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Cover Image: The chamber of the UN Security Council in New York City (Photo Credit: CC BY-SA Gruban/Flickr/File)
Resident Senior Fellow
Enlargement of the UN Security Council (UNSC) is not unprecedented. In 1963, four non-permanent members were added to the five permanent members and six elected members that was originally laid down in the UN Charter. As the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations is commemorated later this month, there are calls once again for the reform and enlargement of the Council.
The current round of UN Security Council reform effort dates back to 1993, and a first round of inter-governmental negotiations (IGN) was conducted in February 2009. There is a broad consensus on a number of points of UNSC reform: that the reform effort should be approached from a comprehensive point of view, that the Council must become more “broadly representative” and in tune with the contemporary global realities, that the overall number of seats on the Council must be expanded, and that the role of Africa must be better reflected on the Council and within the Council’s work.
There are three major country and regional blocs championing alternative models of reform. The African Group seeks no fewer than two permanent seats, with all the prerogatives of membership including the right of veto, and five non‑permanent seats too. The G4 comprising Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, envisages an expansion of both the permanent and non-permanent member categories, with the additional permanent slots assigned to themselves and two to African countries. Arrayed against the G4 is the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) Group of ‘middle power’ states which is opposed to the expansion of the UNSC’s permanent membership category (expansion runs counter to the principle of multilateralism they aver) but is in favor of doubling the number of non-permanent seats. Country and regional groups are also divided on the question of the veto and the means of realizing regional representation on the Council.
The inter-governmental negotiations (IGN) process stewarding UNSC reform has been gridlocked over the past decade over the question of procedure: should a single, consolidated text reflecting divergent positions on UNSC reform that is to be narrowed down in subsequent negotiations come first or should informal negotiations precede the introduction of a concise single text that is based on a prior consensus on the guiding principles of reform.
The Permanent Five (P5) comprising China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States do not oppose expansion of the permanent member category, but beyond this point they don’t agree on much else related to Council expansion and reform. With Russia and the U.S., and probably China, laconic on the specifics of reform and loathe to compromise on their existing privileges and therefore slow-walking the IGN process, the essence of wisdom lies in first exploring red lines and possible limits of political will among the P5, before introducing a single text and structured discussions on UNSC reform within the broader membership.
On October 24, 1945, the United Nations (UN) officially came into being with the ratification of the Charter by the five permanent members of its Security Council – China, France, the Soviet Union [Russia], United Kingdom and the United States – as well as a majority of its founding Member States. Today, the UN Charter is the cornerstone of international law and no global organization enjoys the legitimacy, convening power and normative impact as the UN. As the global institution commemorates the 75th anniversary of its founding on September 21, 2020, there are calls anew for a ‘reinvigorated multilateralism’, starting with the reform and modernization of its three principal organs – the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council. Given the extensive power and decision-making authority vested in the UN Security Council, this body has been the foremost locus of continuing reform-related endeavors.
Reform and enlargement of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is not unprecedented. In 1963, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1991A(XVIII) by way of which four non-permanent members were added to the five permanent members and six elected members that was originally laid down in the UN Charter. The increase in the Security Council’s membership from 11 to 15 seats was implemented in order to accommodate the increase in the UN’s membership – and aspirations – at the time, from the 51 founding Member States in 1945 which had grown to 113 by 1963. Today, with the strength of the UN’s membership standing at 193 and with global power distributed widely across numerous international state and non-state actors, there are renewed calls for the enlargement of the Security Council’s membership for it to better reflect and adapt to shifting geopolitical realities.
The effort to reform the UN Security Council, as currently constituted, dates back to December 1993 when the UN General Assembly established an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) “to consider all aspects of the question of increase in the members of the Security Council.” The process was energized in March 2005, when then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed two models of Security Council reform in preparation for a world summit at UN Headquarters that included the topic of UN reform. In the run-up to the summit, three groupings of countries – the Group of Four (G4) composed of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan; the African Group; and the 12-member Uniting for Consensus Group – placed forth their own reform-related proposals.
Following-on to the 2005 debate, the UN General Assembly adopted Decision 62/557 in September 2008 to initiate inter-governmental negotiations (IGN) on Security Council reform. Five key issues were to be discussed during the negotiations: (1) categories of membership to the Council (i.e. permanent, non-permanent, or a third option); (2) the question of the veto; (3) regional representation; (4) size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods; and (5) the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly. A first round of inter-governmental exchanges was held in February 2009. This first round marked a shift from the prior oral exchange of views on reform to a planned text-based negotiating format. While this constituted an undeniable sign of progress, and the IGN continued to meet in informal plenary after 2009, a common text was nevertheless hard to come by.
