Don’t Let the Glitters Block the Path

It is easy to call for a holistic competition between China and the United States when media coverage and government officials consistently continues to, on the surface, validate the belief that the two countries are irreversibly locked in a more competitive relationship. The steady deterioration of the bilateral relationship continued even after President Biden took office in January 2021. His presidency has appeared to indicate that the notion of a “strategic competition,” if not a “strategic rivalry,” or, to be more extreme, a “new Cold War,” is the new status quo of the bilateral relationship. Such a notion will inevitably end up becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy if not addressed in the near term and lead to a potentially dire global situation if China and the U.S. relationship sours further. For instance, many scholars and observers have quickly rallied behind the idea that any policy recommendations must reflect this new status quo that emphasizes a competition-oriented approach, even if the policies they recommend would require a drastic change of direction of the U.S. policies and gradually redistribution of resources on both the international and domestic fronts.

But must such a drastic competition-oriented policy change necessarily lead to an equally strategic shift? Policy recommendations that emerge from this line of thinking typically have one thing in common: they posit that such change in policy should be considered as strategic moves built to produce tangible outcomes. Unfortunately, they merely reflect the growing insecurities resulting from the evolving nature of the U.S.-China relationship while their suggested “strategic shifts” are misled by sensationalized events that are nothing but ‘glitter.’ More patience should be given to diplomats on both sides to slowly reinitiate regular communication, which serve as the foundation for a path out of the current stalemate.

Such a powerful and singular dogma suddenly emerged and dictates that the United States must compete with China on all fronts and win the competition on both interests and ideological values, just as it did during the Cold War against the Soviet Union. A lack of tangible outcomes further weakens the possible counterargument that there is still a shared vision and interests that the two countries could cooperate with each other. Recent diplomatic exchanges between the two countries—such as the summit in Anchorage in March, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s failed call with his Chinese counterpart, and Wendy Sherman’s visit to China—seem to prove the point that the two countries are holding more talks only on non-negotiable matters such as values and systems of government rather than issues that can be negotiated. To scholars and observers who call for a holistic competition with China, the bilateral relationship is typically described as an existential competition between a rule-based order and an authoritarian revisionist system.

However, there is a significant logical flaw in such a way of thinking. As China continues to rise as a more influential actor in world politics, the interaction between the two countries will be less of an ‘action-reaction’ type engagement like it has been over the past 40 years. A novel way of thinking and approach to the U.S.-China relationship is indeed necessary in this new era. But the reassessment of U.S.-China engagement should not focus on tactical measures that simply look at whether both countries should increase their level of competition or cooperation. On the contrary, a strategic vision that emphasizes a cautious and constant management of the relationship should be considered as paramount to the two countries.

Undeniably, diplomatic exchanges have been in a stalemate over the past eight months. Under this stalemate, tensions between the two countries become unmanageable, and both countries waste time and opportunities to cooperate on mutually-concerned issues such as the pandemic and climate change. That being said, even fruitless diplomatic engagement provides valuable outcome that is becoming increasingly crucial to the development of the U.S.-China relationship. These engagements themselves represent a return to normality of diplomacy between the two countries, which is the foundation to avoid unexpected consequences when the tensions between the two countries is at its historical peak. It is time and effort consuming to restore and potentially reform the structures, channels, and even formats of communication that have been badly undermined both under the Trump administration and during the pandemic. Nevertheless, these time and efforts would provide the two countries a potential path out of the current stalemate. Whether it leads to a steady competition with more manageable tensions or a more cooperative relationship just like the old time, tangible outcomes will be produced to further develop the state of the U.S-China strategic competition.

The state of the strategic competition between the United States and China should be regarded as an evolving concept. It is still too early to set a tone for the two countries’ future engagement, especially while COVID-19 is not yet behind us. A fair assessment of the state of the U.S.-China relationship should only be conducted after the world successfully defeats the pandemic; when all emergency measures are taken off and human exchanges return to normal. Moreover, even when the Biden administration calls for strategic competition with China, it means that a strategic competition is the means to achieve the United States’ desired outcomes, rather than an end to the development of the bilateral relationship. This administration’s call for engaging China from a “position of strength” does not mean that the U.S. should shift towards a more power competition approach. Notably, the Biden administration’s “interim strategic guidance”  greatly emphasized rebuilding the U.S. economy, military, and technology and innovation. Although the notion of competing with China is a strong argument to justify the administration’s policies, it is not the only reason why it matters to the United States. It is the “position” over “strength” that matters more in Washington’s engagement with Beijing.

But for now, instead of recommending policies that drastically shift the United States’ approach to China, we should give diplomats and other decision makers time as they slowly resume their communication with their counterparts in order to figure out how to communicate in this new era. Have patience, do not let the media’s ‘glitter’ of trending negative events block our path to reinitiating the most important bilateral relationship in the world.