Don’t Call It a Done Deal: The U.S.-China London Talk is (Hopefully) Just the Beginning

Following the conclusion of the U.S.–China economic dialogue in London, President Trump swiftly declared on Truth Social: “OUR DEAL WITH CHINA IS DONE… THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS MATTER!” The statement, while characteristic in tone, stood in contrast to the more measured language in the official Chinese readout, which emphasized that both sides had reached a “framework consensus in principle” and agreed to maintain engagement through “institutionalized dialogue mechanisms.”

The asymmetry in messaging is telling. Beijing offered a formal statement outlining the contours of a framework deal—tentative, procedural, and forward-looking. Washington, on the other hand, provided no official communication beyond the president’s personal post, which gave the impression that the matter had been settled in full. For a negotiation that was framed – per the agreement by both President Trump and President Xi during their long-awaited call – as the beginning of a sustained dialogue, the rhetorical divergence alone raises questions about whether both sides are equally invested in what comes next. President Trump may have offered what sounded like a curtain call—but the real performance has only just begun, and the stage is crowded with unresolved acts.

While Washington moved quickly to declare the London meeting a “Mission Accomplished”, Beijing’s tone was noticeably more restrained – and deliberate. The official Chinese readout made no mention of any final deal, instead focusing on the framework as a starting point for “next steps.” Its emphasis on reducing misperceptions and institutionalizing communications reflects a cautious view: this was not the end of a negotiation, but the beginning of a process that hopefully could lead to an end of long-lasting bilateral tensions.

Rather than framing the London talk in terms of deals struck by great leaders, Chinese officials phrased the dialogue as a strategic necessity – a way to stabilize a relationship that had recently shown signs of nothing but free fall. The value of such engagement lies not in dramatic, high-profile, breakthrough, but in providing a quiet structured fallback to prevent accidental escalation. As Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce Li Chenggang noted after the London talk, “the progress achieved in London is meaningful only if it helps rebuild trust between the two countries.”

By contrast, the U.S. side seemed content to claim a victory and move on. In fact, since the Trump-Xi phone call earlier this month, the U.S. side has maintained a consistently upbeat tone about the trajectory of bilateral trade talks. The officially released unofficial Truth Social summary of that call struck a confident, even self-congratulatory note, declaring that major issues had been addressed and that there would “no longer be any questions” regarding the way forward. That tone continued in the aftermath of the London meeting, with repeated assurances that the deal was done and that both sides had reached understanding.

But those assurances were thin on detail. The few public statements from Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent, Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick or even from President Trump offered few concrete specifics, raising questions about what had actually been agreed and subsequently sparked skepticism over whether the outcome justified the triumphal rhetoric—highlighting the lack of clarity on tariff levels, enforcement mechanisms, and timelines for implementation.

For a negotiation described as a “done deal,” the London round produced results that were, at best, inconclusive. On tariffs, the agreement appears to follow the basic outline of the earlier Geneva understanding and the Trump-Xi phone call, with a rollback to pre-April 2 levels. But key measures remain in place – notably, the fentanyl-related tariffs and the core Section 301 tariffs first imposed by President Trump in 2019. It remains unlikely that President Trump would walk back his signature 2019 Trade War tariff legacy—an enduring symbol of his first-term trade policy. Separately, tariffs related to fentanyl are also unlikely to be lifted anytime soon, as disputes over the substance’s role in the U.S. opioid crisis have fueled bilateral tensions since the Biden era. Adding to the ambiguity, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has explicitly stated that the U.S. will maintain a “fixed” 55% tariff rate on China following the London round, which leaves little room for any further progress on the tariff front.

On rare earth, the issue that received the most immediate attention since the Geneva truce, also delivered more optics than substance. While both President Trump and Secretary Lutnick announced that the rare earth matter had been “resolved” and that U.S. businesses should not be worried about rare earth shortage, it was soon learned that China had only agreed to a six-month export window- and that restrictions on materials with potential military applications remain firmly in place as part of Beijing’s broader retaliatory response to U.S. export controls on AI and semiconductors.

Even President Trump’s broader promise to expand U.S. exports to China—something he highlighted in a follow up Truth Social post—lacks confirmation from any official U.S. agencies or negotiating representatives. As of now, the specifics of that pledge remain known only to the president himself.

And the U.S. officials are not showing enough confidence in the prospect of future talks with China either. While China gave the U.S. a six-month limit, the U.S. is also facing a tough decision to make over the suspended tariffs on China that is due by August 10. It was recently reported that the U.S. officials had already “looking to extend” the tariff pause, just a week after the talk in London. The lack of confidence to achieve any tangible outcome by August puts further uncertainty on the durability of the truce between the world’s two largest economies.

This imbalance in perceiving and portraying the London round raises a larger concern: what happens if the London mechanism collapses like its predecessors? Recent history offers little comfort. From the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in the Obama era, the Phase One deal under Trump’s first term, and the San Francisco Consensus under the Biden administration, every attempt at building durable communication channels has ended in void. This latest round of truce came only after painful tariff escalations in April. Letting it dissolve now—simply because one side believes a “deal”, that yields short-term benefit, has been reached—would carry real costs.

Two categories of risks are especially salient. First, if China concludes that Washington treats engagement as a transactional tool, it may respond by further insulating itself from future mechanisms. Second, should economic tensions flare up again, rebuilding trust and reactivating dialogue could prove even harder—and more economically damaging—than before. With every collapsed channel, the baseline for re-engagement becomes higher, the conditions for cooperation less favorable.

This is precisely why it is dangerous for Washington to embrace a “mission accomplished” mindset. The issues at the heart of the U.S.–China trade relationship—namely export controls and  industrial policy—are not resolved. They are barely addressed during President Trump’s “done deal”. If Washington continues to treat every limited breakthrough as an endpoint rather than a starting point, they risk turning mechanisms of engagement into one-off exercises in optics.