Arctic countries, making coordinated observation, shared data, and multinational systems essential. Initiatives such as the Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks reflect the recognition that no single country can fully capture the scale and complexity of these changes. From a scientific perspective, cooperation is therefore both beneficial and necessary.

Yet geopolitical tensions have made such cooperation increasingly difficult. The suspension of many scientific research activities in the Arctic and the broader deterioration of relations between Russia and Western countries have weakened traditional channels of collaboration and posted more climate uncertainties. While climate change continues to accelerate, the institutional mechanisms that once supported scientific cooperation have become constrained.

At the same time, climate and environmental cooperation has often been viewed as one of the few remaining areas where engagement can be sustained during political tensions. Its relatively low sensitivity, shared global necessity, and technical nature have allowed it to serve as a channel for continued dialogue and mutual understanding. It is precisely when geopolitical relations are strained that maintaining such forms of cooperation becomes even more important.

The Arctic also does not lack cooperation opportunities; rather, it lacks mechanisms that can effectively connect policy discourse with scientific collaboration. During the Rome Forum, scientific communities continue to identify concrete areas where independent research faces practical constraints—including data collection, access to advanced technologies, shared infrastructure, and joint research efforts. However, many of these challenges are difficult to address in the absence of effective channels for collaboration. Policy discussions, meanwhile, repeatedly emphasize the importance of scientific cooperation for environmental protection, multilateral trust, and the long-term improvement of international relations. 

Therefore, it is necessary to establish a set of intermediary functions that can translate scientific needs into policy-relevant questions, connect potential partners, and provide a space to explore collaboration before it enters more formal and politically sensitive channels.

The concept of science–policy “boundary organizations” could offer one way to understand how such intermediary functions might operate.Institutions working at the interface of science and policy can help translate needs, coordinate expectations, and sustain communication without directly exercising decision-making authority. In many policy contexts, elements of this boundary role are already present in think tanks and related policy institutes.

Think tanks are well positioned to facilitate dialogue and often possess relevant expertise in climate and environmental policy, but they may not always engage with the operational realities of scientific research. However, since they are not typically embedded in fieldwork in many cases, their understanding of the detailed needs of research institutions may be more limited. 

At the same time, the role of think tanks still differs from that of other actors and enjoy a relatively favorable position. Scientific institutions and research consortia are often more directly affected by restrictions on fieldwork, data access, and formal cooperation channels. Think tanks, by contrast, may retain greater flexibility in engaging across policy domains and national boundaries, particularly through informal dialogue and policy-oriented platforms. This relative flexibility suggests that they may have a more immediate operational space to function as intermediaries under current geopolitical constraints

If think tanks are to make a more meaningful contribution, their role may need to evolve in ways that reflect these comparative advantages. Some policy-oriented think tanks need to deepen their engagement with scientific communities, while university-affiliated or research-linked institutions could build on existing connections. In either case, the shift is less about redefining their function than about extending it. They need to move forward from parallel participation in discussions toward a more active intermediary role as listeners, interpreters, and coordinators. Their added value lies in translating concrete scientific needs into policy-relevant frameworks and feasible cooperation models.

A useful starting point is to recognize that cooperation in the Arctic has not entirely ceased under current geopolitical tensions. In areas characterized by shared risks and immediate practical necessity, certain forms of cooperation have actually continued despite broader political constraints. For example, cooperation on emergency response and search and rescue has been maintained even after the Russia-Ukraine Conflict, reflecting the recognition that some risks cannot be effectively managed unilaterally. This provides an important precedent: when issues are clearly framed as shared and urgent, cooperation can persist across geopolitical divides. 

From this perspective, the urgency of Arctic climate change presents a comparable case. Scientific communities have consistently emphasized that climate risks in the Arctic carry global implications and require sustained multinational observation and research. Yet this urgency has not been translated into comparable forms of sustained cooperation. Think tanks may contribute by drawing clearer connections between scientific urgency and existing policy precedents, and by framing certain areas of climate research as issues of shared risk and practical necessity.

Even if broader cooperation remains constrained, there may still be room for more targeted and incremental efforts, rather than a blanket suspension of collaboration. The challenges faced by scientific communities are often highly specific, including access to data, infrastructure, field sites, and cross-border movement. Think tanks may be well positioned to examine which aspects of cooperation are genuinely restricted by legal or security considerations, and which are limited more by precautionary assumptions or lack of coordination. This could help identify areas of climate research that may reasonably qualify for exemptions or more flexible arrangements.

Such efforts may also involve supporting alternative platforms for engagement. Independent and non-governmental forums—such as Arctic Circle meetings or broader scientific platforms—can provide spaces where communication is less constrained by formal political positions.

Importantly, the constraints on Arctic scientific cooperation are not limited to current geopolitical conflicts. Political debates over the roles of Arctic and non-Arctic states have also begun to shape scientific engagement. Think tanks can contribute by clarifying the distinction between governance and participation. Many Arctic research questions have clear global public goods characteristics, and their scientific investigation should not be unnecessarily restricted by political categorizations. Making this distinction explicit could help prevent political concerns from being extended into domains where wider engagement is both legitimate and useful.

If climate cooperation is to remain a viable pathway for Arctic engagement, the focus may need to shift from rhetorical consensus toward more practical forms of institutional coordination. In the long run, sustained cooperation will still depend on governments. Yet in the current environment, when formal channels are constrained, strengthening intermediary functions that connect science and policy may be one of the few available ways to preserve cooperation, maintain scientific continuity, and keep open the foundations for future engagement.