On December 12, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson announced that the US was
prepared to enter diplomatic talks with
North Korea without preconditions. “And then we can begin to lay out a map, a road map of what we might be willing to work towards,” he said. This was a stark departure from Washington’s past insistence that unless North Korea was willing to accept denuclearisation as the premise for negotiations, there was nothing to talk about.
Just three hours after Tillerson’s speech, the White House abruptly issued a statement directly contradicting what he had just said. The next day, State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert effectively stabbed her boss in the back, tweeting: “Our policy on #DPRK has not changed. Diplomacy is our top priority through our maximum pressure campaign. We remain open to dialogue when North Korea is willing to conduct a serious & credible dialogue on the peaceful denuclearization, but that time is not now.”
It is hard to overstate the significance of this. Although Tillerson’s humiliation barely made a ripple in the maelstrom of news engulfing Trump’s presidency, consider this: the secretary of state’s purpose is to communicate the policies of the US to allies and adversaries alike. When Tillerson travels abroad to secure the interests of the US, he can only do so if those negotiating with him believe he speaks on behalf of the president. It is becoming abundantly clear that he speaks for no one. Tillerson himself admits he has his staff print out Trump’s tweets and retroactively instructs them try to figure out how to “use it” to make policy.
The abasement of America’s secretary of state has real-life implications. Allies who no longer have faith in America’s security guarantees are more likely to take matters into their own hands. In 2010, when the South Korean warship Cheonan was torpedoed by North Korea, the US worked behind the scenes to convince Seoul not to respond with force. If a similar situation arose today, it might play out very differently, sparking a regional conflict that the US would be dragged into.
Perhaps more important than the perspectives of America’s allies are the interpretations of its adversaries.
Mutual understanding between competing nations is central to strategic stability but, for that to exist, effective signalling is crucial. For decades, America’s intentions, interests and red lines have been clearly drawn and communicated, but that is no longer the case. One year into the Trump presidency, key mid-level positions in America’s foreign policy bureaucracy remain unfilled. This, combined with Trump’s erratic tweets, disregard for truth and degradation of his secretary of state, creates a recipe for disaster.
If adversaries like North Korea cannot accurately discern the interests the US is willing to go to war over, they are more likely to make a miscalculation that could spiral out of control. Kim Jong-un has threatened to fire a missile in the direction of the US territory of Guam, and conduct the atmospheric detonation of a warhead over the Pacific. Thus far, North Korea has resisted doing so, probably calculating that the risk of a US retaliatory strike is too great. However, that calculus could rapidly change if the war of words between Kim and Trump escalates.
The risk of miscalculation is equally great or greater when dealing with strategic competitors like China. Ambiguous signalling by the US could cause China to overplay its hand in volatile areas like the South China Sea and cross a red line the US is, in fact, willing to enforce. A minor confrontation could turn into a high-stakes stand-off where both sides find themselves unable to retreat without catastrophic loss of face. At that point, all it would take is for the wrong person to shoot at the wrong people at the wrong time to ignite a cycle of escalation.
Reflection from the 2024 Arctic Circle Assembly: Charting the Future of Arctic Governance