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Trump touts economic success, but is that what North Korea wants?

Blog Post By: 

Wentao Hui & Xue Lin
Research Assistant Interns

Taking place at a highly symbolic location, Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam, the second Trump-Kim Summit intended to use Vietnam’s free-market victory as a model for North Korea, which might develop similarly through reform and openness. However, seen from the perspective of the Kim regime, Vietnam’s success in forcing an American withdrawal and reunifying a divided nation under a communist government offers more inspiration to North Korea than its later economic success.

But the situation between North Korea and Vietnam is not the same. Vietnam, a communist nation, is not juxtaposed with a prosperous “other” Vietnam in the south the way North Korea is on a split peninsula. Kim Jong Un shows no sign of giving up what his grandfather dreamed of- the reunification of Korea under Pyongyang. Furthermore, an open North Korea could potentially challenge the legitimacy of its authoritarian ruler if its citizens are awakened to the reality of the democratic and far more affluent South Korea.

Fundamental differences remained between the two leaders’ stances at the conclusion of the second summit. North Korea demanded an easing of sanctions, neutralize the military threat from the U.S., and economic assistance to accelerate economic development, while President Trump sought a diplomatic triumph with unilateral and verifiable denuclearization.

Vietnam is certainly a shining model for North Korea, but not in the way the Trump administration had expected. Trump’s Wednesday tweet on North Korea’s economic potential seems to assume that economic opening will happen overnight once the country relinquishes its nuclear power, but back in Pyongyang, the ruling party’s daily newspaper, Rodong Sinmun printed a commentary vowing the nation will stay the course the Kim family has set for the past three generations.

“The revolutionary cause of juche (self-reliance) and the cause of socialism are sure to triumph” under the guidance of the party and the people “who remain faithful to the cause of the party with indomitable mental power,” it said.

Why was there no deal?

Although the much anticipated Trump-Kim summit meeting created a fanfare, it ended abruptly. Why? Trump attributed the collapse of talks to a disagreement over sanctions: “It was about the sanctions. Basically, they wanted the sanctions lifted in their entirety, but we couldn’t do that.”

However, hours later, at a late-night press conference, North Korea’s foreign minister, Ri Yong-ho, contradicted Trump’s remarks, saying DPRK only sought a “partial” lift of sanctions — those that “hamper the civilian economy, and the livelihood of all people in particular” — in exchange for dismantling main enrichment capabilities for fissile material.

The dispute over sanctions is a prima facie reason. The underlying problem is the poles-apart interpretations of “denuclearization of the Peninsula” from both sides. The U.S. demands verifiable unilateral disarmament of nuclear weapons from the DRPK. Hence, the bottom line for the U.S is the DPRK’s commitment to surrendering all its nuclear arsenal and facilities in the first place before the U.S. proceeds to ease the noose of sanctions.

DPRK, on the other hand, demands a guarantee of non-aggression from the U.S. For the DPRK, a complete denuclearization comes after, and only after, establishing “new U.S.-DPRK relations” and building a “peace regime” with the United States. It fears that the lure of the Vietnam example is simply a Trojan Horse.

Beneath the veneer of a blossoming relationship between the two leaders, the deep-rooted distrust between both sides likely decided the outcome before the summit even began. Although It is not clear if Trump and Kim will resume the talks again in the near-term, this deadlock further entrenched the idea that both sides are likely to remain inflexible for future negotiations.

Xue Lin is a research assistant at ICAS and a M.A. candidate at Johns Hopkins SAIS in Washington, D.C.

Wentao Hui is a research assistant at ICAS and a M.A. candidate at the George Washington University Elliot School of International Affairs.

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