In 2015, to remedy this absence of a common text, the then-chair of the inter-governmental negotiations (IGN) on Security Council reform, Jamaica, placed forth a Framework Document outlining the various pillars of the proposed reform. The Document was a compilation of position submissions by 120 member states as well as letters from six groupings and Member States that did not want their proposals to be reproduced in the framework text due to process-related differences of approach to Security Council reform. The Framework Document was intended as an important stepping-stone towards a text-based negotiation. Rather than work through the positions of this Document however, new revised papers have instead been circulated by the IGN co-chairs in the period since. In July 2016, an Elements of Convergence paper was issued to help inform discussion of Security Council reform and, along these lines, the co-chairs of IGN GA73, Luxembourg and the United Arab Emirates, issued a Revised Elements of Commonality Paper in July 2019. At this time, the IGN co-chair-led discussions on UN Security Council reform has been temporarily shelved due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
There are three major blocs championing alternative – and, at times, competing – models of UN Security Council reform.
First, is the African Group composed of the 54 Member States of the African continent – by far, the largest regional group by number of Member States. The Group’s position is guided by the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration, which demand that Africa be allocated no fewer than two permanent seats on the Security Council, with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including the right of veto. Five non‑permanent seats should be allocated to Africa too. While Africa is opposed to the veto, so long as it exists and as a matter of common justice, its view is that the veto should be available to all permanent Council members. Criteria for the selection of the African members of the Security Council should be left to be determined by the assembly of heads of State and Government of the African Union. With regard to the IGN co-chair-led process, the African Group’s view is that the current negotiating framework does not facilitate for real give‑and‑take discussions, which would have been the case had it been based on a single, consolidated text. There needs to be greater openness, transparency, inclusiveness and attribution in the IGN-led procedures too.
Next, is the numerically narrow but politically muscular Group of Four (G4) comprising Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. The G4’s reform plan envisages an expansion of, both, the permanent and non-permanent member categories, with the additional permanent slots assigned to themselves and two (at minimum) to African countries. The non-permanent member category, meantime, should be expanded to 14-15 seats from the current 11, bringing the overall composition around the horseshoe table to 25-26. On the question of the veto, the G4 position is that while new permanent members must in principle have the same responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members, new permanent members should not exercise the veto-right until a decision on the matter is taken during a review period, to be held 15 years after the Security Council reform comes into force. Lastly, on procedural matters, the G4’s stand is that the IGN framework needs to be guided by the normal decision‑making requirements and working methods laid out in the UN Charter and in the rules and procedures of the General Assembly. A normal process in the UN system entails an initial sharing of views, followed by written documentation provided by those stewarding the process, which is then the basis for transparent give-and-take negotiations through attributed additions, deletions or amendments. While a normalized process does not guarantee results, it does express the good faith and sincerity of the entire membership. The IGN co-chair-led process, featuring an absence of official webcasts, official records, institutional memory and attribution of position in official documents, fails to currently do so.
The final major bloc is the numerically larger grouping of geographically-dispersed ‘middle power’ countries, including Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, Spain, and Turkey, among others, joined together under the banner of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) Group. The UfC Group do not favor an expansion of the UNSC’s permanent membership category but are in favor of a doubling of the number of non-permanent seats within the Security Council. In the UfC Group’s view, adding new members to the Council’s permanent seating roster would only add more countries to the list enjoying exclusive privileges, a notion that runs counter to the very idea of multilateralism and which will only complicate the ability to resolve current and future global challenges. The need of the times, rather, is to encourage a world order that is more rules-based, democratic, and pluralized; not preserve and entrench the power dynamics-based approach that was conceived 75 years ago. In this vein, the UfC Group proposes new, longer‑term non‑permanent seats with the possibility of immediate re‑election, and an increase in the number of two‑year non‑permanent seats. Similarly, on the veto question, the Consensus Group does not support increasing the number of countries with such powers, which would make the Council less transparent and efficient. Rather, the power of veto should rather be limited or abolished. Lastly, on the IGN co-chair-led process, the temptation for quick-fix solutions should be avoided and a broadly consensual path to comprehensive UN Security Council reform maintained.
