Debunking the “Winning” Narrative: a Reality Check on the South China Sea

Recently, a scholar from the well-known American think tank CSIS published an article titled How to Keep Winning in the South China Sea. It examines the United States’ approach to the South China Sea during the second Trump administration, suggesting a continuation of policies from its predecessor aimed at countering Chinese influence. It points to U.S. support for the Philippines, the regularization of Freedom of Navigation Operations, and Southeast Asian successes in resisting Chinese pressure, particularly in oil and gas exploration. However, its analysis reveals more about American geopolitical anxieties and strategic priorities than it does about the realities of the South China Sea disputes. 

The most striking feature of the article is its geopolitical tone, steeped in competition and confrontation. This mindset is not unique to the South China Sea but mirrors U.S. foreign policy across regions like Europe, the Middle East, the South Pacific, and Latin America. The focus on “deterring Chinese aggression” and “shaping the geopolitical environment” betrays a deep-seated unease about China’s growing maritime power, a fear of declining American hegemony, and a stubborn attachment to Cold War thinking and zero-sum games. This approach assumes that any advance by China is a loss for the U.S., reflecting a bias rooted in viewing international relations through the lens of “strength” and “dominance.” This same perspective has led to America’s recent diplomatic struggles. In multilateral settings like the United Nations, the U.S. has faced widespread criticism over its handling of trade tariffs, climate change, and conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine. The root of these troubles lies in a consistent preference for unilateral power over cooperative solutions—a pattern that the article extends to the South China Sea. By casting China as a threat that must be contained, the U.S. reveals its own insecurities rather than offering a balanced view of the region’s disputes.

The article’s narrative also mischaracterizes the South China Sea disputes by framing them as geopolitical and security challenges rather than what they truly are: unresolved issues of territorial sovereignty and maritime boundaries. It portrays China’s efforts to protect its legitimate claims as attempts to “control” the South China Sea, a depiction that oversimplifies the situation. The disputes involve multiple claimants—Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia—each asserting rights over land features and maritime zones. The article points to instances where these countries have pursued oil and gas exploration in contested waters, describing China’s responses as aggressive. Yet, it fails to acknowledge that these activities are unilateral moves in areas where sovereignty and boundaries remain unsettled. China’s countermeasures—diplomatic protests, coast guard deployments—are not about dominating the region but about defending its perceived rights in the absence of a resolution. The article’s focus on China’s “gray zone” tactics, like the use of coast guard vessels, further distorts the picture by implying a level of belligerence that does not align with reality. These are non-lethal measures, chosen to assert claims without escalating to conflict. China will continue to safeguard its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, but the methods and intensity will depend on specific circumstances and its own needs, not a grand scheme of control as the article suggests.

Contrary to the article’s claims, stability in the South China Sea owes much to China’s diplomatic efforts with Southeast Asian nations, not to U.S. deterrence or Philippine strategies. China maintains open communication channels with Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, using these to protest infringements, manage maritime frictions, and prevent escalation. These efforts reflect a shared desire among the claimant states to control disputes and avoid crises. For instance, China has worked with the Philippines to de-escalate tensions around Second Thomas Shoal, showing a willingness to prioritize dialogue over confrontation. The article’s assertion that Southeast Asian nations have “stood up” to China, thanks to U.S. support, ignores this broader context. Stability is not the result of American or Philippine “victories” but of mutual restraint and diplomatic engagement. The idea that the U.S. and the Philippines have “won” is self-deceptive and exposes what truly matters to the U.S.: not crisis management or dispute resolution, but the perception of triumph over China. This focus on “winning” rather than stability underscores a fundamental misalignment with the region’s needs.

The article’s encouragement of legal challenges against China—through mechanisms like the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), or the UN General Assembly—is particularly troubling. This push to use international dispute resolution platforms is less about justice and more about weaponizing them for strategic gain, a move that mocks the principles of international law. By promoting further arbitration or resolutions, the U.S. aims to isolate China, stoke tensions with claimant states, and keep the South China Sea in the international spotlight—all to serve its broader strategy of containing China. This approach creates a false dichotomy of an “international community” versus China, casting the former as lawful and the latter as a violator. The article’s obsession with counting votes in international forums, as if support can be tallied like a child’s game, is naive and disrespectful to the sovereignty of other nations. It assumes that countries can be pressured into aligning against China, ignoring their own interests and the risks of entanglement in a superpower rivalry. Such tactics do not resolve disputes; they deepen divisions and politicize legal processes, potentially dragging third parties into a conflict they did not choose.

The U.S. has played a significant role in worsening the South China Sea situation, and the article’s portrayal of it as a stabilizing force is unconvincing. As a non-claimant with its own strategic agenda, the U.S. uses the region to bolster alliances and justify military presence, framing China’s actions as threats to navigation and security—claims unsupported by evidence, given China’s reliance on these sea lanes for trade. Operations like Freedom of Navigation patrols, while cloaked as legal exercises, are provocative and fuel mistrust. Some U.S. scholars and think tanks exacerbate this by aligning their analyses with American policy goals rather than offering objective insights. Their work often simplifies the disputes, emphasizing China’s actions while downplaying those of other claimants, thus reinforcing a confrontational narrative. This lack of depth hinders a true understanding of the South China Sea and serves U.S. strategic interests over regional peace.

In conclusion, the South China Sea disputes are intricate, involving overlapping claims and competing interests that demand careful diplomacy, not geopolitical posturing. The article’s analysis, while detailed, reflects America’s broader tendency to view global affairs as a contest where China’s rise must be checked. This mindset, coupled with efforts to leverage legal and diplomatic pressure, risks escalating tensions rather than resolving them. Stability in the region has been maintained through the efforts of China and its neighbors, not through U.S. intervention or Philippine tactics. A constructive path forward requires all parties—claimants and external actors like the U.S.—to prioritize dialogue and respect sovereignty. U.S. scholars and policymakers would benefit from deeper study and a more nuanced grasp of the South China Sea, moving beyond simplistic narratives to support a stable, peaceful future for the region.

This article was originally published on the website of the Voice of the South China Sea on June 10, 2025