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Issue Brief
May 11, 2023

L.E.A.D. Project Brief

WASHINGTON, DC – FEBRUARY 22: U.S. President Joe Biden arrives to deliver remarks from the East Room of the White House February 22, 2022 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

US-China Effort to Set “Guardrails” Fizzles with Balloon Incident

ISSUE BRIEF BY:

Picture of Sourabh Gupta
Sourabh Gupta

Resident Senior Fellow

This article is extracted from Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal of Bilateral Relations in the Indo-Pacific, Vol. 25, No. 1, May 2023. Preferred citation: Sourabh Gupta, “US-China Relations: US-China Effort to Set “Guardrails” Fizzles with Balloon Incident,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp 33-46.

On This Page

Summary

The proposed “guardrail” that Joe Biden and Xi Jinping sought to erect last fall in Bali failed to emerge in the bitter aftermath of a wayward Chinese surveillance balloon that overflew the United States and violated its sovereignty. Though Antony Blinken and Wang Yi met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference afterward, aspersions cast by each side against the other, including a series of disparaging Chinese government reports, fed the chill in ties. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy during the return leg of her US transit added to bilateral and cross-strait tensions and were met with Chinese sanctions. Issues pertaining to Taiwan, be it arms sales or a speculated Chinese invasion date of the island, remained contentious. The administration’s attempt to restart constructive economic reengagement with China, including via an important speech by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, appears to have fallen on deaf ears in Beijing.

Following the Biden-Xi meeting on Nov. 14 on the sidelines of the G20 Leaders Summit in Bali, Indonesia, US-People’s Republic of China relations were transitioning to an improving track—or so it seemed. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with his Chinese counterpart, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense Ministers” Meeting-Plus meeting in Cambodia on Nov. 22. On Dec. 11-12, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink held “candid, in-depth and constructive” talks in Beijing. On Jan. 18, Secretary Yellen had a “candid, substantive, and constructive conversation” with departing Vice-Premier Liu He in Zurich ahead of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Hours before Secretary Blinken was due to board a flight to Beijing on Feb. 3, which would have been the highest-ranking contact between the two sides since the Bali meeting, the budding rapprochement came to a screeching halt.

Wayward Balloon Blows Bilateral Ties Off-Course

Two days earlier, on Feb. 1, a high-altitude balloon was spotted in the sky over Billings, Montana; it was followed by a Department of Defense statement and a background briefing the next day identifying it as a high-altitude surveillance balloon of PRC provenance. A second balloon had also been spotted over Latin America. The Chinese foreign ministry was quick to admit responsibility on Feb. 4, confirming the “unintended entry of a Chinese unmanned airship into US airspace due to force majeure.” With “limited self-steering capability,” the airship had apparently “deviated far from its planned course”—a claim a US official speaking on background appeared to validate on Feb. 15. The planned track would have taken the balloon over Hawaii and Guam, home to key US military installations—speaking in turn to the balloon’s defense surveillance purpose. The Feb. 4 Chinese statement observed however that the airship was a “civilian” one “used for research, mainly meteorological, purposes,” and that China had “no intention of violat[ing]…the territory or airspace of any sovereign country.” The balloon’s flight over US airspace was, after all, a violation of the territorial sovereignty of the United States as well as of Article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (“no state aircraft of a contracting state shall fly over the territory of another state…without authorization”). Privately, an expression of regret was tendered to US counterparts—one that was acknowledged by a senior State Department official at the time of protesting the incursion and announcing the postponement of the Blinken visit.

Regret turned to anger in Beijing, however, when the balloon was downed by an F-22 fighter jet on Feb. 4 and significant portions of its payload retrieved from within US territorial waters off the coast of South Carolina (the balloon overflew the entire continental United States). This “use of force [was a] clear overreaction and serious violation of international practice”—although not necessarily of law, Beijing protested, pointing presumably to the US’s alleged excessive use of force against a civilian airship in distress (Article 3 bis of the aforementioned Chicago Convention). Beijing also charged that Washington had flown high-altitude balloons “over Chinese airspace over 10 times without authorization” since 2022—which begged the question why these intrusions were never formally protested by the Chinese military which controls the airspace. A US proposal for a telephone call between the US and Chinese defense chiefs to maintain lines of communication was declined, as per a communication on Feb. 8.