CHINA: China’s position is that it supports “reasonable and necessary reform” of the UN Security Council, with priority placed on increasing representation and “giving a say” to other Member States, especially those in Africa. Reform must increase opportunities for small‑and-medium‑sized countries to participate in discussion, which is the only way to make the Council transparent and efficient. The final goal of UN Security Council reform should be to find a solution that accommodates the interests of all countries. Turning to the intergovernmental negotiations (IGN) process, the setting of artificial timelines and forcing through any premature agreements will only aggravate disagreements and confrontations. It is fundamental to listen, show respect for the various positions, and continue engaging in dialogue.
FRANCE: France’s position is that it envisions a UN Security Council that takes into account “new powers” in the world – those in particular that can take on new international responsibilities and make important contributions to the Council’s work. France favors enlargement of both categories: permanent and non‑permanent membership. Germany, India, Brazil and Japan should receive permanent seats, and Africa should be represented in both the permanent and non‑permanent categories. Together, the Council could be enlarged to include as many as 25 seats. These changes would make the Council more representative of today’s world while preserving its operational nature. Further, all permanent members should entirely suspend the veto in face of mass atrocities. With regard to process-related considerations, while reform of the Council is constantly debated, real negotiations are not undertaken. As such, moving forward, negotiations must be based on a draft document, which will make it possible for Member States to avoid endlessly repeating positions that are known by all.
RUSSIA: Russia’s position is that it seeks a more balanced UN Security Council by increasing the representation of developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Boosting Africa’s representation would “right [previous] wrongs”, as its presence in the Council’s work does not correspond with its importance in world affairs. Overall, the “compact character” of the Council should be maintained by limiting the number of seats to the low 20’s. Russia opposes reducing the prerogatives of current Council members, including the right of veto. In its view, veto use, and the threat thereof, has prevented the UN from being associated with “dubious ventures”. With regard to the current IGN process, despite the fact that 15 years of ongoing negotiations has delivered modest progress, patience and step‑by‑step work is the only way forward to advance Council reform. The current IGN platform has “unique and universal legitimacy” and moving away from it could lead to the collapse of the entire reform architecture and all progress could be lost. Should consensus on Security Council reform nevertheless remain elusive and the UN General Assembly become engaged, it is essential that much broader State support than the typical two‑thirds majority be obtained in order to advance Council reform.
UNITED KINGDOM: The UK’s position is that while many United Nations structures have evolved positively in the decades since their creation, the Council – lacking any expansion over the past five-and-a-half-decades – has lagged behind. The UK supports a “modest” expansion in both permanent and non‑permanent categories of membership, including the creation of new permanent seats for India, Germany, Japan and Brazil, and permanent African representation. The non‑permanent category should be expanded to enable broader participation on a rotating basis, bringing the Security Council’s overall membership to somewhere in the mid‑20s. Disagreement over the veto should not prevent progress in other areas – even as the UK has refrained from using this power since 1989 and would do so again only in exceptional circumstances. Lastly, the UK supports a code of conduct regarding Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
UNITED STATES: The U.S.’ position is that the intergovernmental negotiations framework remains the most appropriate forum to discuss UN Security Council reform. The U.S. remains open to the organ’s “modest” expansion in a way that does not diminish its effectiveness and efficiency. In the past, the U.S. has voiced its support for Japan’s and India’s candidature to seats on a reformed Council. In the U.S.’ view, given that the Council is an important tool in the global arena, prospective members must be ready to shoulder heavy international responsibilities. Any alteration of the Council’s composition, too, must occur by consensus. Regarding the power of veto, the U.S. opposes any alteration.
Source: United Nations General Assembly (2019)
In addition to these three major blocs, there are other groups – some with overlapping membership – championing agendas of reform. For example, the Arab Group advocates for a permanent Arab seat and a minimum of two non-permanent seats on the Security Council, given that several items on the Council’s agenda deal with Arab countries. The L69 Group is a collection of developing countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific which is focused on broader representation of developing countries on the Security Council. And a cross-regional group of two-dozen or so small and medium-sized states ranging from Austria, Chile, Ghana, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Uruguay, united the banner of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group, is primarily focused on improving the working methods of the Security Council. In October 2015, the ACT group unveiled a Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and, as of early-2020, the Code had garnered 120 supporters, including P5 members France and the United Kingdom.
More than a decade after the commencement of inter-governmental negotiations (IGN) on Security Council reform, there is little to show by way of substantive forward progress. There are elements of commonality, nonetheless, that can be gleaned from an analysis of the position statements of the key blocs championing alternative models of reform.
First, all countries agree that reform of the UN Security Council is a consequential, once-in-a-generation endeavor and that it should be approached from a comprehensive point of view. There must be no piecemeal approach to reform. The negotiations should proceed based on the principle that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. The (five) key reform-related topics are interlinked and must be addressed in concert.
