Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), also known as underwater drones, are submersible vehicles that can operate underwater without a human occupant. There are two main categories of UUVs: remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). ROVs are controlled in real-time by an operator from a surface vessel or platforms similar to the pilot for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), whereas AUVs operate independently, following pre-programmed instructions or utilizing advanced algorithms.
Since the 1950s, UUVs have been a pivotal technology for the navies in executing maritime search missions. In the 1970s, the UUVs played a crucial role in assisting the rescue mission for crews of wrecked submarines. Then the commercial industry began exploring this technology in the 1980s. For instance, around 1985, ROVs enabled scientists to discover the shipwrecks of the RMS Titanic and WWII-era German battleship the Bismarck in the North Atlantic Ocean.
In the last five years, several major and middle powers have dedicated themselves to developing their own UUVs for naval operation. In 2019, during the parade celebrating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese military demonstrated its first large AUVs, the HSU-001. In the same year, the Russian government announced the sea trial of its “Poseidon” UUV which would be deployed on its Project 09852 nuclear-submarine. In 2023, Boeing delivered the first autonomous Extra Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV) named as Orca for the U.S. Navy. Since 2019, the U.S. Navy and Department of Defense have been updating its fleet architecture which aims to include extra-large unmanned Undersea vehicles. On December 28, 2023, the French Defense Procurement Agency (DGA) also awarded Naval Group an agreement for the design, production and testing of an Unmanned Combat Underwater Vehicle (UCUV).
However, the naval concept of operations (CONOPS) for UUVs varies between each country. According to the congress research services’ report, the United States’ Navy wants to develop UUVs for its “distributed fleet” naval framework. The aim of this naval initiative is to distribute the Navy’s capabilities across a broader range of platforms including UUVs, preventing the concentration of the fleet’s total capacity within a limited number of high-value vessels. Similar to the U.S. Navy’s CONOPS, the Chinese Navy wants to broaden its options for naval operations by integrating unmanned warfare like UUVs. For the middle naval power, the CONOPS for UUV is to consolidate the offensive capability of the current naval fleet. For instance, the latest South Korean naval concept “Navy Sea GHOST” envisions a lean and mobile force that includes close cooperation between manned and unmanned vessels. In the case of Russia, the latest “Poseidon” UVV was designed to carry the nuclear warhead for targeting ports or aircraft carriers.
Traditionally, navies have deployed UUVs primarily for reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) and mine detection, rather than carrying out combat operations. However, recent developments indicate a growing interest in the offensive capabilities of UUVs, especially for countries that seek to boost their forces capacity and offense variety in a short time period. Since the onset of the Ukraine-Russia War in 2022, Ukraine has been dedicated to developing its “Army of Drones.” In 2023, Ukraine’s “Brave1 initiative” revealed its defense project involving Toloka TLK-150 UUVs which are particularly challenging to detect due to their relatively small size (2.5 meters).
Another instance showcasing the offensive potential of UUVs was the recent Red Sea crisis. On February 18, 2024, U.S. Navy forces neutralized a UUV in Houthi-controlled waters around Yemen. Public images captured the characteristics of those UUV which are similar to the torpedo or one-way attack underwater drone. Former Pentagon officials have highlighted the difficulty of detecting or destroying these UUVs and their threat to a ship’s defense.
Furthermore, the rising importance of maritime security also prompted countries to boost their UUV development. On February 23, 2024, Japan and Australia announced their joint research on the future innovation of underwater drones. The Australian Defense Minister described this joint defense project as a key foundation for “maintaining a technological edge in our rapidly changing strategic environment.”
In both cases of Ukraine and Houthi, UUV is an important tactical equipment to reinforce their warfare against more advanced naval powers. Unlike the conventional anti-cruise torpedo or missiles that require well-trained sophisticated operators and platforms, these one-way attack undersea drones are designed to operate in asymmetric conditions to offset the deficiencies of their naval capability vis-a-vis the advanced naval adversaries. Moreover, due to their wider operational range, these one-way attack drones can threaten naval vessels that exceed the range of conventional anti-cruise torpedoes. The adoption of UUV will revolutionize the future naval warfare as it has been proven to be effective for the weaker naval states against the more advanced conventional naval fleets.
Also, advanced UUVs will flourish future naval combat options. The U.S. congress inquiries about the Navy’s acquisition of UUVs has implied that there are many potential developments for UUV. For instance, there are two available CONOPS for UUVs. On one hand, the U.S. Navy can choose to prioritize the quality over quantity of UUVs. Those kinds of UUVs will have precision offensive capabilities and self-defense measures. On the other hand, the Navy prioritizes the quantity. An abundant quantity of UUVs can organize the ”Swarm Warfare,” which employs “blanketing” tactics and strikes the target from all directions. Both kinds of CONOPS can require the infrastructure, retrieving, refueling, and repairing those UUVs. In other words, the future UUV warfare might require the navy to develop the similar UUV task groups fleets with escorted vessels like those in a carrier strike groups
Despite the relatively technical competences and promising future development of UUVs, there are still concerns and challenges. Their dual-use capability for civil and military operations can easily lead to disputes. In 2016, the Chinese Navy Dalang-III class submarine rescue vessel retrieved a UUV in the South China Sea. Although the U.S. government claimed that this UUV was U.S. property and was used as the oceanographic survey device, its potential capability of military intelligence gathering was perceived as a threat to China’s national security. As the U.S.-China competition in the South China Sea remained, the adoption of UUVs for anonymous intelligence collection and surveillance might become a regular point of concern for both countries. The potential for military intelligence collection by such devices poses national security threats, underscoring the need for transparency in UUV operations, especially in contested maritime areas.
Another key issue related to UUVs that observers need to monitor is the supply chain for UUVs. The latest U.S. XLUUV, the Orca, produced by Boeing for the U.S. Navy, experienced a delayed production of three years. As a response to this overtime production, the U.S. Navy Sea System command said that Boeing is now improving its industry base for UUV production in titanium composites, pressure vessel manufacture, and also battery. The U.S. does not have a competitive downstream supplier for two of those supply chains, titanium and battery. Instead, China, which was labeled by the U.S. as the main competitor, is the biggest supplier of both these two products. In 2022, China produced 1.20 TWh relative to U.S.’s 0.11 TWh; in 2023, China manufactured the most titanium and held 30% of world’s titanium reserves. The escalating sophistication and strategic deployment of UUVs not only redefine the parameters of underwater warfare and maritime security but also prompt a reevaluation of global naval capabilities in the face of burgeoning technological and geopolitical challenges, signaling a pivotal shift in the future conduct of maritime operations and international relations.
This Spotlight was originally released with Volume 3, Issue 3 of the ICAS MAP Handbill, published on March 26, 2024.
This issue’s Spotlight was written by Ao Gu, ICAS TnT Part-time Research Assistant Intern.
Maritime Affairs Program Spotlights are a short-form written background and analysis of a specific issue related to maritime affairs, which changes with each issue. The goal of the Spotlight is to help our readers quickly and accurately understand the basic background of a vital topic in maritime affairs and how that topic relates to ongoing developments today.
There is a new Spotlight released with each issue of the ICAS Maritime Affairs Program (MAP) Handbill – a regular newsletter released the last Tuesday of every month that highlights the major news stories, research products, analyses, and events occurring in or with regard to the global maritime domain during the past month.
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