Sailors of the US Navy assigned to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group 2 recover a high-altitude surveillance balloon off the coast of Myrtle Beach, South Carolina on Feb. 5, 2023, after it was shot down. Photo: US Department of Defense, Public Domain

In the days and weeks following the incident, it emerged that both China and the United States maintain high-altitude balloon programs to exploit the domain of “near space” in the upper atmosphere (above 18 km or approximately 60,000 feet) for aerial surveillance, signals intelligence, and communications intercept purposes. Unlike satellites, balloons are quieter to launch and can loiter over a given location for extended durations and bridge a “capability gap between aircraft and satellites.” There is no record of the US Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC) flying high-altitude balloons into another country’s airspace, however, and as per an internal memo such military-operated or -commissioned balloons “are state aircraft under international law subject to the same requirements as other state aircraft.” This does invite the question whether US retrieval of the downed balloon’s payload, even in its own territorial waters, was a breach of the sovereign immune status of the airship.

Be that as it may, it has become increasingly clear that the Chinese “unmanned airship” was no mere civilian meteorological airship. It was 200-feet tall with solar panels, weighed more than 2,000 pounds, and was bristling with “a surveillance payload the size of a regional passenger jet.” For US intelligence agencies, the flight of the balloon was no surprise either. They had been aware of up to four additional Chinese spy balloons over recent years, as per a confidential National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) document that surfaced in the course of the Discord Leaks. The document states though that the government “has no imagery collection of the bottom of the [latest balloon’s] payload to analyze for an optical sensor,” suggesting a lack of detailed conclusions about the balloon’s surveillance capabilities and inviting questions regarding the decision to allow it to overfly the country. From the get-go though, President Biden was forthright that the shootdown decision was intended first, to protect lives beneath and thereafter to send a clear message that the “violation of our sovereignty is unacceptable.” He said he would be speaking to President Xi. That call has yet to materialize. At this time, Secretary Blinken’s postponed visit to Beijing is on hold as well.

Munich Security Conference Sets the Stage

Secretary Blinken and Wang Yi, director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, did meet on the sidelines of the 59th Munich Security Conference in Germany on Feb. 18. The Chinese were quick to emphasize in their readout that the meeting was held at the request of the US side. The balloon incident, the Ukraine conflict, and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait were key topics of the meeting. The US readout additionally underscored the importance of maintaining diplomatic dialogue and open lines of communication at all times. Whatever political traction the Munich meeting might have generated was quickly dissipated however by a “low confidence” but headline-making classified assessment by the US Energy Department, reported in The Wall Street Journal on Feb. 26, that the COVID-19 pandemic likely originated with a leak from a Chinese laboratory. The department had previously been undecided on the origins of the pandemic. Compounding this assessment was yet another intelligence report, dated late February and publicized soon after by Secretary Blinken, that China was actively considering providing weapons and ammunition to aid Moscow in its fight in Ukraine. Even though President Biden stepped in to refute the charge, saying that he did not expect China to send weapons to Russia in an interview with ABC News, the damage was done. In April, it emerged as part of the Discord Leaks that the Russian paramilitary group Wagner had sought munitions and equipment from China but was brushed aside. To date, no known sale of lethal arms has been made or found on the battlefield.

The Munich Security Conference also set the stage for a breakout moment in Chinese diplomacy. With a view to distancing itself from the stigma of its “no limits” characterization of ties with Russia and begin repairing its frayed relations with Europe, Wang Yi reached out directly in his conference keynote speech to the gathered Europeans. “China are Europe are two major forces, markets and civilizations in an increasingly multipolar world…if we choose peace and stability, a new Cold War will not break out,” he observed. The speech was followed by a 12-point policy statement listing “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis“ and the lending of its good offices to facilitate peace talks. This diplomatic facilitation was met with extreme skepticism in the West (although not by President Zelenskyy in Kyiv), especially in the wake of President Xi’s state visit to Moscow in late-March. On April 26, President Xi spoke with Zelenskyy for the first time since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war and promised to “send the Special Representative of the Chinese Government on Eurasian Affairs…to have in-depth communication with all parties on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis.” It remains to be seen what Li Hui, a fluent Russian speaker and ex-ambassador to Moscow, can produce on the peace facilitation front, but after Beijing’s surprising foray into Middle East relationship management featuring the Saudis and the Iranians, the effort cannot be entirely dismissed as a sham.