Next, there is a broad consensus that the overall number of seats on the UN Security Council needs to be expanded. Typical views place the size of a reformed UNSC somewhere between the low-20s to the mid-to-upper 20s, from the current 15. There is an equally broad consensus that the category of non-permanent members must increase, in the context of this expansion of the size of the Security Council. While there are divergent views on adding additional permanent members – and thereby entrench the existing insider-outsider dispensation, there are no two views on the need for additional non-permanent membership representation on the Council.
Third, there is cross-cutting unity across country groups that a reformed UN Security Council must become more “broadly representative” and in tune with the realities of the contemporary global order – not the realities of the immediate post-1945 order or the early-1960s order. Foremost, this means greater representation of the developing world at the horseshoe table, and particularly for under-represented regions and groups, such as the Small Island Developing States and other small and medium-sized states. The days of a select handful of states arrogating the role of judge, jury and executioner needs to be diluted. That said, a balance between representativeness and effectiveness of an enlarged Council must be borne in mind.
Fourth, there is a broad consensus that the aspirations and role of Africa needs to be better reflected within the Council, including in its permanent membership category (if this category of membership is expanded). Given that the Council devotes almost two-thirds or more of its work to the continent, Africa’s representation on the Council is essential. African countries enjoy the unique privilege of being the only geographically discrete group of countries identified by a significant majority of the membership as meriting an automatic permanent berth/s on the UN Security Council. There is considerable support for the Common African Position. For the other key groupings canvassing their respective case for a seat on an expanded Council, it doesn’t hurt to tie one’s candidature to and back a by-and-large homogeneous 54-member group that votes en bloc.
Finally, there is a loose consensus that the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly should be mutually reinforcing and complementary, in accordance with their respective functions, authority, powers, and competencies enshrined in the UN Charter. Importantly, this includes matters related to international peace and security too. The General Assembly’s participation in and access to the work of the Security Council and its subsidiary organs should be improved in order to enhance the Council’s transparency and accountability to the larger UN membership.
The divergence in views among country blocs and regional groups on UNSC reform far outweigh their elements of convergence. The areas of divergence can be summarized under two broad heads: (1) process-related divergences, and (2) substance-driven divergences.
Process-Related Divergences
The UN membership is broadly divided into two bitter camps on the procedural aspects of carrying forward the exchanges within the co-chair-led inter-governmental negotiations (IGN) framework. At risk of over-simplifying the debate, it can be characterized as one between an immediate text-based approach versus an initial principles-based approach to reform. As per the former view, which is held by a numerically larger group of countries and blocs, the negotiating process should follow the practices set by established UN processes. This would entail an initial sharing of views, followed by written documentation provided by those stewarding the process, which is then the basis for transparent give-and-take negotiations through attributed additions, deletions or amendments. The current absence of a single consolidated text does not allow for such give-and-take discussions to form, in turn leaving differences unabridged. As per the latter view of the numerically smaller camp but critically including a majority of the P5 powers, a broad consensus on core principles of reform should be agreed-upon first before producing a single negotiating text and proceeding with text-based discussions.
In a nutshell, on the question of procedure, the membership is trapped in a ‘chicken-or-the-egg’ dilemma: should the single text with divergent positions that is to be narrowed down in subsequent negotiations come first or should informal negotiations precede the introduction of a concise single text that is based on a prior consensus on the guiding principles of reform? Linked to this divide over text-based v. principles-first approach is the mode of decision-making to be adopted in this regard. Is a super-majority of the UN membership a sufficient threshold to determine that the parleys should now be rendered into a workable negotiating text? The numerically larger group favoring a text-based approach imply so. Or must a full consensus be awaited first – one that discards the temptation for quick-fix solutions with artificial timelines and allows for a free-flowing debate, given the grave significance of UNSC reform? The latter camp favoring a principles-based approach argue so. The unwillingness of three key Permanent Five (P5) members, China, Russia and the U.S., to have their positions officially recorded in the body of the IGN chair’s framework text appears to suggest that they clearly lean in favor of the latter approach, and that the IGN process should continue informal parleys at this time without a single text – even at a snail’s pace if that so be the case.
Substance-Driven Divergences
There are diverging views on which of the models of Security Council expansion best reflects the realities of the contemporary world. While there is a rough-and-ready congruence of opinion within the membership on (1) the need for an enlarged Security Council and (2) the imperative to improve Security Council-General Assembly coordination and accountability, there is a particularly wide range of opinion on the other three issue clusters: (3) categories of membership; (4) the question of the veto; and (5) regional representation.
