How the West can navigate Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic

Ocean-2024 reportedly focused on simulated defensive strategies to protect vital infrastructure and on offensive amphibious landings on unprepared terrain. These simulations reflect an emphasis on maintaining operational readiness against potential threats such as those posed by Nato.

These exercises are not only about shoring up Arctic defence capabilities; they also send signals to Western nations, emphasising the partnership’s ability to project power in the geopolitically contested region. The Chinese coastguard’s first joint patrol with its Russian counterparts in Arctic waters last month marked a significant milestone in bilateral maritime cooperation.

Conducted during China’s National Day celebrations and the 75th anniversary of Sino-Russian diplomatic relations, the operation tested the vessels’ ability to perform in challenging Arctic conditions. Operating in Russia’s exclusive economic zone and the Bering Sea near Alaska, the patrol highlighted enhanced maritime coordination and reinforced their shared commitment to Arctic ambitions.

This cooperation suggests a shared focus on securing and developing the Northern Sea Route, a trade route with increasing global importance due to retreating Arctic ice. The route not only offers a shorter transit passageway between Europe and Asia but also provides access to vast natural resources.

Beyond defence, both nations have deepened economic and scientific cooperation, further embedding China’s “Polar Silk Road” into the region’s framework. Russia, facing Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation due to its war in Ukraine, increasingly leans on China for economic and technological support. In turn, Beijing secures access to critical Arctic resources and transport routes. This alliance is vital for both nations as they challenge sanctions and Nato’s Arctic presence.

The Arctic’s growing strategic significance and the deepening China-Russia partnership spark fresh questions about the direction of US policy under Donald Trump when he takes office as president in January.

During his first term, Trump undermined US involvement in global climate initiatives like the Paris Agreement, but showed a strong interest in the Arctic region’s economic potential, as seen with his proposal to purchase Greenland. Trump also reinforced the US military’s Arctic presence, aiming to counterbalance Russia and secure US strategic interests. In 2020, Trump called for an accelerated expansion of the US icebreaker fleet.

In his second term, Trump may adopt a transactional approach to Arctic policy, emphasising economic access to regional resources and opposing China’s increasing Arctic presence . His ties to the fossil fuel industry suggest he will roll back environmental regulations to encourage oil and gas exploration and compete with Russia and China.

Meanwhile, Trump’s scepticism towards Nato could undermine the alliance’s cohesive Arctic strategy. While Nato has recently bolstered its presence in the Arctic, a Trump presidency could strain allied coordination, potentially weakening collective resolve. Trump’s past critiques of Nato, including questioning its financial fairness, have cast doubt on the alliance’s unity. A renewed focus on “America first” policies might deprioritise US commitments to multilateral defence frameworks.

Without a united front, Nato might struggle to effectively deter joint China-Russia activities such as military drills and infrastructure projects along the Northern Sea Route. Trump’s preference for transactional diplomacy could prompt bilateral deals with Arctic stakeholders, diluting Nato’s influence and opening avenues for China and Russia to leverage regional fragmentation in their favour.

Such scenarios could embolden Russia to assert greater dominance over Arctic governance, especially in security matters, and enable China to advance its “Polar Silk Road” initiative under reduced scrutiny. The potential erosion of Nato’s strategic cohesion would shift the balance of power in the Arctic and complicate broader global dynamics.

Addressing these risks requires a nuanced strategy that balances Trump’s possible policy shifts with the preservation of Nato’s Arctic unity. Strengthening partnerships with other Arctic stakeholders and exploring non-military avenues of cooperation, such as scientific research and sustainable development, could help mitigate the destabilising effects of reduced multilateral engagement.

Increased Sino-Russian partnership in the Arctic brings to the fore key considerations for the West. Collaborative activities, such as joint drills, underscore the need for enhanced vigilance and robust defence capabilities to safeguard critical Arctic territories and infrastructure. Western nations must also urgently craft sustainable Arctic policies that align resource development with environmental stewardship, ensuring a balanced approach to the region’s growing economic potential.

The next Trump administration might prioritise bilateral agreements over multilateral frameworks, fostering competition for Arctic resources while potentially reducing Nato’s collaborative momentum. This could create openings for China and Russia to expand their influence in Arctic governance and energy policy. This makes dialogue to mitigate tensions and foster coexistence all the more important.

The Arctic is increasingly emerging as a focal point for international cooperation and competition. China and Russia, while strategically aligned, have distinct national priorities and ambitions to shape the regional order. For Western nations, this partnership calls for nuanced and coordinated strategies that balance engagement with preparedness.

As climate change accelerates resource accessibility and amplifies geopolitical interest in the Arctic, the stakes remain high for all stakeholders. By pursuing collaborative approaches and maintaining open channels of communication, the West can effectively navigate these challenges, promoting an inclusive framework for Arctic governance that considers the interests of all regional players, including China and Russia.

This commentary was originally released by South China Morning Post on November 26, 2024.