In parallel with its diplomatic audacity on the Ukraine front, the Chinese foreign ministry also laid out the core principles of President Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), in a concept paper on Feb. 21. The GSI was first proposed by Xi at the Boao Forum in April 2022, two months after Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and presumably to forestall the splintering of major power international relations into a bloc-based format. The GSI’s contents are primarily the standard Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence fare, backed by 20 priority themes of cooperation. Not done yet with grand initiatives, on March 15, Xi unveiled a Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) to attendees at a High-level Dialogue between the Communist Party of China and World Political Parties.

The turbulent February period in US-China relations was also notable for an extraordinary series of bitter and denunciatory Chinese government reports, berating the United States for its drug abusegun violencehegemonistic tendencies, and economic polarization. In the run-up to and during the Biden administration-led Summit for Democracy in late-March, the focus of disparagement was directed at the US state of democracy, its human rights violations, and arbitrary detention and home and abroad. This descent into smearing begs the question: would these reports and papers have been issued if the budding rapprochement—and, specifically, Secretary Blinken’s visit—had not been blown off-course by China’s wayward balloon? Constructive engagement and bitter diatribes don’t sit well together, one would imagine. “Zhong Sheng,” a homonym for “voice of China” and used by the People’s Daily to communicate the CCP’s views on international affairs, also remained active in its inimitable anti-American style, including in editorials prior to the postponement of Blinken visit.

Tsai-McCarthy Meeting Ruffles China’s Feathers

The other major development in US-China relations during the first trimester of 2023 was the meeting between Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen and the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Kevin McCarthy (R-California) at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, during her transit on US soil on her trip to Guatemala and Belize. Transits by Taiwan’s leaders are hardly unusual; Tsai’s was the 29th such transit by a sitting Taiwanese president. Slightly more unusual was the duration of the transit—the length of the visit seemed more like a “private visit” than a “transit” (the former being disallowed as a norm by the US government since 1995). Tsai stopped in New York City from March 29-31 where she received the Hudson Institute’s Global Leadership Award; on her return leg from April 4-6, she was met by Speaker McCarthy and a host of Congresspersons and policy experts at the Reagan Library. Both institutions and their leaders were promptly sanctioned the day after her return by China’s foreign ministry under its Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law for facilitating Madame Tsai’s “Taiwan independence’ separatist activities” in the US. A number of Taiwanese organizations and government representative were also sanctioned. Later in April, in the rare instance of a senior US Congressperson being sanctioned, US Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was barred from entry into China under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law for drawing a comparison between Xi Jinping and Adolf Hitler during his meeting in Taipei with Taiwan’s vice president.

Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen (meets with US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy on April 5, 2023 at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. Photo: Twitter/@SpeakerMcCarthy

The most precedent-worthy aspect of the Tsai transit was her meeting with McCarthy—the first such meeting between Taiwan’s President and a House speaker on US soil. Previous speakers have placed phone calls to transiting Taiwanese presidents and even participated in events hosted on Capitol Hill by Taiwan’s representative office in Washington, D.C.; none had met him or her in person. Still, one ought not make too much of the in-person meeting on US soil, especially since prior speakers paid visits to Taipei—Newt Gingrich in April 1997; Nancy Pelosi more recently in August 2022. On balance, Beijing appeared to bow to this reality. While working up indignation to protest McCarthy’s meeting with Tsai, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military exercises in the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea were a shadow of the August 2022 maneuvers conducted after the Pelosi visit—be it in terms of their provocation, intensity, or sophistication.

