Commentary by:
Associate Professor, Institute of International Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
Cover Image: Pixabay
How to deal with a rising China has become America’s primary strategic issue since the 2008 financial crisis. In many American scholars’ views, with its emergence as the world’s second largest economy, China is becoming more and more assertive, and becoming more and more aggressive in the maritime territorial dispute with its neighbors. Most importantly, the US is very concerned that a rising China will take actions to challenge and replace its leadership in East Asia. All of this has triggered significant debate regarding China policy in the US. Many leading scholars and think tanks believe that the current strategy of cooperation has not achieved America’s strategic objectives—in short, that the engagement strategy has failed. Some American Scholars think that the domestic consensus on engagement has fallen apart, and some have suggested that U.S should adopt a tougher policy toward China.
Yet if we think the engagement strategy has indeed failed, it is really because the US has been pursuing the wrong goals and with the wrong intentions. The cooperation relationship with China isn’t wrong itself, and the collaborative relationship has brought huge strategic benefits to United States. This policy of cooperation should not be reconsidered. Rather, it is America’s goals and intentions that need adjustment.
What does Sino-US cooperation bring to the world and to the US? It brings peace and prosperity, with the US benefitting the most. The policy of reform and opening up pushed China’s integration into the international system, which was an important condition for the expansion of US power in the post-Cold War era. Without strategic cooperation with China, it would have been difficult for the United States to increase its global influence throughout that period, and America’s leadership would not have become so established globally. The pursuit of cooperation under the engagement strategy is very helpful to America’s strategic interests. It promotes the global expansion of the United States in such a way that “globalization” has become “Americanization.” This has been a foundation of long-term economic growth in U.S in the Post-Cold war. If it is necessary for U.S to adjust the engagement strategy, what should be changed is not the policy of cooperation, but using cooperation as a means toward the strategic end of maintaining hegemony.
The strategic goal or intention behind the engagement strategy has been to shape China by bringing it into an international system and international order that is dominated by the US, and then pressure China to conform to America’s vision for it. Essentially, this is a huge and impractical goal. The strategic objectives of the United States with regard to China have two aspects: the first is to establish American-style democracy in China—to change China from the inside; the second is to bring China into the post-WWII international system that was constructed by the US—to tame China from the outside to conform to the strategic interests of the United states. In reality, the two objectives are very difficult, if not impossible to achieve.
In the case of the first US goal, different cultures have different democratic systems: China and the United States have different civilizations and political cultures, which means that between China and the United States, the same democratic notions are bound to produce different forms of institutions. American democracy is not suitable for China’s national conditions, and it is impossible to establish in China. It is clearly not feasible to make China’s democratization an objective of the engagement strategy.
With regard to the second US goal, incorporating China into the international system that the United States established and using liberal norms to assimilate China into an international rules-based order will not cause China to relinquish its sovereignty and independence. Nor do they mean that China’s interests will be subordinated to the US under the common international rules. In fact, China is learning how to use international law to safeguard its national interests, and has a long history of opposing inequality in international relations. As China rises, its pursuit of a more equitable international political and economic order will only grow stronger. It is simply not feasible to use international standards to ensure China’s compliance with America’s strategic interests. China’s diplomatic behavior will grow increasingly in line with the common interests of international community, not just America’s.
All in all, the US engagement strategy has been motivated by two impossible goals. It is revealing that even when the United States makes significant other gains by cooperating with China, many American scholars are nonetheless disappointed by the engagement strategy. Ultimately this is because they judge the success or failure of engagement by reference to its unrealistic and impractical strategic intentions.
How should the United States adjust its China policy? Some American scholars have suggested that US take tougher policy toward China, either by containing or punishing China. These recommendations raise significant concerns. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the United States implemented a policy of containment and isolation for a long time, but the policy was certainly a failure. The United States had to return to the strategic orbit of cooperation with China in the Nixon era. Today, China is very different than it was then. It is broadly integrated with the rest of the world, and has become the world’s second largest economy. The gap in relative power between China and the United States continues to narrow and China and the United States have established relationships of mutual dependence in the economic, security and global governance domains, among others. It is very difficult for us to imagine the consequences of the US implementing strategy of containing China. The Chinese saying comes to mind, 杀敌一千,自伤八百, “sacrifice eight hundred men in order to kill one thousand.” It should be obvious that strategies of containing or acting tough on China lack sense, and would lead the US into the dead-end of power politics.
Since the cold-war thinking of containment is not feasible, how should U.S adjust its strategy of engagement with China? The first adjustment should be to abandon its unreasonable strategic objectives and build a China strategy on the basis of equality. China is very different from the United States, China has its own historical and national conditions, and its own political genetic makeup. Policymakers in the United States should realize that the engagement strategy is incapable of altering China’s path of developing its own model of socialism. The United States should not expect to transform China through “peaceful evolution.” Even if China somehow adopted American-style democracy, it would not behave according to America’s will. Russia introduced Western democracy after the cold war, but what happened? Russia’s experience with democracy has not improved its relations with the US, and it doesn’t conform to America’s strategic vision. The United States should not assume that the “peaceful evolution” of countries towards an American model will ensure alignment with its interests.
The second adjustment is that American needs embrace the concept of “harmony without sameness.” This idea can be found in traditional Chinese thought. It means even when there are differences between people, they can still enjoy peace, harmony and cooperation. China and the United States have very different histories, political systems and paths of development. These are not a reasons for them to clash with one another, but can be reasons for establishing mutual respect, exchange and a complementary relationship. Unfortunately, the logic of the US engagement strategy is precisely opposed to this thinking. Nonetheless, we are pleased to see that some of America’s friends have accepted the Chinese way of thinking on such matters. On September 17, President Xi Jinping had a meeting with some American business representatives and former officials in Beijing. They agreed that China and US should establish “harmony without uniformity,” and should build cooperative relations. If the United States adjusts its strategy towards this direction, then engagement with China will update to Version 2.0. This revised principle of engagement should not only be the mantra for US-China relations, but also for the entire world.
Third, the United States should be wary of the temptations of “global leadership” or hegemony. World politics is changing, all kinds of global issues and challenges will continue to arise that no single country can cope with alone. The world must work together to deal with global governance. This is a truth that United States also understands. In an increasingly interdependent world, leadership in global governance also means assuming greater responsibility, which is different from traditional hegemonic leadership. Unfortunately, the United States’ current engagement strategy is still to defend the international order with a view to maintaining America’s leadership. Assessed by this criteria, the strategy has been considered by many scholars to have failed already. If the United States still cannot resist the temptation of hegemony, and cannot, together with China and other big countries, assume the responsibilities and obligations of global governance the engagement strategy will not have a successful future, and it will be difficult for both China and the US to build a new type of great power relations.
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