Search
Close this search box.
Commentary

Significant Changes in Russia's Arctic Affairs are on the Horizon

August 25, 2022

COMMENTARY BY:

Nong Hong
Nong Hong

Executive Director & Senior Fellow
Head, Maritime Affairs Program

Cover Image: Arctic research station on Vize Island (Kara Sea, Russia) in September, 2014. (Credit: Ansgar Walk, CC3.0)

On July 31 2022, half a year after the Ukraine conflict, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree dictating a new Maritime Doctrine that outlines Russia’s key strategic priorities in marine and maritime development, stressing Arctic waters. Compared with two previous similar documents released in 2015 and 2001, this new Marine Doctrine reflects the positions of a more assertive Russia in conflict with neighbors, reiterating Moscow’s concern about the U.S. and NATO encroaching on Russia’s access to resources and transportation routes.  

This new Marine Doctrine comes at a time when Russia has encountered tremendous difficulties in maintaining its role in Arctic affairs due to the Ukraine conflict. In March 2022, the seven Arctic Council member states—Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States—issued a joint statement on Arctic Council cooperation following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. According to this statement, the representatives from these countries will not travel to Russia, the current chair of Arctic Council for meetings. They will also temporarily pause participation in all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies, which indicates grave impediments to international cooperation in the Arctic.

To date, the West’s economic sanctions to cut Russia off from the world’s financial arteries have been the most potent reaction to the Ukraine crisis. Another significant impact on Russia regarding its Arctic development can been seen from the overwhelming condemnation by scientists and research organizations worldwide. More specifically, some scientific institutions in Western nations quickly cut off funding and resources and end collaborations with Russian scientists. Scientists in Ukraine support such actions and are pressuring countries to freeze Russia out of their science programs while calling on Russian institutes and scientific leaders to condemn the invasion. For instance, in the United States, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology cuts ties with the Skolkovo Foundation, a Moscow-based non-profit organization focusing on innovation, which fueled international academic debate over continued collaboration with Russian science. Though it is unclear which scientific fields these funding cuts will impact, Arctic research will undoubtedly be impacted. The joint statement of the Arctic Council States to pause participation in all meetings of the Council is another example. Though the Arctic Council does not directly fund research, it helps set the scientific agenda for collaboration among member countries. The European Commission halted all funds for science collaborations involving Russia, followed by similar policies adopted by other funding agencies and institutions. 

The Ukraine conflict, while severing partnerships between researchers inside and outside of Russia across many fields of science, has a particularly profound impact on climate science in the Arctic. Russia’s territory makes up a huge portion of the Arctic region—all of which must be monitored to understand and successfully fight climate change. There is a decades-long tradition of scientific collaboration among nations in this region and Russian scientists play key roles in tracking changes such as permafrost degradation and methane emissions from warming landscapes. Thus, the war in Ukraine has presented a unique dilemma for climate researchers and scientists, some of whom are even repositioning themselves to adapt to a new normal—some are shifting to work in the North American Arctic, with others turning to remote-sensing technologies such as satellites to maintain essential measurements. 

Within the economic realm, Russia also faces obstacles in pursuing its Arctic development due to many of the foreign investments in the Russian Arctic being cancelled or suspended. China is seen as an uncertain card in the Arctic under the Ukraine crisis. On one hand, with the outbreak and subsequent escalation of the Ukraine crisis, Beijing has been seeking to retain a certain degree of non-alignment in the crisis thus far. On the other hand, under the pressures of being widely seen as providing an economic lifeline for the Putin regime in the wake of multiple Western sanctions, Beijing has started to take certain measures such as including some Chinese state banks’ announcement to limit financing for Russian commodities purchases. In the past, Chinese shipping companies, including COSCO, have sent a number of ships across Russia’s Northern Sea Route, carrying big industrial modules and components. However, China has appeared to shun the north Russian waters this year so far despite COSCO’s continued cooperation with Russia. For context, as of August 22, Rosatom, the managing body run by Russia’s state nuclear company, has granted sailing permission to a total of 869 vessels, most of which are Russian except for LNG carriers that shuttle to natural gas terminal.

The diminishing economic activities in Russia’s Arctic and the suspension of fundings for many scientific projects involving Russia have invited worries on what measures Russia will take to solve the problem. The recently-signed Marine Doctrine places significant emphasis on the Arctic, outlining the country’s priorities in the region and mentioning the Arctic 66 times across 22 pages. This is compared to 29 mentions of the Arctic in the 2015 version and only 11 times in the one from 2001. Furthermore, the document seems to put more focus on pursing its national security, identifying American and NATO maritime activities in the Arctic as major security threats. Putin described a plethora of measures Russia would engage in to enhance the Navy’s warfare capabilities in both the Arctic and the world’s oceans. This new Marine Doctrine also outlines plans for naval development, including the building of aircraft carriers and a higher level of engagement of civilian ships in military activities. Though it is not a new phenomenon for civilian ships being given a role in national security preparedness as well as military conflicts, and Russia also has a long experience in applying non-military ships for military purposes, this new Marine Doctrine clearly prepares the ground for a more systematic approach. This proves again that the longstanding perception following the end of the Cold War that the Arctic region would benefit from a disconnect from security concerns in other parts of the world has lost its essence. Instead, the geopolitical importance of the Arctic region is coming back into focus with Russia’s full military escalation of Ukraine.