Do not strand U.S.-China relations in the Taiwan Strait

The Taiwan Strait, at a mere 100 nautical miles wide, seems to have recently bottlenecked any potential progress in U.S.-China relations. And, while there are short-term benefits, this recent string of events shows that it is overall ineffective for Washington to be laser-focused on Taiwan. 

When President Biden unequivocally stated during his first trip to Asia that the U.S. would be involved militarily to defend Taiwan, the shockwave grabbed major headlines and triggered chain reactions from both the U.S. and China. The White House quickly clarified the President’s gaffe in Tokyo amid growing speculation that his statement signaled an adjustment to the long-held U.S. policy towards the self-governed island. The White House reiterated that the current administration remains committed to the “one China” policy and will “provide Taiwan with the military means to defend itself” as stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. China, which regards the issue of Taiwan as a critical matter of sovereignty and territorial integrity, responded by conducting a joint forces combat readiness patrol around Taiwan “as an action against U.S.-Taiwan collusion”. 

This is not the first time that the Biden administration has sent mixed signals on Taiwan. During a CNN Town Hall last October, President Biden unambiguously stated that the U.S. has a commitment to protect Taiwan if China attacked. This statement came only weeks after he and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to “abide by the Taiwan agreement”. So, both last October and this May, the White House clarified America’s longstanding position on Taiwan after the President stated commitments to defend Taiwan by force.

What led to President Biden’s remark in Tokyo is beyond public knowledge. It is possible that the President’s strong remarks may stem from his own personal belief, as reports suggest that some senior U.S. officials were “caught off-guard” and did not anticipate him to speak so unequivocally on Taiwan. That being said, the Biden administration’s mixed signals on Taiwan inevitably sparked speculation in Beijing on whether the U.S. seeks to subtly change its policy and approach towards Taiwan; especially after the State Department amended its guidelines in April to encourage more engagement between Washington and Taiwan and, one month later, changed its wording on its new Taiwan webpage; the latter of which was altered once again a few weeks later.

The settling of the “one China” policy issue, as seriously as it may have been studied back in 1979, in fact, has a rather high ceiling of achievement today. And there are a lot more policy issues that can readily be achieved below that threshold. Seeing these mixed signals from the top-level U.S. officials, China would naturally be concerned that the U.S. now believes that it is convenient to achieve numerous quick, tangible, and domestically-popular goals without actually declaring a permanent change to the long-time U.S. position on Taiwan. 

Three short-term benefits explain the Biden administration’s apparent fluctuations on U.S.-Taiwan policy. First, there is the influence of domestic politics. Since taking office, the Biden administration has made very little progress in engaging with China. Having President Biden play as a ‘waving a big stick’ politician on the Taiwan issue may be an easy way for the Biden administration to show Congress—and the American people—that the President is committed to defending democratic values, standing up against authoritarian powers, and leading allies and partners with determination. Second, there is the pressure of alliance management and U.S. global leadership. Multiple experts have likened Russia’s attack against Ukraine as an analogy for Taiwan, even though that analogy itself is problematic in its generalizations. Mixed U.S. signals agitate China, causing it to act more assertive and aggressive on the issue of Taiwan, such as how it responded to Lithuania. But, a more aggressive China could help restore respect for U.S. global leadership, both in Europe and Asia, as these countries seek greater U.S. support to balance China. Lastly, there is the deepening issue of semiconductor and supply chain security. As the world’s top manufacturer of semiconductor chips, Taiwan is critical to the Biden administration’s aim to build a secure and resilient supply chain that empowers the U.S. to compete with China. Publicly expressing support for Taiwan’s defense and ingratiating itself to the Taiwanese public would aid the Biden administration’s goal to pursue greater U.S.-Taiwan cooperation in semiconductor manufacturing.

While these short-term benefits are notable, it would be dangerous for the Biden administration to continue to so heavily fixate on Taiwan and dance around the threshold. The Biden administration should be more careful operating under the “one China” policy threshold for five main reasons, otherwise, American interests may be negatively impacted in the short and long run.

First, there is currently no cushion for a soft landing over the issue of Taiwan. The most obvious consequence of intensifying cross-strait tensions is a direct armed conflict between the U.S. and China. Beijing and Washington have not yet built any guardrail, as President Biden and President Xi have agreed to do, to guide their future engagement in an era of strategic competition. The Biden administration should be cautioned that, in the absence of sufficient crisis management and prevention mechanisms, accidents could still lead to direct conflict between the world’s two largest military powers; and there is no known, logical plan B for such incidents.

Second, the narrow obsession over Taiwan limits—or even eliminates—the valuable potential of U.S.-China engagement on other fronts. Being overly obsessed with Taiwan needlessly jeopardizes potential bilateral U.S.-China engagement in other areas that have a greater impact on the world, such as trade, climate change, public health, and North Korea.

Third, should the U.S. focus on achieving short-term tangible foreign policy outcomes, it will lose, not gain, control over the case of Taiwan. The pursuit of achieving these outcomes, when there is no progress from U.S.-China engagement, would tip off the balance that has kept the U.S. in a favorable position for decades. Should such a trend continue, China will reach a point demanding adamantly that the U.S. clarifies, without any ambiguity, its position on the “one China” principle. Is the Biden administration ready to face that “China or Taiwan” decision? It would not be surprising if China made that decision a prerequisite for further U.S.-China engagement, especially on issues that the U.S. seeks to cooperate with China.

Fourth, being overly active on Taiwan contradicts U.S. efforts to reshape China’s strategic environment. Washington made its first move to align Indo-Pacific nations under the high-profile Indo-Pacific Economic Framework while deciding to exclude Taiwan. Yet days after, Washington launched the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade. The seemingly contradictory decision to exclude Taiwan from regional initiatives at first while offering exclusive inclusion and openness is not aligned with Washington’s “vision for an open, inclusive international system”.

Lastly, overemphasis on Taiwan—alongside the daily animosity between the U.S. and China—is likely to permanently alter the next generation’s perception of U.S. engagement with Taiwan. Americans growing up seeing the U.S. positively engaging with Taiwan while not engaging with China in any positive way would have a very different interpretation of the “one China” policy. Likewise, Chinese citizens growing up seeing the U.S. actively ‘intervening’ in the Taiwan issue could amplify their growing nationalistic propaganda on the younger generation of Chinese, thus further compressing the space to shelve disagreements. 

Pursuing short-term goals on the issue of Taiwan gives no way out of the U.S.-China standoff. The current trajectory shows that the Biden administration is heading towards a point that, in the near future, the U.S. may have to choose between Taiwan and China. But it is vital to remember that whatever occurs now will shape future Chinese opinions of the U.S., inevitably impacting players at both the grassroots and senior officials levels. It is time to unchain the U.S. from its Taiwan obsession and not strand itself into an unalterable situation. The fate of the indispensable U.S.-China relationship should not be decided unilaterally by the issue of Taiwan, but bilaterally by the U.S. and China.