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Cover Image Source: Rao Aimin/Xinhua via Getty Images
With Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin meeting on August 21 in Moscow and pledging deeper economic partnerships, it appears that China and Russia are making strides in their long-discussed cooperation in the Arctic. However, while the political will for collaboration in the Arctic is evident, this partnership presents both opportunities and challenges, making it difficult to be fully optimistic about its long-term success.
Opportunities for Cooperation
The opportunities for Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic are significant across several areas. The Arctic is home to vast, untapped reserves of oil, natural gas, and minerals. China, with its growing energy demands, is keen to secure a stable supply of these resources from the Arctic. Meanwhile, Russia, lacking the capital and technology for large-scale extraction, stands to benefit from Chinese investment and technological support
The melting of Arctic ice due to climate change has made the Northern Sea Route (NSR) more accessible, which could significantly shorten the shipping distance between Asia and Europe, reducing time and costs for global trade. Russia, which controls this route, sees it as a lucrative opportunity to enhance its economic prospects. For China, the NSR is an essential component of its Belt and Road Initiative, particularly the Maritime Silk Road.
Moreover, both countries view their cooperation in the Arctic as a mean to challenge U.S. and Western influence in the region. Traditionally dominated by Western powers, particularly through NATO, the Arctic is a strategic area where Russia and China seek to create a counterbalance by establishing a strong presence. This cooperation aligns with their broader strategic alignment against what they perceive as Western hegemony. Their growing alignment against Western powers has also led to increased collaboration in areas such as defense, technology, and energy.
Challenges and Uncertainties
Despite the potential benefits, there are several challenges and uncertainties that make the long-term success of Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic difficult to predict.
From a geopolitical perspective, the U.S. and its allies are likely to view Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic with suspicion, potentially leading to increased militarization and strategic competition in the region. NATO countries could impose sanctions or take diplomatic actions to disrupt Chinese and Russian plans, particularly if these moves are perceived as threatening the current balance of power in the Arctic. For example, following the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2022, Sweden and Finland departed from their longstanding military non-alignment policy and began to work together to apply to join NATO, and officially obtained NATO membership in April 2023 and March 2024 respectively. Greenland seeks to strengthen its ties with the US and Canada, advocating for the establishment of a new high-level Arctic North American Forum that would include leaders from all indigenous territories. Meanwhile, US troops stationed in Alaska are advancing to become the army’s Arctic force, collaborating with Norway, Canada, Finland, and Sweden in joint exercises.
While China and Russia share interests in the Arctic, there are underlying tensions and competition between them. Russia is wary of China’s growing influence in its traditional sphere of influence, and China is cautious about becoming overly reliant on Russia for access to the Arctic. This mutual suspicion could limit the depth and scope of their cooperation and may lead to potential conflicts of interest. Russia has historically been suspicious of foreign involvement in the Arctic, particularly from non-Arctic nations, and only reluctantly supported China’s observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013.
Developing the necessary infrastructure for the NSR and resource extraction in the Arctic is a monumental logistical challenge. The harsh Arctic conditions, including extreme cold and extensive ice coverage, make construction and operation both difficult and expensive. Additionally, the fluctuating global energy market could affect the profitability and feasibility of these ventures. The stalling of Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project is another economic aspect arising from the Ukraine crisis.
Moscow’s enthusiasm for developing the NSR is largely driven by a pressing need to counteract the economic impact of Western sanctions. The NSR offers Russia a strategic alternative to traditional maritime routes that are more vulnerable to sanctions and geopolitical pressures. For Russia, the NSR represents a means of sustaining and expanding its economic ties with Asia, particularly China, while reinforcing its sovereignty and control over the resource-rich Arctic region.
However, the NSR is seen by China as a valuable alternative to traditional shipping routes like the Suez Canal, but not an essential one. China’s broader strategy involves securing multiple trade routes and diversifying its energy supplies to reduce dependency on any single path. Therefore, while China is interested in the NSR, it is not as heavily invested in its development as Russia.
Chinese companies involved in the NSR also face significant risks due to ongoing geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West. Western nations, particularly the European Union, have been tightening sanctions on Russia, including efforts to restrict its exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Chinese firms that engage too closely with Russia in the Arctic could find themselves targeted by these sanctions, potentially jeopardizing their global operations and access to Western markets.
As a result, China must balance its interest in the NSR with the broader implications of its actions in the Arctic. While the NSR offers potential economic benefits, these must be weighed against the risks of becoming entangled in the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West. Consequently, China’s approach to the NSR is likely to remain cautious, focusing on opportunities that align with its broader strategic goals while avoiding actions that could provoke Western retaliation.
In addition, while China has made significant strides in technology, there are still gaps in its ability to operate effectively in the Arctic. Russia, too, faces technological limitations, particularly in areas such as icebreaking and offshore drilling. Overcoming these hurdles will require substantial investment and time, and the success of these ventures is not guaranteed. However, this also presents an opportunity for both countries to engage in joint technological innovation, particularly in areas such as ice-resistant infrastructure, advanced navigation systems, and sustainable resource extraction techniques.
Environmental concerns also loom large. Spills or accidents could have catastrophic consequences, leading to international condemnation and potentially stringent regulations. Environmental concerns may also prompt resistance from indigenous communities and global environmental organizations, complicating project implementation. Both China and Russia have been criticized for prioritizing economic gain over environmental protection, which could lead to international backlash and further complicate their cooperation. The success of this cooperation will largely depend on how both countries navigate these complex challenges while balancing their national interests with the broader geopolitical dynamics of the Arctic region.
Another challenge lies in the legal realm. The Arctic is governed by a complex web of international laws and agreements, most notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As China and Russia expand their activities in the region, they may encounter legal issues with other Arctic nations over resource rights and shipping lanes. The ability of China and Russia to navigate these legal frameworks, while securing their interests, will be crucial to the long-term success of their cooperation.
The success of Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic will largely depend on how both countries navigate these complex challenges while balancing their national interests with the broader geopolitical dynamics of the Arctic region. While there is potential for significant economic and strategic benefits, the road ahead is fraught with risks and uncertainties that make long-term success far from assured. As they move forward, both China and Russia will need to carefully manage their relationship, address environmental and legal challenges, and consider the broader implications of their actions on the global stage.
The Institute for China-America Studies is an independent nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization dedicated to strengthening the understanding of U.S.-China relations through expert analysis and practical policy solutions.
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China’s cautious navigation amid talk of a new Cold War in the Arctic