Philippines v China: Putting the Status Cart Before the Sovereignty Horse

This paper is concerned with a particular aspect of the Philippines/China case about the South China Sea, and is entitled “Putting the Status Cart before the Sovereignty Horse”. Why choose that title?

First, it is necessary to explain what is meant by status. The term “island” is defined in paragraph 1 of Article 121 of UNCLOS as “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,” and paragraph 2 states that “islands” have the full range of maritime zones provided for in the Convention. However, under paragraph 3, “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own” cannot generate an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. As many commentators have said, this latter provision raises difficult questions of interpretation. To begin with, the word “rock” is not self-evident in meaning. This word seems to have been used because the provision had its origins in concerns over Rockall, a feature claimed by the United Kingdom in the North-East Atlantic. This is certainly to be regarded as a “rock.” But it is unclear at what point a feature ceases to be a “rock” and thus ceases to fall within paragraph 3.

In addition, the phrases “cannot sustain human habitation” and “cannot sustain …. economic life of their own,” which appear to be used disjunctively, are not self-evident in meaning. But without going into these difficult of questions of interpretation here, one must note that a factual enquiry will be required to decide whether a feature falls within paragraph 3 of Article 121.

There is however a third category, namely low-tide elevations. These are defined in Article 13 of UNCLOS as “naturally formed areas of land which [are] surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide.” In two cases the International Court of Justice has expressed the view that low-tide elevations, outside a State’s territorial sea, cannot be the subject of national appropriation.[1] The Chinese have disputed this proposition,[2] but since the Tribunal has declined to rule on any question relating to sovereignty the Tribunal will presumably not give its opinion on the issue.

And actually there is a fourth category, namely “artificial islands”. Under Article 60(8) of UNCLOS they “do not possess the status of islands.” But again the term “artificial island” is not defined. If a State takes a naturally occurring feature above water at high tide which is (say) one metre across and then builds around it so that it becomes ten kilometres across, is the resulting feature an artificial island? From press reports that issue could become live in the South China Sea, but it does not seem to be raised by this case.

But the key point from the perspective of this litigation is that a decision particularly on whether a feature is a rock for the purposes of Article 121(3) or whether it is a low-tide elevation will require an investigation of the facts. That is obviously going to create serious difficulties for the Tribunal if only one party is present to adduce evidence. The problems of interpreting Article 121(3) have been alluded to above, but it is also not straightforward to decide whether or not a feature is a low-tide elevation. One will of course need expert hydrographic information on whether it is above water at low tide and below water at high tide.

So, that is what is meant by the “status cart.” So how did it get ahead of the sovereignty horse?

It is important to note that, in its Award, the Tribunal accepted that it did not have jurisdiction to decide on the sovereignty of land features in the South China Sea.[3] China had argued in a paper presented to the Tribunal that the “real issue” in the case was about sovereignty.[4] Because China did not appear at the hearing, it will never be known whether this argument could have been developed further and more convincingly at the oral hearing. On the other hand, Counsel for the Philippines on several occasions disclaimed any intention to seek a ruling on sovereignty over any feature in the South China Sea.[5]

The Tribunal distinguished the recent decision in the case brought by Mauritius about the Chagos Marine Protected Area on the basis that two of Mauritius’ submissions required an “implicit decision on sovereignty” and that sovereignty was “true object” of Mauritius’ claim.[6] The Tribunal reached the conclusion that none of the Philippines’ submissions required “an implicit determination of sovereignty.”[7] In other words, the Tribunal decided that it could rule on the status of various features even though the sovereignty over those features is disputed, and even though it concedes that it has no jurisdiction to decide that dispute.

In addition, the Tribunal says it will proceed on the premise that China is correct in its assertions of sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys.[8] So, the Tribunal will apparently work on the basis that Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys belong to China even though it is common knowledge that this proposition is strongly contested.

Below is a table showing the Tribunal’s conclusions on jurisdiction on each of the nine submissions made by the Philippines which deal with the status of features in the South China Sea.[9] (There are other submissions which do not involve questions of status.)

It is to be noted that in relation to two such submissions the Tribunal said that it unequivocally had jurisdiction; in relation to two others it had jurisdiction subject to caveats; and five other submissions were joined to the merits, because in order to rule on them a decision on the status of a feature referred to in the submission, or a decision on the status of other features, is a necessary pre-condition for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction.

In relation to category (D) in the table, the reason that the status of other features is relevant is that, if a feature claimed by China within 200 nautical miles of the activities covered by submissions 5, 8 and 9 is held to be an island, then there would be an issue of maritime delimitation – which is also outwith the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

To summarise, it would appear that there are nine Philippines’ submissions which involve the status of features. In dealing with these nine submissions, the Tribunal will have to decide on the status of nine specific, named features. In addition for the purpose of disposing of three of the nine submissions, the Tribunal will have to decide on the status of certain other features. How many of these other features there are is unclear from the Award.

