U.S. Congressional Visits Jeopardize Taiwan’s Interests, and Its Own

Since Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in 2022—the first U.S. House Speaker visit since 1997—U.S. lawmakers in various congressional roles have made increasingly more frequent visits to Taiwan, nearly doubling their frequency from 2022 to 2023. These lawmakers have framed congressional visits as a necessary move to “underscore and reaffirm…[the U.S.’s] strong bipartisan support for the Taiwanese people.” Yet, despite these intentions, these visits ultimately contradict the priorities of Taiwan’s democratic will and hurt U.S. strategic interests.

Taiwan’s core priority is its economic prosperity. Its people overwhelmingly prioritize the economy over other political issues. A poll conducted right before Taiwan’s 2024 election showed that 48.4% of the respondents chose “Economy” as their most important election issue. In comparison, the second most important election issue—“Cross-strait relations” —received only 29.1% of the respondents’ concern. It was closely followed by “Housing Prices” at 28% and “Salary” at 26.5%.

Under this context, there is a notable disconnect between the priorities of the people of Taiwan and the focus of the U.S. lawmakers’ visits. The lawmakers heavily emphasize security issues. Their discussions center around U.S. commitment in building Taiwan’s defense capabilities and “protect[ing its] democracy from the CCP [Chinese Communist Party].” Such rhetorics carry an implicit dichotomy that places Mainland China and Taiwan in opposition, and brew hostility. 

Yet, a stable relation with Mainland China is crucial to Taiwan’s economic prosperity. Mainland China has historically been Taiwan’s largest export market, and was only very marginally overtaken by the U.S. in 2024. Mainland China and Taiwan have further ratified the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) that provided tariff concessions on hundreds of goods. This agreement alone was estimated to have increased Taiwan’s economic growth by 1.7%. In comparison, Taiwan’s GDP growth was 1.31% in 2023.

It is evident that stability is important. However, such stability is founded upon a fragile status quo defined by the 1992 Consensus and Washington’s official One-China Policy. At the core, these are mutual recognition that there is only one legitimate Chinese polity while shelving almost every other political difference in ambiguity. Under the 1992 Consensus, Taiwan can maintain its political autonomy while Mainland China pursues peaceful—instead of forceful—reunification. Under the One-China Policy, the U.S. can continue its extensive yet unofficial relationship with Taiwan while retaining its diplomatic relations with China. Yet, all of these divergent strategic interests are unified under the mutual understanding that there is only “one China.” The reason is simple: it is the prerequisite for avoiding war in the Taiwan strait.

Under this context, U.S. congressional visits are concerning because they promote the very opposite of the 1992 Consensus and the One-China policy by creating the image of “One China, One Taiwan.” Washington’s publicized, quasi-diplomatic visits imply that the U.S. is attempting to establish de facto diplomatic relations with Taipei. The lawmakers’ rhetoric on the democracy-autocracy dichotomy, on the other hand, highlights the idea that Taiwan is a separate and different entity from China. Even more importantly, these visits’ emphasis on security suggests that Taipei and Washington are actively building up Taiwan’s military capacity—and inching closer towards future de jure Taiwan independence. 

The result is a closing escalation to conflict between the U.S., Mainland China, and Taiwan. Mainland China views the Taiwan issue to be “at the very core of China’s core interest” as a matter of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Therefore, Beijing reacts to these visits by conducting intensified, live-fire military exercises surrounding Taiwan, shifting to hardened rhetoric on reunification, and terminating tariff concessions in ECFA. All of these alter the status quo by introducing instability that could tip the delicate trilateral balance. 

Even worse, this escalation spirals. Heightened security risks and severing economic ties with Mainland China push Taipei closer to Washington for protection and trade. Interpreting this trend as a growing sentiment for independence, Beijing escalates its measures against Taiwan as a form of punishment. The spiral begins, and the status quo leans towards conflict. 

However, this is not what the people of Taiwan want. By 2023, 89% of the people in Taiwan support maintaining the status quo in some shape or form. The cause for immediate Taiwanese independence has also never attained more than 10% of the population’s support in the last 19 years, since 1994. The status quo is the best compromise for all parties involved. Yet, the status quo can only be achieved by returning back to the 1992 Consensus and the One-China policy, and by halting these congressional visits.

Admittedly, there are political reasons behind these congressional visits. In a survey conducted in September 2023, more than two-thirds of Americans supported a strengthening U.S.-Taiwan relationship and believed that the U.S. should intervene (economic sanction, military supply aid, etc.) in the case of an invasion of Taiwan. Taiwan serves a critical role in the U.S.-China competition. The island is a technological powerhouse; it is irreplaceable in the global semiconductor supply chain. Taiwan is also crucial to U.S. regional security interests as a part of the first island chain. It is therefore no surprise that Congress has oriented its focus onto Taiwan.

Yet, as the election for the U.S.’s 119th Congress approaches in November 2024, the entirety of the U.S. should think twice about its approach in supporting Taiwan. As a student from Taiwan, I am acutely aware of the dangers of a de-stabilized cross-strait. It not only poses risk to the global supply chain, but it further ramps up possibilities for military miscalculations between Taiwan, Mainland China, and the U.S. Especially as the U.S. has entered a period of great power competition with Mainland China, these developments threaten the already-tenuous relations with Mainland China and exacerbates tensions that could trickle into larger geopolitical conflicts. At the end, the right approach for the U.S. is not to aggravate tensions for Taiwan, but to restore a stable status quo—for itself, and for the people of Taiwan.