In August 2022, the PLA declared six closure zones around the island, blocked maritime trade for an entire week, and fired ballistic missiles over Taiwan, some of which landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). This time, the drills lasted three days and Beijing refrained from imposing a ring of missile-landing zones. The April 2023 drills, a combination of combat readiness patrols, joint air and sea operations, and live fire exercises off China’s Fujian province, also did not replicate the multistage war plan—firepower campaign, blockade, and invasion—executed after the Pelosi visit. The drills did not stray into Taiwan’s territorial waters either. That said, the PLAAF did fly a single-day record number of sorties during the three-day exercises, conducted numerous median line crossings, and the PLAN deployed its aircraft carrier, Shandong, to the East China Sea 230 km south of Japan’s Miyako Island in the Okinawa chain. To display resolve and restore deterrence, the USS Miliusa guided-missile destroyer, conducted a Taiwan Strait transit in international waters on April 16, the first such naval operation through the waterway since early January. In a rarer occurrence, a US Navy P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft transited the Strait in international airspace on April 28. The last time a US warplane had overflown the Taiwan Strait was on Feb. 28, and before that only on June 24, 2022.

McCarthy has not ruled out a visit to Taiwan during his tenure as speaker of the 118th Congress. It is hard to see him do so in 2023, given the island’s cramped presidential election calendar. For its part, China managed to engineer the diplomatic defection of the Republic of Honduras from Taipei a mere few days before Tsai’s New York City stopover, with Tegucigalpa vowing in the Joint Communique that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of [the People’s Republic of] of China’s territory.” This pattern of poaching has form. Two days after Tsai returned from her California and Texas transits in August 2018, China scooped El Salvador up. It is worth noting that the Central American countries, including El Salvador and Honduras, had been Taipei’s staunchest backers at the San Francisco Peace Conference that seven decades ago set in train the geostrategic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. Today, Guatemala and Belize are Taiwan’s only remaining diplomatic partners in Central America.

Taiwan at the Epicenter, Including in US Senior Officials’ Testimony

The Taiwan question was also at the center of US-PRC relations during this period—in no small part due to the incessant focus within the Beltway and beyond on the timing of a putative Chinese attack on the self-governing island. This fixation was kicked off by ex-US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) head, retired Adm. Philip Davidson, in March 2021 when—in testimony before the US Senate Armed Services Committee—he observed that the People’s Republic could take control of Taiwan “in the next six years.” Davidson attempted to walk back his observation somewhat, noting in an interview later that October that he had spoken as a strategist and not in his “role as the INDOPACOM commander” that day in March. Still, the 2027 timeline—labeled the “Davidson window”— spawned a cottage industry of invasion date speculation, including by senior uniformed officers. In October 2022, Adm. Mike Gilday, chief of naval operations, said that the US needed to prepare for possible action as early as 2023 and in January this year, Gen. Mike Minihan, former deputy Indo-Pacific commander, predicted that the US and China would probably go to war in 2025. To put a damper on such “guessing” talk, Adm. John Aquilino, commander of US forces in the Indo-Pacific—testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 20—declined to endorse any timeline of attack and focused his remarks on deterring “bad choice[s]” by China and President Xi.

Earlier in March, senior Biden administration civilian officials, testifying before Congress and elsewhere, had sought to inject greater depth and nuance to this invasion and unification hypothesis. At a Senate hearing on “evaluating US-China policy in the era of strategic competition,” Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner observed that an invasion of Taiwan was not “imminent or inevitable.” The US and Taiwan can certainly “get to the end of this decade without [the People’s Republic] committing major aggression against Taiwan,” he maintained. During testimony on Capitol Hill in early March, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Avril Haines, assessed that Beijing did not want to go to war. It would only opt for war if “they believe peaceful unification is not an option,” she postulated. More broadly, Beijing was still invested in “preserving stability in its relationship with the United States,” despite sharp criticism of Washington by Xi at the “Two Sessions” meeting that coincided at that time. (The Two Sessions meeting itself did not produce any new policy initiatives or phraseology on Taiwan, sticking instead to a recitation of well-worn positions.) Separately, in April, William Burns, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), chimed in during an appearance at Rice University’s Baker Institute that there was no evidence to suggest that Xi had made a decision to invade Taiwan. While he is utterly committed to unification and had instructed the PLA to be ready by 2027 to successfully invade Taiwan, “being ready does not mean that he’s made the decision to go to war in 2027 or 2028 or 2026, but it’s something that we need to take very seriously as well,” Burns noted.