As indicated above, if China continues to absent itself from the proceedings – and therefore the Tribunal only receives evidence from one source – the Tribunal may find it challenging to answer the factual questions necessary to enable it to decide on the status of these features.

The real question is whether it was appropriate for the Tribunal to put the status cart before the sovereignty horse.

In relation to each of the nine specific features, as well as possibly in relation to other features covered by the submissions in category (D), the Tribunal will be deciding on the status of the feature, i.e. into which of the categories outlined above it falls. These decisions will be binding on the parties. So, if either China or the Philippines has sovereignty over any of these features, then it will be bound by the Tribunal’s decision as to its status – but it would not of course be binding on Vietnam, if in fact it is Vietnam which has sovereignty over that feature.

It would seem that there is no precedent for an international tribunal deciding on the status of a feature when the sovereignty over that feature is disputed between the parties and the parties have not consented to the tribunal making such a decision. At the hearing, Judge Pawlak asked the Philippines’ legal team if they could quote a precedent,[10] but it does not seem that they were able to do so. Equally, however, there seems to be no precedent for a tribunal declining jurisdiction in such a case.

So, in entering uncharted waters, should the Tribunal have been cautious, and declined jurisdiction? Or should we applaud the Tribunal for being bold?

Furthermore, one principle which was not raised was this: as a judicial body should the Tribunal have declined to decide the posterior question, ie the status of the features, when it cannot decide the anterior question, i.e. sovereignty? And indeed, the anterior question is hotly disputed.

When asked to give an advisory opinion, the ICJ said in one case that it must “protect the integrity of the Court’s judicial function” and must “satisfy itself as to the propriety of the exercise of its judicial function;”[11] and in another that it must consider whether answering the request for an advisory opinion “would render the existence of the Court’s jurisdiction improper and inconsistent with the Court’s judicial function.”[12] One might argue that the same underlying theme can be seen where the ICJ has referred to “the fundamental principles of its Statute”[13] when declining to adjudicate upon a dispute when not all necessary parties are before the Court.

The question is whether these statement reflect a wider principle of judicial behaviour. Might they be generalised to suggest that in a case such as this a tribunal should have declined jurisdiction? Of course, that point was not one which Philippines would make – and China debarred itself from making it by refusing to appear. But if that point had been made to the Tribunal, might it have caused them to pause?

So, the Tribunal’s Award raises have a number of questions about the appropriateness of the Tribunal proceeding in this case. To come back to the title: was it appropriate for the Tribunal to put the status cart before the sovereignty horse?

Chris Whomersley is former Deputy Legal Adviser for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom

TABLE: PHILIPPINES SUBMISSIONS INVOLVING THE STATUS OF FEATURES WITHIN JURISDICTION

3 – STATUS OF SCARBOROUGH SHOAL (island/rock?)

7 – STATUS OF JOHNSON REEF, CUARTERON REEF, FIERY CROSS REEF (island/rock?)

WITHIN JURISDCITION, SUBJECT TO A CAVEAT ABOUT POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF OVERLAPPING ENTITLEMENTS
4 – STATUS OF MISCHIEF REEF, SECOND THOMAS SHOAL, SUBI REEF (low-tide elevations?)

6 – STATUS OF GAVEN REEF, MCKENNAN REEF (INC HUGHES REEEF) (low-tide elevations?)

JOINED TO MERITS: DEPENDS ON STATUS OF THE FEATURE
12 – CHINA’S ACTIONS ON MISCHIEF REEF

14 – CHINA’S ACTIONS ON SECOND THOMAS SHOAL

JOINED TO MERITS: DEPENDS ON STATUS OF OTHER FEATURES

5 – MARITIME ENTITLEMENTS

8 – INTERFERENCE WITH PHILIPPINES’ ACTIVITIES

9 – CHINESE FISHING ACTIVITIES

[1] Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 2001, page 40, at page 102, paragraphs 204-9; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Colombia v. Nicaragua), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 2012, page 624, at page 641, paragraph 26.

[2] Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, paragraph 25.

[3] Paragraphs 152-3 of the Award (hereafter references to paragraph numbers are to paragraphs of the Award).

[4] Position Paper (footnote 2 above), section II.

[5] Paragraph 153.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Paragraphs 397 – 412

[10] Final Transcript Day 3 (13-07-2015), page 62, lines 10-13.

[11] Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, I.C.J. Reports, 2010, page 403, at pages 415-6, paragraphs 29 and 31.

[12] Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, I.C.J. Reports, 2004, page 136, at page 156, paragraph 43.

[13] East Timor, I.C.J. Reports, 1995, page 90, at page 101, paragraph 26; affirming Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, I.C.J Reports, 1954, page 19, at page 33.