Diverging Currents: U.S.–China Strategies on Deep Seabed Mining and the Future of Ocean Governance

In April 2025, the Trump administration issued an executive order authorizing the U.S. government to begin granting commercial licenses for deep seabed mining (DSM) in areas beyond national jurisdiction. The decision marks a significant policy shift, reflecting a renewed emphasis on national interest and access to critical minerals. While the order reaffirms longstanding U.S. concerns about the regulatory scope of the International Seabed Authority (ISA), it also introduces new tensions into an already delicate global effort to govern the seabed as a shared space.

In contrast, China has continued to pursue its seabed mining ambitions through formal engagement with the ISA, holding multiple exploration contracts and investing steadily in the technology and regulatory infrastructure required for eventual exploitation. These divergent approaches—one asserting national authority outside of the UNCLOS framework, the other operating within it—highlight broader differences in legal strategy, institutional engagement, and visions of global ocean governance.

Trump’s Executive Order: Reviving a Unilateralist Ocean Strategy

The Trump administration’s April 2025 executive order invokes the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA) as a domestic legal basis for licensing DSM operations beyond U.S. jurisdiction. While the United States has never ratified UNCLOS, it has generally adhered to many of its principles in practice. This order represents a reassertion of unilateral regulatory authority over commercial activities in the international seabed area, bypassing the ISA—the body established under UNCLOS to oversee mineral development in the “Area”.

Supporters of the policy argue that it is necessary to secure access to critical minerals—such as cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements—seen as essential for clean energy transitions and national security. Given the increasing geopolitical competition over supply chains, this rationale resonates with concerns over strategic vulnerabilities, particularly in relation to China’s dominant position in rare earth processing.

However, the executive order has prompted criticism from a range of observers. Environmental organizations have raised alarms about potential ecological damage in the deep ocean and the precedent set by moving outside the multilateral regime. The ISA Secretary-General expressed concern that unilateral actions may undermine collective efforts to manage the seabed as the “common heritage of mankind.” Some U.S. allies, including European nations committed to the ISA process, have voiced unease over what they see as a move toward regulatory fragmentation.

China’s ISA-Driven Strategy: Embedded Multilateralism with Strategic Depth

China’s approach to deep seabed mining has evolved gradually, with a clear preference for operating within the established ISA framework. Through state-backed entities such as the China Ocean Mineral Resources R&D Association (COMRA) and China Minmetals Corporation, China currently holds multiples exploration contracts with the ISA, covering polymetallic nodules in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone and Western Pacific Ocean, polymetallic sulphides in the Southwest Indian Ridge, and cobalt-rich crusts in the Western Pacific.

This strategy aligns with China’s broader efforts to position itself as a participant in global rule-making processes. Engaging with the ISA allows China to secure legal access to potential mining zones while contributing to the development of the ISA Mining Code—a set of rules and environmental safeguards still under negotiation. By remaining within this regime, China benefits from legal certainty and reputational legitimacy, even as it advances its national interests.

That said, China’s approach is not without its challenges. Critics have questioned whether ISA mechanisms provide sufficient transparency, and environmental groups have called for more rigorous oversight of seabed mining practices globally, including Chinese initiatives. Like other major players, China must also confront growing global calls for a moratorium on DSM until stronger environmental protections are in place.

Legal and Philosophical Divergences

The U.S. and China’s contrasting strategies reflect broader philosophical differences in how each engages with international law and institutions. The U.S. approach—particularly under Trump—leans toward regulatory autonomy, emphasizing flexibility and national control. The executive order is consistent with a view that multilateral institutions should not impede commercial innovation or strategic competition, especially in a domain where the U.S. sees a potential technological edge.

China, on the other hand, sees long-term value in shaping the rules from within. Its participation in the ISA Mining Code process enables it to influence standards and expectations while gaining operational experience through its state-backed operators. China has also made significant investments in marine technology, environmental baseline studies, and subsea infrastructure, preparing for eventual commercial activity under the ISA’s evolving regulatory framework.

Neither approach is without trade-offs. The U.S. risks triggering legal ambiguity and diplomatic friction by operating outside the ISA, while China must navigate concerns about environmental impacts and institutional trust in multilateral processes. Still, both countries aim to secure access to strategic resources and to build competitive advantage in what is likely to be a defining domain of future maritime activity.

Risks of Fragmentation and Norm Divergence

The key concern raised by observers is that diverging approaches may lead to fragmentation in seabed governance. If more countries follow the U.S. lead in issuing national licenses outside the ISA system, the result could be a weakening of global oversight mechanisms and a race to the

bottom in regulatory standards. At the same time, frustration over the slow pace of the Mining Code negotiations may tempt other actors to explore alternative legal pathways.

China, for now, remains committed to the ISA process, but it too will face strategic choices if others begin to act unilaterally. A breakdown in ISA legitimacy could erode the predictability that currently underpins Chinese contracts and investments. Moreover, China’s reputation as a responsible actor in global ocean governance would be tested if multilateralism fails to deliver timely or credible outcomes.

Both countries would benefit from a stable, clearly defined regime. Even amid strategic rivalry, the deep seabed represents an area where shared interests—legal certainty, environmental stewardship, and avoidance of conflict—may still foster common ground.

Environmental Considerations: A Shared Challenge

Both powers face growing scrutiny over the environmental and ethical implications of seabed mining. The deep ocean remains one of Earth’s least understood ecosystems. Mining operations risk disturbing fragile habitats, creating sediment plumes, and releasing toxic materials. China has begun investing in environmental baseline studies and impact assessment methodologies, largely to satisfy ISA requirements. The U.S., despite having a well-established regulatory framework for environmental protection, has not put forward a coherent environmental strategy alongside its licensing announcement—raising concerns that its approach may prioritize resource access over long-term sustainability.

Civil society pressure is mounting on both sides. Calls for a global moratorium—led by environmental NGOs and small island states—highlight the risk that seabed mining becomes a new frontier for ecological degradation and inequality. Whether China and the U.S. incorporate environmental norms into their strategies—or dismiss them as geopolitical constraints—will shape the moral and legal contours of seabed governance in the decades to come.

Future Trend: Competition, Cooperation, or Coexistence?

The future of deep seabed mining remains uncertain. The United States and China represent two ends of a broader spectrum—between sovereign innovation and multilateral regulation, between speed and caution, and between national advantage and shared responsibility. Whether these approaches will converge or continue to coexist in tension remains to be seen.

Turning deep seabed mining from a domain of strategic rivalry into a model of cooperative governance will require a nuanced, evidence-based strategy. By combining deep-sea-specific regulatory reform, flexible engagement with UNCLOS, regional partnerships, and targeted technology-sharing initiatives, the U.S. and China have the potential to jointly secure critical minerals while safeguarding the long-term health of the ocean’s last frontier.

For now, the ISA remains the central platform for reconciling diverse interests and developing binding global rules. If it succeeds in finalizing a credible, enforceable Mining Code that balances commercial ambitions with environmental safeguards, there is still hope for a unified international regime. If not, the risk of fragmented governance, legal uncertainty, and growing geopolitical tension on the ocean floor will intensify.

Ultimately, deep seabed mining is more than a resource challenge—it is a test case for how major powers navigate global commons. Striking a durable balance between competition and cooperation in this frontier domain will shape not only the future of seabed governance but also the broader trajectory of ocean law and international order.