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Once seen as a remote Arctic wilderness, Greenland has emerged as a geopolitical hotspot in the 21st century. Beneath its icy terrain lies a trove of critical minerals — rare earth elements, uranium, zinc and nickel — key to powering the green energy transition and high-tech industries.
As the climate warms and ice retreats, global powers are racing to secure access to these resources. The US, China, and the EU have all staked political, economic and strategic claims on Greenland’s future. But their competing approaches not only shape Greenland’s mining landscape — they also carry profound implications for Arctic governance, economic development, great power rivalry and Greenland’s path toward greater autonomy.
Greenlandic authorities responded to public concerns about radioactive waste while signalling wariness of growing Chinese influence.
The mineral wealth beneath the ice
Greenland’s geological makeup positions it as a future leader in the supply of critical raw materials. According to the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS), the island is home to significant reserves of rare earth elements (REEs), uranium, zinc, iron ore and niobium.
The Kvanefjeld project in southern Greenland, originally led by Greenland Minerals Ltd. and backed by Chinese interests via Shenghe Resources, was set to become one of the world’s largest REE and uranium mines. However, in 2021, Greenland’s new government banned uranium mining, effectively halting Kvanefjeld’s development.
This decision was both environmental and political. Greenlandic authorities responded to public concerns about radioactive waste while signalling wariness of growing Chinese influence. Yet the appetite for mining remains strong. Greenland has issued dozens of exploration licenses, and new projects — like zinc mining in Citronen Fjord or rare earth prospecting in Sarfartoq — continue to attract international interest.
US policy: security-driven investment
The US has taken a strategic approach to Greenland’s resources, viewing them through the lens of national security and supply chain resilience. In 2019, President Donald Trump famously floated the idea of purchasing Greenland — a move dismissed as absurd by many, but underscoring Washington’s deepening interest in the island. The same year, the US signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU)with Greenland to support sustainable mineral resource development. The next year, the US reopened its consulate in Nuuk and launched initiatives through the Department of State and US Geological Survey to support mining partnerships.
Through the Defense Production Act and the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) program, the US Department of Defence (DoD) began fundingrare earth supply chains free of Chinese involvement — including those potentially based in Greenland. These efforts aimed to secure critical materials for the defence and technology sectors and reduce dependency on China-dominated supply chains.
However, developments under the last two US administrations suggest a cooling of the relationship. Greenland’s Minister for Business and Mineral Resources Naaja Nathanielsen noted that the MOU on mineral cooperation signed during Donald Trump’s first term has expired, and efforts to renew it under President Joe Biden were unsuccessful. In May 2025, she criticised Trump’s renewed suggestion that the US might acquire Greenland, calling it “disrespectful and distasteful”. Her remarks reflect a broader sentiment in Greenland that US engagement in mining should be grounded in equal partnership and respect for Greenlandic sovereignty.
This reflects Nuuk’s realist approach to foreign engagement — China remains a viable partner, provided it adheres to Greenland’s conditions, including respect for sovereignty, environmental safeguards, and transparency.
China’s cautious yet persistent presence
China has long eyed Greenland as part of its Arctic economic strategy. Its 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper declared China as “Arctic stakeholder” and highlighted scientific research, infrastructure, energy and mineral development as key interests. Chinese firms, such as Shenghe Resources and China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), have attempted to invest in Greenlandic mining, notably in the Kvanefjeld and Isua Iron Ore Project Mine.
However, these efforts have encountered political headwinds. Greenland’s 2021 uranium ban was widely interpreted as a rebuke to Chinese involvement. In 2019, Danish intelligence reportedly warned that China sought to establish dual-use infrastructure in Greenland that could serve strategic or military purposes. This has increased Western wariness about Chinese investment.
Nonetheless, China remains engaged in Greenland. Its firms continue to hold minority stakes in certain projects and explore partnerships. Beijing’s global Belt and Road Initiative and growing Arctic diplomacy make Greenland a continued focal point for resource diplomacy. As global demand for REEs intensifies, China may recalibrate its strategy — balancing commercial interest with lower-profile engagement to avoid geopolitical friction.
Despite these constraints, Greenland has signalled a pragmatic openness to Chinese investment, warning that “if the US and EU do not act, we may turn to Chinese investment”. This reflects Nuuk’s realist approach to foreign engagement — China remains a viable partner, provided it adheres to Greenland’s conditions, including respect for sovereignty, environmental safeguards, and transparency.
Greenland welcomed the EU’s initiative, but Nathanielsen noted that the bloc has yet to translate its intentions into tangible investments.
The EU’s green demand and regulatory leverage
The EU pursues a different path — leveraging rules and norms to project soft power. Its 2020 Critical Raw Materials Action Plan and 2023 Critical Raw Materials Act aim to diversify and secure sustainable mineral supplies. Greenland, with its close historical ties to Denmark, is seen as a key non-Chinese source of rare earths in the EU’s strategic calculus.
Unlike the US security-driven model, the EU emphasises environmental protection, corporate social responsibility and Indigenous consultation. The 2023 EU-Greenland MOU on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains outlines cooperation on feasibility studies, environmental assessments, and local stakeholder engagement.
Greenland welcomed the EU’s initiative, but Nathanielsen noted that the bloc has yet to translate its intentions into tangible investments. What Greenland needs, she stressed, are real partners — not just verbal commitments.
Geopolitical and environmental implications
Greenland’s mining politics encapsulate broader Arctic shifts. As great powers increase their economic footprints, the island becomes a proxy arena for strategic competition. US-China rivalry is increasingly mirrored in resource diplomacy, while the EU acts as a normative power pushing environmental safeguards.
This dynamic raises two concerns. First, Greenland may become over-politicised. As its autonomy within the Kingdom of Denmark grows, Nuuk seeks to chart its own economic path. Yet external pressure risks reducing Greenlandic agency, especially if caught in US-China tension.
Second, the rush for minerals could undermine Arctic environmental standards. Greenland’s melting ice already symbolises global climate change. Without stringent safeguards, mining expansion could threaten fragile ecosystems and Indigenous livelihoods.
Nonetheless, there is also an opportunity. If managed transparently, mining could fuel Greenland’s economic self-reliance, support global green energy goals and demonstrate that Arctic resource development need not be a zero-sum game. This would require cooperation among major powers, respect for Greenlandic self-rule, and a clear regulatory framework — something that may prove elusive in today’s fractured global order.
The international community must support sustainable development that centres Greenlandic priorities, ensures environmental protections, and fosters transparency.
A test case for strategic sustainability
Greenland’s mining industry is more than a commercial venture — it is a litmus test for how major powers manage the intersecting challenges of climate change, resource competition, and Arctic governance.
The US frames Greenland as a strategic resource hub but has struggled to maintain consistent engagement beyond symbolic gestures and security-driven rhetoric. China sees it as a crucial node in its broader Arctic economic ambitions, yet faces political resistance and growing suspicion from Western actors. The EU, while positioning itself as a normative power committed to sustainability and ethical sourcing, has so far failed to translate its lofty principles into concrete investment or meaningful partnerships. Whether these visions eventually collide or coalesce will determine not only Greenland’s trajectory but also the future balance of power and governance norms in the Arctic.
To avoid turning Greenland into another arena of great power rivalry, the international community must support sustainable development that centres Greenlandic priorities, ensures environmental protections, and fosters transparency. Mining can be a driver of cooperation rather than confrontation — if approached with shared responsibility and respect for the Arctic’s fragile future.
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