US arms sales to Taiwan continued on their set path during the first trimester of 2023. On March 1, Congress received notification of potential sale of $619 million worth of F-16 fighter jet munitions, including 100 AGM-88B High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM), 200 AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), four AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM guidance systems, and 26 LAU-129 multipurpose launchers. Once approved by Congress, the package would mark the first sale to Taiwan of AIM-120C-8 missiles, which are fielded on advanced US jets and feature a greatly increased range over its predecessor. In mid-April, it was reported that a contract with Boeing was issued on Taiwan’s behalf by the US Naval Air Systems Command for 400 land-launched Harpoon missiles, completing a deal approved by Congress in 2020. It marks the first sale of the mobile, land-launched version of the missile; the ship-launched version already exists within the Taiwanese military’s inventory.

The arms sales, while intended to assist the island to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, don’t sit well with Beijing. Beijing moved on its (usually empty) threat to impose sanctions to actually imposing sanctions, however symbolic, on offending parties involved in an arms sale package. Replying to questions on April 18 on the implementation of its Unreliable Entities List Working Mechanism, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that six senior executives from Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Missile and Defense would be barred from entering or working in China, and that the two companies were prohibited from engaging in People’s Republic-related import and export activities. Both companies had been placed on the Unreliable Entities List in February, the first instance of placement of any company on that list. In September 2022, Raytheon Missile and Defense had been awarded a $412 million contract to upgrade Taiwan’s military radar as part of a larger $1.1 billion arms package. Raytheon Technologies, the parent firm which sells its Pratt & Whitney aircraft engine as well as landing gear and controls to China’s commercial aviation industry, was not sanctioned. The Wall Street Journal also reported in Feb. that Washington planned to scale up its rotational deployment on the island from 27 troops in December 2022 (as per the Pentagon’s Defense Manpower Data Center website) to between “100 and 200 troops…in the coming months.” A uniformed US presence on the island is a touchy subject in US-China relations.

There were a number of other notable developments with direct and indirect geostrategic implications for relations with China. On March 13, President Biden flanked by United Kingdom Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in San Diego, listed the AUKUS partnership’s project milestones related to Canberra’s acquisition of a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability. On March 16, the State Department approved the sale of 220 Tomahawk cruise missiles to Australia, a transfer that would exceed the prescribed payload and range limits of Category I systems listed in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex. The MTCR maintains a strong “presumption of denial” but not an outright prohibition on such transfers. On April 4, the US and the Philippines announced plans to expand Enhanced Defense Cooperation Arrangement (EDCA) to include four new sites, including ones located in close proximity to the strategically vital Bashi Channel. On April 26, Biden and South Korea’s Yoon Suk Yeol pledged to coordinate more deeply on nuclear response strategy—although not “nuclear share”—on the Korean Peninsula, including establishing a new Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) to strengthen strategic planning. A US nuclear-armed submarine will also dock in South Korea for the first time in over four decades. And finally, also in late-April, the US Defense Department released its Annual Freedom of Navigation Report for Fiscal Year 2022. The People’s Republic of China was challenged for the largest number of excessive maritime claims. Freedom of navigation assertions were also conducted in the South China Sea on March 23 (near the Paracel Islands) and on April 9 (near Mischief Reef in the Spratlys) by the US Navy’s 7th Fleet, and were met by rebukes from China’s Southern Theater Command.

Mixed Messages on Economic Outreach to China

Two important speeches were delivered by senior officials in late-April that bookend the Biden administration’s economic approach to China. On April 20, almost exactly a year to the day that she delivered an important speech on “favoring the “friend-shoring” of supply chains to a large number of trusted countries,” Treasury Secretary Yellen stepped to the podium and called this time for a “healthy economic engagement that benefits both [the United States and China].” The “world is big enough for both of us,” she declared with an outstretched hand, and Beijing and Washington needed to “find a way to live together and share in global prosperity.” National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan was less charitable in remarks a week later, noting that Beijing had become neither “more responsible or cooperative, and ignoring economic dependencies that had built up over decades of liberalization had become really perilous.” NSA Sullivan’s speech was directed in any case at the US’s favored set of “like-minded” friendshoring partners in the developed and developing world; it was not meant as an outreach to China.

Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen delivered a remark on the U.S.-China Economic Relationship at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on April 18, 2023
US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen speaking on US-China economics relations on April 20, 2023 at The John Hopkins University in Washington, DC. Photo: Xiaohang Zhou/Institute for China-America Studies

The mixed messaging is emblematic of the Biden administration’s approach on China. Like fellow Cabinet appointees Gina Raimondo (Commerce) and Katherine Tai (US Trade Representative), Yellen was at pains to stress that the administration had imposed its technology denial measures for national security and not unfair economic competitiveness reasons, that it was not seeking to stifle China’s development or decouple from it, and that she looked forward to travelling to Beijing at the “appropriate time.” On the other hand, the steady stream of “economic suppression” measures (in Beijing’s eyes) continued unabated. On March 23, the Commerce Department published a proposed rule that sets tall guardrails against the flow of any CHIPS for America Incentives Program money from bleeding into the Chinese semiconductor ecosystem. On March 31, the Treasury Department released proposed guidance on the Inflation Reduction Act’s new clean energy vehicles consumer subsidy that will effectively bar Chinese EV’s and EV components from the American marketplace. Earlier in March, a number of Chinese firms were consigned to the Commerce Department’s Entity List for their contributions to Beijing military-civil fusion strategy as well as surveillance and repression of ethnic minorities in China. It includes the biotech research firm BGI Tech Solutions (entities associated with the high-altitude surveillance balloon program were sanctioned in mid-February, and suppliers of precursor chemicals for fentanyl production placed on the Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List in mid-April).

Executive action is awaited on an outbound investment screening mechanism that will impose a notification requirement or outright bar capital or technology transfer participation in China’s semiconductor, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing sectors. And on Capitol Hill, legislative text is being finalized with the administration’s assent that will empower the Commerce Secretary to review, block, and mitigate a range of adversary ecommerce platforms and social media applications, including most notably TikTok. The Section 301 tariffs on Chinese imports continue to fester too, although they appear to have done little in narrowing the gargantuan trade deficit with Beijing.

For its part, China has not been sitting still. Though professing to maintain open lines of communication, not a single senior-level economic official visit is on the anvil. China has within the past few weeks opened a cybersecurity review of the US chip firm Micron, rewritten and broadened its espionage law, raided the local office of the US due-diligence firm Mintz Group, let it be known that TikTok’s algorithm is covered by China’s export control laws and hence unprocurable through foreign acquisition, and is in the process of adding high-performance rare earth magnets to its revised Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited and Restricted from Export to protect “national security” and the “public interest of society.” There will be more countermeasures. Moreover, at the Two Sessions meeting in early-March, a root-and-branch institutional reorganization of government focused on the technology, finance and data sectors was instituted, to help compete against and counter US economic suppression measures.

Bali Guardrails-Building on Hold for Now

The balloon incident continues to cast a pall over US-China relations. Beijing remains leery of scheduling high-level meetings with its counterparts, lest the US release the incident report at or immediately after the scheduled meeting and embarrass China by confirming the obvious—that the balloon was no civilian weather airship but a military-commissioned high-altitude surveillance balloon. Even working-level dialogues remain impacted, with the defense side ones in particular—the Defense Policy Coordination Talks; Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Mechanism meetings—unlikely to start anytime soon. That the Pentagon point person for Beijing, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China, Taiwan and Mongolia Michael Chase, paid a quiet visit to Taipei in February—only the second such visit by a senior defense official in many decades—has added a wrinkle. That said, the balloon incident is likely not the only explanation, though it may be the justification, for China’s reticence to talk. With its relations with Brussels thawing and with Washington confronted by financial market instability and recession talk as well as impending debt-ceiling challenges, Beijing may be playing harder to get now that it feels reasonably assured that the US side is genuinely committed to setting a “floor” under the relationship. Where this leaves the erecting of guardrails as envisaged at the Biden-Xi meeting in Bali, only time will tell.

— Chronology of US - China Relations —

January – April 2023

This chronology was prepared by Alec Caruana, ICAS Part-Time Research Assistant.