Categories of Membership: A range of Member State and bloc preferences have been expressed for one of more the following options:
enlargement of the Security Council in, both, the permanent and 2-year non-permanent categories;
enlargement of the Security Council in the permanent category but without veto power as well as in the 2-year non-permanent category;
enlargement of the Security Council in the non-permanent category only. This could include the creation of longer-term non-permanent seats with the possibility of immediate reelection; as well as the maintenance, and potential expansion in the number of existing 2-year non-permanent seats.
As earlier noted, there are no two views on the need to add non-permanent membership representation on the Council. There is far less consensus however on enlargement of the sensitive category of permanent membership. There is entrenched opposition in particular from the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) Group. While it may be tempting to tar the group as a coterie of disgruntled middle powers seeking to throw a wrench in the aspirations of the G4 countries – Mexico and Argentina vis-à-vis Brazil; Spain and Italy vis-à-vis Germany; Pakistan vis-à-vis India; South Korea vis-à-vis Japan – the legitimacy of their view that the expansion of a select category of insiders with exclusive privileges runs counter to the principles of multilateralism and pluralism, cannot be summarily dismissed. Besides, the views of countries as geographically and culturally diverse as Canada, Colombia and Turkey, and with less of an ax to grind vis-à-vis the G4, should be entertained respectfully. For their part, China, France, Russia, UK and the U.S. do not oppose expansion of the permanent member category, but beyond this point they don’t agree on much else related to the Council’s expansion.
The Question of Veto: A plethora of options are again on the table. They include:
In the case of enlargement of the Security Council in the permanent category (a) extension of the veto to all permanent members, (b) no extension of the veto, or (c) extension of the veto to be decided on in the framework of an overall review conducted after UNSC reform comes into effect;
Progressive restraint in use of veto;
Abolition of the veto;
Opposition in principle to the veto with the caveat that as long as it exists, it should be made available to all acceding permanent members of the Council;
Voluntarily refrain from the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocity crimes, as per a proposal initially presented by France and Mexico.
About the only aspect of the veto question that is conclusive is that Russia and the U.S. (and probably China too) are adamant that they will not cede this power under any circumstance.
Regional Representation: As earlier noted, there is a wide consensus that the Security Council, and global governance structures more broadly, must become more representative of underrepresented groups. There is less consensus on how such regional and group representation is to be realized. Views range from the role of regional groups in self-selecting new members to sit on their behalf on the Security Council, to the distribution of additional non-permanent member seats among regional groups, to the possibility of reflecting an enhanced role for regional groups and organizations in the fields of peace and security, to the clarification of the very concepts of “equitable geographic distribution” and “regional representation”.
In August 1941, on a cruiser off the coast of Newfoundland, President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill proclaimed the Atlantic Charter, a set of common principles that detailed their vision and aims for the war and the postwar world thereafter. The Charter would become one of the first key steps toward the establishment of the United Nations in October 1945. Although the Atlantic Charter framed the problem of postwar security in entirely Wilsonian terms and did not even once refer to power-based considerations, the founding Member States of the UN were alert to the need to superimpose such power considerations on the institutional management of peace and security. The Security Council’s exclusive permanent membership, along with privileged veto power, was the answer to this need.
On the 75th anniversary of the UN’s founding, as today’s multipolar order strives for a restructured Security Council balance between representativeness and effectiveness, it is imperative that this bow to power relations as well as the Permanent Five’s (P5) privileges be retained. Enlargement of the Council entails amendments to Article 23 of the UN Charter. Amendment of the Charter, as per Article 108, requires the assent of all permanent members of the Security Council – at minimum. Willy-nilly, the P5 must all be on board for any Council reform to succeed. With Russia and the U.S. – and probably China – laconic on the specifics of reform and loathe to compromise on their existing privileges and, effectively, slow-walking the IGN process therefore, the essence of wisdom lies in exploring the ‘red lines’ and possible limits of political will, first, among the UN’s most influential stakeholders, especially the five permanent Council members. From that point on, a single draft text could thereafter be introduced and a structured discussion on UNSC reform, guided by UN system work procedures and refereed by super-majority voting rules, could be initiated.
The obverse would be to continue rolling the veritable Sisyphean boulder of UN Security Council reform up the hill only to have it roll down repeatedly until and beyond the UN’s 100th anniversary in 2045 – consigning the obsolescing global governance structure even less purpose-fit to address the challenges of peace and security in the 21st century.
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